The Individual in Government Research and Innovation - ACS

15 The Individual in Government Research and Innovation JACOB

RABINOW

Downloaded by EAST CAROLINA UNIV on April 8, 2018 | https://pubs.acs.org Publication Date: August 8, 1980 | doi: 10.1021/bk-1980-0129.ch015

National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D . C . 20234

In t h i s paper I will d i s c u s s the r o l e of the researcher i n Government, the climate i n Government today and as it was years ago, and a little b i t about the system o f e x p l o i t i n g patents belonging to the Government. All of the ideas t h a t I express i n t h i s paper are strictly my own and do not n e c e s s a r i l y represent the thoughts or p o l i c i e s of the management o f the N a t i o n a l Bureau of Standards or any other Government agency. I t h i n k our l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s are g e t t i n g too l a r g e ; I think they are too r a t i o n a l ; and I t h i n k they are managed by the wrong people. When you have a m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n which buys a s e t of my patents and when you t a l k t o the d i r e c t o r of one o f the d i v i s i o n s t h a t is supposed t o develop my r e c o r d p l a y e r and he tells you he doesn't know anything about r e c o r d p l a y e r s , when you r e a l i z e t h a t h i s s u p e r i o r s know even l e s s than he does, and t h a t they own 400 companies, you begin to wonder what is going to happen t o our technology. The answer, of course, i s q u i t e obvious. In an i n t e r e s t i n g article e n t i t l e d "On the S t a t i s t i c s of I n d i v i d u a l V a r i a t i o n s of P r o d u c t i v i t y in Research L a b o r a t o r i e s " about why some inventors invent a lot and some people do a lot of other c r e a t i v e t h i n g s W. Shockley — the Nobel P r i z e winner f o r the t r a n s i s t o r (Proceedings of the IRE, f o r March 1957), analyzes why it is t h a t some i n v e n t o r s do a great d e a l and some do very little. Most of us do nothing. He d i s c u s s e s the r e l a t i o n between q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y of output of c r e a t i v e people, and he comes t o some nonobvious c o n c l u s i o n s . I t is probably the best article ever w r i t t e n on the s u b j e c t , and it backs some of the things t h a t are d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s book. The United States Government performs a great amount of research and supports a great amount of research. I t i s rather i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t i n a l l the major wars our Government found i t necessary t o bypass the r e g u l a r Army and Navy procedures and developed c i v i l i a n l a b o r a t o r i e s t o do what the Army and Navy l a b o r a t o r i e s presumably should have been doing. I t i s a truism

This chapter not subject to U.S. copyright. Published 1980 American Chemical Society Smith and Larson; Innovation and U.S. Research ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1980.


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that people who f i g h t wars (that i s , the p r o f e s s i o n a l people who f i g h t wars — s o l d i e r s and o f f i c e r s ) f i g h t each war l i k e the l a s t war; and i t u s u a l l y turns out that i t i s not the way to f i g h t the next war. You have to draw i n t o the Government the best s c i e n t i s t s , the best b r a i n s to create the new weapons and the new t e c h n o l o g i e s . This was done i n the C i v i l War; i t was done i n World War I; i t was done, of course, i n World War I I , and I hope there w i l l be enough time to do i t f o r World War I I I . In World War I, r a d i o was very young. There was no Radio Corporation of America. So, the Government p u l l e d together a l l the people and c o r p o r a t i o n s who had patents and made a kind of conglomerate out of i t . During that war a great d e a l more r a d i o technology was developed. A f t e r the war, there was a question of what to do with t h i s new o r g a n i z a t i o n that had so many new ideas and had done so much development, and out of t h i s was born the Radio Corporation of America. I t i s r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g that f o r many years David Sarnoff was i t s p r e s i d e n t . David Sarnoff was a r a d i o man; he was the r a d i o operator who heard the SOS from the T i t a n i c and organized the rescue crew that rescued a l l the boats there were to rescue. He a l s o supported Zworykin, f o r example, f o r some twenty years before they developed e l e c t r o n i c TV. They d i d i t because David Sarnoff l i k e d the i d e a . Today's management does not do t h i s ; i t has to have a pay-off and the pay-off has to be r a t h e r quick. No s e n s i b l e master of business a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would ever support a man l i k e Zworykin f o r twenty years because he happens to l i k e him. T h i s love of r a d i o was a l s o true of McDonald of Zenith. Zenith was one of our c o n t r a c t o r s during World War I I . McDonald b u i l t radios. I f a r a d i o d i d not please him p e r s o n a l l y , i t was not made by Z e n i t h . T h i s type of management i s changing, and i t i s changing i n the Government a l s o . During World War I I , when I d i d a great d e a l of work on weaponry the atmosphere was as f o l l o w s : You were asked to do a job, more or l e s s i n d i r e c t l y . Someone would say, "Jack, we need a parachute r e l e a s e f o r a guided m i s s i l e to save i t a f t e r a t e s t , " or, "We want to i n j e c t a hypodermic needle i n t o the behind of a p i l o t b a i l i n g out at 30,000 f e e t because he's going to l o s e oxygen; about 2,000 f e e t above ground, please i n j e c t the Adrena l i n needle i n t o h i s backside." I found to my amazement that t h i s was not an easy problem because i f he b a i l s out over a high mountain you can not use barometric pressure; barometers are not r e l i a b l e enough because one does not always know the weather ahead of time. Therefore you would l i k e to do t h i s by r a d i o , proximity fuse. I found that brave p i l o t s , who had no h e s i t a t i o n going over enemy l i n e s , d i d not l i k e to f l y with a hypodermic needle f a c i n g t h e i r backsides. This was the kind of problem that was thrown at you, and you could do i t anyway you pleased. The only question was, "How soon can you have i t done?" There was no accounting of money; there was no p r o j e c t w r i t i n g i n advance; we d i d not do any " e n t i t y s t u d i e s " ; we d i d not worry about any-

