n order ‘0 pfedict the future, it is wise to undertand the past. I will thereore briefly go over the iistory of nuclear power. ilthough I have been asked IO emphasize the possible role of nuclear power in developing countries, it is worthwhile to understand the situation in the developed countries first. In March 1939, with the discovery of nuclear fission and the measurement of 2.5 neutrons per fission, it became clear that a fast chain reaction suitable for an atomic bomb was possible; the possibility of a slow, stable chain reaction suitable
U
~
RICHARD WILSON Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 stations use the old technology of steam engines and turbines, the boilers are very different. The technologists of nuclear power must make a reactor that is stable against a l l normal changes; t h i s is a straightforward engineering prohlem that has been solved in most designs. Still, by 1970, nuclear fission boilers were soon adapted to the steam technology. Yankee Rowe nu-
fuel oil sludge commonly used in power plants. The future seemed limitless; an overenthusiastic chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, foolishly said that “electricity will be too cheap to meter” [although this was actually referring to his enthusiasm for nuclear fusion). However, by 1980 some environmentalists were actively opposing nuclear energy, and the costs had escalated. What had happened? Can we return to either the enthusiasm or the low cost? Should we try to return? Unfortunately it is hard to get clear and unequivocal answers to these questions.
THE= FUTURE .
I
for controllable power production was not proven for a few more years. It took the malization that 0.5% of the neutrons from fission are delayed by up to a few seconds, to enable a controllable reaction to be designed and achieved. As Enrico Fermi said: “Thank God for the delayed neutrons.” without which we could not have a nuclear power program. Nuclear power raises interesting scientific and technical issues. The first and most obvious method of using the power is the only one presently economically successful: to substitute a nuclear reactor for the coal-, oil-,or gasfired boiler in a n ordinary steam-generating power plant. This has the advantages of using two centuries of steam engine and turbine technology. But from a thermodynamic point of view this is inefficient; nuclear fission produces high temperatures (of a million electron volts or many millions of degrees compared to 1/30eV for thermal neutrons). Can we not use this fact to make a mom efficient cycle? Such considerations lead to thoughts of high-temperature gas cooled reactors, high-tempmature organic liquids, and even gas plasmas as heat transfer devices. But the technology for these has yet to become competitive. Although nuclear electric power
OF
\-
clear power plant was producing electricity a t a busbar cost of 0.95 cents per kWh according to ordinary utility calculations; Connecticut Yankee was finished in 1966 and was producing electricity for 0.55 cents per kWh. This was cheaper electricity than could be produced fromoil, even at the 1970 cost of $2 per barrel, or even the $1.40 sometimes charged for the
1116 Environ. Sci. Technol.. Vol. 26. NO.6, 1992
As early as 1975,US.antinuclear activists had begun their steady and successful attacks. It is inshctive to understand their methods. Although the public hearing process for individual power plants leaves more opportunity for intervention than that for other power plants, it is attacked as not beina o w n enough. n e r e is a r e a i o i for this. Many of the hndamental issues of nuclear power were decided at a generic level by Congress o r by generic hearings; for example. a n individual power plant hearing is not the place for discussion of proliferation of nuclear weapons. This led Ralph Nader 15 years ago to propose his successful strategy of using delays in the legal system to make nuclear power too expensive: this included controlling the local public utility commissions, which has proved so effective in stopping the power plant at Shoreham, NY.As Nader said early on:“We may lose every battle in the hearings, but we will win the war.” The U S . legal system is particularly suited to such tactics. Few, if any,
0013-936X/92/0926-1116$03.00/0 D 1992 American Chemical Society
courts are willing to admit that delay, in itself, deprives people of their legal rights.
The changes since 1970 It has been common for antinuclear activists to state that opposing nuclear power is not a technical but a moral issue, and that nuclear power is an evil. I suggest that although nuclear power may pose more moral issues than technical ones, it should be considered immoral to oppose a technology that can improve the living standards of a number of the world's poor. I will here discuss the nature of the changes between 1970 and 1985 in four roughly separable categories: the science, the technology, the economics, and the politics. Then I will discuss how in 1992 there are signs that some of them might be &--LT ~
Jf
SCIENTISTS FORGET TO REMIND PEOPLE OF THE HUGE DIFFERENCES IN TECHNOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND FOSSIL FUELS. There have been few changes in the scientific understanding of nuclear energy. One important though small change, however, is that a study of survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has shown that two to threetimes as many cancers are produced by a given radiation dose than F-...:,usly & L - ~ ~ I'But . the
effect is still not huge.) Such studies have been done by scientists at the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima. They found 5734 cases of cancer up to 1985, whereas 5472 would be expected on the basis of cancer rates in the general population. This is an increase of less than 300. or about 5% of the cancer rate and 1%of the total mortality rate. This change demands a correspondingly greater attention to radiation protection, but that is not hard to achieve. Nuclear technology has advanced considerably, and the understanding of the technology has advanced much more. There are many examples. In the early 19705, about 1%of all zirconium fuel rods leaked. releasing fission product gases to the coolant water. This caused unnecessary and undesirable radiation problems, particularly in boiling-
I NUCLEAR POW
I
!
a Environ. Sci. Technol.. Vol. 26. No. 6. 1992 1117
water reactors, where there is no heat exchanger to isolate radioactivity from the steam turbine system. By 1992 fuel fabrication had improved worldwide. For example, according to General Electric Co., the last 433,000 fuel rods they made had two leaks instead of 4000-one failure for every 10 years of operation. There is a continual discussion among those who argue for inherent safety and those who argue that engineered safeguards are adequate. Thirty years ago, U.S. engineers used the high energy density to achieve a compact core; but, for example, if cooling is lost, the reactor core will be damaged in a couple of h o u r s by t h e decay h e a t , even though the nuclear reaction has shut down. It is therefore vital to have emergency systems to cope with such a contingency promptly. The Soviet VVER 400 uses a less compact core which is inherently safer; as a result, the VVER in Armenia survived a fire in 1982 with a total loss of power for five hours without core damage, and a VVER in the Ukraine survived a similar eighthour isolation. This compensates, to some extent, for less reliable emergency engineered safeguards. With many years of experience with designing, licensing, and operating light water reactors, nuclear reactor designers are now able to incorporate more “inherently safe” systems in crucial places and to restrict the number of places where engineered safeguards are needed. This enables designers and operators to understand those places where failures are most likely to occur and to ensure that the engineered safeguards work. One important problem not recognized 30 years ago is how to ensure cooling of the reactor core when bad weather or other catastrophe disconnects the power plant from the electricity grid. Reliable and redundant backup generators and a large time constant are important safety mechanisms. Whatever way the nuclear industry decides to use these new developments, it is likely that all the newer reactors that are proposed have a probability of catas t r o p h i c a c c i d e n t that is 1 0 to 100 times smaller than their predecessors at the time the predecessors were first proposed. cost
It is harder to understand the increase in cost. In 1961 Yankee Rowe cost $40 million for 180 MWe installed capacity. In 1966 Connecti1118
c u t Yankee cost $120,000,000$160,000,000 ( d e p e n d i n g u p o n one’s estimate of the value of government subsidies) for 550 MWe ($250 per kWe installed). In 1972 Maine Yankee cost $200,000,000 for 800 MWe (also $250 per kW installed). But this cost increased 1 0 % w h e n Maine Yankee was forced to spend an extra $20 million to revise the cooling water system to meet objections from environmentalists raised after the initial design had passed the construction public hearing. This increase was just the beginning. Now even the best plants cost $2000 per kW. This increase far exceeds t h e threefold inflation since 1972. The operating costs have also increased, so that whereas in 1970 nuclear-produced electricity was competitive with that from oil and coal, in 1990 it had become more expensive, even though the cost of using oil and coal also increased i n this period. This runs counter to all previous experience. One expects that costs will come down as new technology is learned! A part of what happened is due to interest charged on capital during the construction period. Interest rates have increased because of inflation since 1970; total interest charges have also increased because of delays. The long delays have been due