Smith and Larson; Innovation and U.S. Research ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1980.

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t h i n g except how to do i t and do i t q u i c k l y . You worked s i m u l taneously on b i g and l i t t l e p r o j e c t s , and nobody cared about the d i s t r i b u t i o n of time. Of course, the work was v e r y e f f i c i e n t because there was no accounting. I never knew who p a i d the b i l l s ; I never had an "estimate" or a "proposal"; there was simply no paper work. O c c a s i o n a l l y at the end of a p r o j e c t , we would w r i t e a r e p o r t , but that would be only on the t e c h n i c a l aspects. Now, of course, we do a great d e a l of accounting, which I w i l l discuss shortly. The o r g a n i z a t i o n was very simple. I was a P - l when I s t a r t e d working a t the Bureau of Standards. T h i s was the lowest grade of p r o f e s s i o n a l s . I c a l i b r a t e d meters, p l o t t e d my own curves, and f i l l e d out the c a l i b r a t i o n papers. There was no one under me; no a s s i s t a n t s . A l t o g e t h e r , there were four people i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ladder, between the P r e s i d e n t and myself. I was a worker; there was the s e c t i o n c h i e f , a Mr. Stutz; the d i v i s i o n c h i e f , Hugh Dryden; the D i r e c t o r of the Bureau of Standards, Dr. Briggs; the S e c r e t a r y of Commerce; and there was the P r e s i d e n t of the United S t a t e s . Many years l a t e r I t r i e d to count the people i n such a c h a i n and I became l o s t . Not only i s there a l i n e of a u t h o r i t y that goes f o r some 10 to 15 people or so but there are so many branches which have e f f e c t s and power over one's work that you cannot t r a c e them a l l . I w i l l discuss some of the consequences of t h i s . During the war, people l i k e B i l l McLean, myself, and others who worked on weaponry, worked on many t h i n g s . We a l s o worked on p r o j e c t s on which we were not supposed to work but we got away with i t p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e l y . There i s a Rabinow Law #13, I t h i n k , that says t h a t everything you do i l l e g a l l y , you do efficiently. T h i s , of course, i s p e r f e c t l y obvious. For one t h i n g , you do not w r i t e a t a l l because w r i t i n g on an i l l e g a l project i s suicide. For another t h i n g , you work with whatever equipment you a l r e a d y have on hand, and, of course, you do everyt h i n g on your lunch hour, which s t a r t e d at 8:00 i n the morning and f i n i s h e d a t 5:00 i n the evening. Another t h i n g , when i t doesn't work w e l l and because i t i s i l l e g a l , you drop i t very q u i c k l y and k i l l the p r o j e c t . When i t i s l e g a l , you c a r r y i t on to doomsday, hoping somebody e l s e w i l l c a r r y i t on so that when i t f i n a l l y f a i l s you won't be blamed. I f an i l l e g a l p r o j e c t does succeed, you w i l l be a hero, but i f i t f a i l s you would l i k e no one to know about i t , so you bury i t q u i c k l y . I l l e g a l proj e c t s are very, very e f f i c i e n t from many p o i n t s of view. We were allowed to do much of t h i s . For example, I was permitted to develop a new hand grenade — not r e a l l y permitted. I used money from proximity fuses and developed a new hand grenade because our then c u r r e n t hand grenades were t e r r i b l e weapons. I don't mean t e r r i b l e f o r the enemy; i t was t e r r i b l e f o r us. I f you should happen to drop i t , i t exploded i n three seconds, give or take two seconds. This i n c i d e n t a l l y , t e c h n i c a l l y i s a very important p o i n t . When you