in large part to increased licensing requirements (though some older plants have had retrofits and the cost of those does not make up the difference in cost), in part to public opposition, and in part to reduced competence of the utilities. Because we do not know the detailed reasons for this increase in cost, it is hard to predict when or even whether the costs will decrease again. Politics The politics of nuclear power stems from the public’s lack of understanding and fear of this technology. People do not know, and scientists forget to remind them, of the huge differences i n technological possibilities between nuclear and fossil fuels: The energy density is 3 million times as great-the weight of coal needed to produce a certain amount of energy is three times that of uranium 235. This difference is the difference between chemical and nuclear energy densities. The difference in energy density leads to many environmental advantages. The quantity of fuel is small enough that we can afford to chemically purify the uranium both before and after fission, which is not
Environ. Sci. Technol., Vol. 26,No. 6, 1992
possible with fossil fuel. Although the waste products are highly toxic, they can be kept concentrated and their volumes small. T h e waste products from fossil fuel, particularly coal burning, are also toxic, and their volume is inevitably a million times larger. Indeed, they contain chemicals that are chemically toxic and others that are radioactive. Studies such as one done 1 4 years ago by the American Physical Society show that the total radioactivity from nuclear plants is greater, but after the short-lived products have decayed in 200 years it is comparable to that from coal. The chemical toxicity of coal wastes far exceeds t h e c h e m i c a l toxicity of nuclear waste. People are often confused; they correctly attribute to high-level nuclear waste a high specific toxicity (toxicity per u n i t weight), but forget that there is a much smaller quantity, which means that nuclear waste is the only waste in society for which we have a reasonable solution. It is vital to realize that the concentration of the nuclear waste is an advantage-but an advantage that can be thrown away by an inappropriate public emphasis. The public should be emphasizing that the waste must be kept concentrated, and this advantage is not negated by faulty handling such as at the Hanford plant. In other countries The situation in other countries is different. France is the most obvio u s e x a m p l e of a c o u n t r y t h a t started nuclear energy later than the United States, but has developed it to the extent that most of its electricity comes from nuclear energy (the rest from hydropower). France even exports 10% of its electricity output. Why has France been so successful in avoiding the dread American disease? Some social scientists have argued that France is aided by the centralized nature of its government and compare France to Germany with its federal structure. Nuclear energy was used by the individual states in Germany to disagree with the federal government. As a result, Germany seems to have lost the political will to develop nuclear energy. In France the centralized government a n d electricity company provide incentives to the population to accept a power plant in their midst, by providing electricity at reduced cost to the neighbors. Others note the political nature of the opposition, which i n France was left wing and largely
communist. One of their heroes, a supporter of the resistance in World War 11, was communist Fr6d6ric Joliot, a pioneer and believer in nuclear energy. How could he be repudiated? Whatever the reasons, most French citizens are proud of their successful and integrated nuclear power program. Developing countries There has always been a concern about developing countries. Will a developing country have a system like that in Russia or one like that in France? It is common even for liberals to be paternalistic and to state that the technology is too hard for a developing country. But let us look at the record. In 1955 most Westerners would have considered Korea a developing country. Yet Korea has built a nuclear power program that appears to be operated as well and as safely as any in the world. Koreans have accepted the advice, help, and training of the Western world without developing an inferiority complex. The same applies to Korean industrial development generally. In contrast, Iran had a better start than Korea; it had oil money and a long intellectual tradition. But it has not developed nuclear energy, and other industrial development has lagged. I chaired a committee that just reviewed the operation of the nuclear power plants in Taiwan. It was clear to us that the Chinese are technically, and probably politically, as capable of running these plants as anyone in the world. In 1982 I visited Egypt and discussed Egypt’s hopes for a nuclear power plant to be built at El-Dabah, near the large populated area of the Nile Delta. An elderly engineering professor asked whether I thought Egypt was capable of operating such a plant. I reminded him that in 1956 the British stated that Egyptians were not competent to run the Suez canal by themselves. Yet after Egypt took it over from the Suez Canal Company, itself largely influenced by the British government, many needed modernizations and improvements were made; the canal has been probably better and more safely run than before. But it is difficult for Egypt to find the capital to build a power plant; it sells oil and natural gas internally at prices most economists would consider too low. If this can be overcome, Egypt seems a good candidate for expansion. The fundamental feature of nuclear power, its energy density, helps here. To run a successful and
safe nuclear power program it is not necessary that all the people in the country have technical training. For nuclear energy one needs comparatively few highly trained people. As countries develop, this happens naturally as the bright and privileged few are educated overseas. I suggest here that those developing countries that can politically accept a technically trained elite can have a successful nuclear power program. But this technical training inevitably is associated with a degree of political freedom that is sometimes difficult for politicians of a developing country to accept. The Philippines built a nuclear reactor. But large projects bring the opportunity for corruption. The reactor became associated with the old, discredited Marcos regime. Iran is an example of a country that had a technical elite that was eventually abandoned and repudiated by a new government. In such a case, nuclear power could not be safely developed either. Can we allow the “free market” between nations to decide which countries are allowed to have nuclear power? I think not. All the world must worry about a country that tries to develop nuclear power but fails to support the technical elite; it will have power plants that are badly run; there will inevitably be political pressures to cut corners to provide output at the expense of safety. Perhaps a technical elite would be more acceptable if it were internationally sponsored; UN (UNESCO, IAEA, and the World Bank) support and training may be very helpful. Already Europeans and Americans see the importance of ensuring that the power plants i n the former U.S.S.R. are run safely. We do not want another Chernobyl. How the world is going to give this help without being charged with interference in domestic affairs is an interesting challenge. The current situation of the republic of Armenia is instructive. Three years ago, after the earth-
quake, there was public pressure to shut down the two VVER 400 reactors. They were built in a densely populated area and in a n earthquake zone. Three U.S. engineers of Armenian ancestry visited the plants and found that although they were earthquake resistant, the auxiliary systems were not. The central government of the U.S.S.R. s h u t them down. Now Azerbaijan has cut off oil supplies and intercepted the natural gas pipeline from Russia. As a result, Armenian industry is at a standstill. The new president of the republic, Levon Ter-Petrossian, himself active in getting the plants shut down, wants to start them up. As an important political measure, h e w a n t s some u p g r a d i n g , a n d i s searching for international sources of capital for a loan. Such a turnaround by politicians is likely to become common as situations change. It is useful to realize that the low transportation costs of nuclear fuel make nuclear energy particularly competitive in countries with no indigenous fuel supplies such as Japan and Taiwan. Such countries will also find that an attractive feature of nuclear energy is the ability to store many years’ supply on site, compared with a typical three months’ worth for a fossil fuel power plant. This leads to a degree of political security that their historical experience may suggest to them is needed. There are other developing countries that might be candidates for nuclear power development in the future. Singapore has a high technical competence and imports its fuel; its largely English-speaking Chinese citizens are obviously as competent as those in Taiwan. Thailand is advancing technically, although its political stability may be in question. Vietnam also needs fuel, and before 1960 was developing a welltrained cadre of engineers and scientists (including a U.S.-supplied research reactor just north of Saigon). But it has difficulty in raising capital ( t h e World Bank might help). India and Pakistan are more difficult cases. Although each has a small program, large expansion would need international help. It is unlikely that they will get the necessary world cooperation until they agree with each other not to make any more nuclear weapons. Conclusion In conclusion we can say that in the United States the following hold: the scientific future for nuclear power remains excellent,
Environ. Sci. Technol., Vol. 26,No. 6,1992 1119
the technical future for nuclear power is steadily improving, the economic future for nuclear power is moderate, and the political future for nuclear power still looks bleak. For Germany a n d t h e United Kingdom the political situation is similar to that in the United States. For Austria and Italy it is worse. But for France: the scientific future remains excellent, the technical future is steadily improving, the economic situation is saturated (there are enough plants), and the political situation is excellent. However, in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Eastern Europe the situation is a little different: the scientific future has been the same as in the United States, the technical situation has been very bad but is improving, the economic situation is very confused, and the political future, like everything else, is confused. For Japan the situation is similar to France’s except that the market is not saturated.
For the countries of the Pacific Rim, Korea, T a i w a n , a n d even mainland China the situation is like that in Japan: the scientific future is the same as in the United States, the technical future is the same as in the United States, the economic future is bright, and the political future looks excellent. The situation varies in developing countries. Mexico is close to the United States and shares some of its social and administrative diseases. But its relative poverty may enable it to avoid the “antinuclear disease.” Brazil and Argentina at one time had large nuclear power programs coexisting with atomic bomb plans. Now that the bomb plans are canceled, the extensive hydroelect r i c p o s s i b i l i t i e s may w e l l be cheaper than-and prevent expansion of-the nuclear option. However, they may decide that nuclear power is preferable environmentally, Western Africa has untapped hydroelectric resources and is also an unlikely candidate. This might be seen as one more example of why the next century will be an “oriental century.” The resurgence of nuclear power may come from the Orient; let us hope
that the United States notices it soon enough to follow close behind. Otherwise our economy will decline and we will become an “undeveloping country.’’ Acknowledgment This article i s based o n a talk given at the A m e r i c a n Association for the Advancement of Science in Chicago, February 1992.
Richard Wilson is Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics and director of the Regional Center for Study of Global Environmental Change at Harvard University. He is a founder of the Society of Risk Analysis and is on the editorial board of its journal, Risk Analysis. With E.A.C. Crouch, he has written a book, RisWBenefit Analysis. He traveled to Chernobyl soon after the accident, and helped to make a film for public television about the accident. He wasgiven the Forum Award of the American Physical Society in 1990.
Now in a new edition
Now available In paperback
MARINE POLLUTION Third Edition
BIOLOGY OF WASTEWATER TREATMENT
R.B. Clark
N.F. Gray
This text gives a ciear and objective introduction to the subject of marine pollution, describing the types of wastes, their effects on marine life and habitats, and their impact on fisheries and human health. Emphasis is piaced on lessons from practical experience. with case histories from the North Sea, the Baltic, and other areas. The third edition has been fully revised and updated. From reviews of previous editions: “Outstanding for its clarity and readability and for the way its author has selected good examples and controlled the level of detail, ” -internatma/ Journal of Environmentai Studies
A clear and thorough overview of wastewater treatment processes is provided in terms of operational management Makes the functions of the engineer availabie in comprehensible terms - New Technicai Books (The N Y Pubiic Library) This comprehensive book provides a unified course in wastewater treatment and disposal It deals with environmental and biological aspects as well as fundamental physical and chemical principles
July 1992 184 p p , 9 5 illus cloth $75 00 paper $35 00
PLASTICS RECYCLING Products and Processes
Edited by Raymond J. Ehrig Widespread environmental concerns coupled with dwindling wastemanagement options have led to a growing demand for recycling programs in countless communities across the United States. This book describes today s plastics recycling technology, offering a wealth of information in one convenient resource Topics addressed include the chemistry, engineering, and economics involved; specialized equipment; collecting and sorting procedures; and new research and development activities. Patents and publications are referenced throughout. This is an indispensable resource for plastics and materials engineers, technicians, entrepreneurs, and cityplanning personnel who are either involved in on-going recycling operations or who need the facts for setting up such a service. 1992 304 pp,, 77 figures and 98 tables $64.00 1120
Environ. Scl. Technol., Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992
1990 (paper 1992) 848 pp 195 illus cloth $150 00 paper $59 95
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN AND INDOOR MICROBIAL POLLUTION Edited by Ruth B. Kundsin Makes an excellent case for the effect of the bioburden on the problems of indoor air quality and morbidity Very well illustrated with remarkable photographs One comes away from this book with a very real appreciation of biologic hazards in the indoor iiving space and the role that building design and ventilation engineering have in fostering or eliminating these hazards -New England Journai of M e d i o n e An authoritative resource for assuring consumers health and safety in buildings --Poi/ution Engmeering 1988 3 2 8 p p 102iilus $49 95
I
To order or for more information, contact
Oxford University Press,
Science Marketing Dept., 200 Madison Aver, New York, NY 10016, or call 1-800-451-7556