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throw a grenade, you can t e l l p r e t t y w e l l when i t i s going t o h i t the other s i d e and you l i k e to d e l a y t h i s as much as p o s s i b l e so t h a t the enemy can't throw i t back at you. He could throw i t back a t you. So, what you would l i k e to know i s e x a c t l y when i t i s going to explode; hold i t i n you hand f o r a l i t t l e time and then throw i t j u s t before i t i s ready to explode. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , with the three seconds plus or minus two, i t may explode i n your face and k i l l you and your f r i e n d s . I began to work on a new grenade and succeeded i n making one that had s e v e r a l advantages. When I f i n i s h e d , the C o l o n e l who was i n charge of our work s a i d , "Jack, where d i d you get the $100,000 you spent on it?" I s a i d , " I s t o l e i t from P r o x i m i t y Fuses." He s a i d , "You shouldn't have done i t . " I s a i d , "Well, do you want me to stop the work?" He s a i d , "No, c o n t i n u e . " I s a i d , " C o l o n e l , would you have given me the money i f I had asked f o r i t e a r l i e r ? " He s a i d , "No," and I s a i d , "That's why I d i d n ' t ask you." You see, we understood each other. Of course, t h i s i s what you do i n any good l a b o r a t o r y and we did q u i t e a b i t of t h i s . As a matter of f a c t , the sidewinder m i s s i l e (which was developed by B i l l McLean, who was my boss during the Second World War, and who l a t e r went to China Lake) was done more or l e s s i l l e g a l l y . I t i s hard to j u s t i f y to anyone why an a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e should be b u i l t by a Naval r e s e a r c h l a b o r a t o r y . However, B i l l McLean thought he could make a cheap m i s s i l e — an inexpensive m i s s i l e that would cost i t s weight i n silver. At that time, m i s s i l e s cost t h e i r weight roughly i n gold. So, he developed t h i s device because he was the t e c h n i c a l d i r e c t o r , and that i s another i n t e r e s t i n g s t o r y . I had asked him, "Why do you want to be t e c h n i c a l d i r e c t o r when you l i k e t e c h n i c a l things and you don't l i k e to manage?" He s a i d , "Because I know the SOB who w i l l get the job i f I don't take i t . So, I'd r a t h e r take the j o b . " I hope he f o r g i v e s me f o r quoting him c o r r e c t l y . Anyway, because he was the t e c h n i c a l d i r e c t o r , he could take f i v e percent of t h e i r budget and spend i t on anything he l i k e d , and he chose to b u i l d the a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e . I t became a b i g t h i n g . E v e n t u a l l y , i n d u s t r y took i t over and the p r i c e went back up roughly to i t s weight i n gold, which i s not surprising. I was i n i n d u s t r y about h a l f my l i f e t i m e and h a l f i n Government. The end of World War I I meant, f i r s t of a l l , that defense work was to continue and the government workers were b e t t e r o f f than ever. We had more money, more freedom and s t i l l v e r y l i t t l e o r g a n i z a t i o n . We r e a l l y had a great time except f o r McCarthyism that f i r e d some of our good people and f o r some other changes of atmosphere, but by and l a r g e u n t i l about the l a t e 1950's the government workers r e a l l y had a grand time. We had l o t s of money f o r R&D because the Government was on a r e s e a r c h k i c k . In i n d u s t r y , a l s o , everybody thought that you must do r e s e a r c h whether you knew what the h e l l you were doing or not because i t was the "growth" t h i n g to do. Wall S t r e e t gave money to anybody



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who wanted to s t a r t a new R&D business; things were wonderful. And there was a r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f that r e s e a r c h was good f o r i t s e l f ; no one questioned i t . The Government had developed atomic energy, computers, radar, and so on. There are arguments as to who invented the f i r s t computer. I don't r e a l l y care, you never can go back f a r enough i n any a r t to r e a l l y know who d i d anything, but the b i g computer business was s t a r t e d by Eckert and Mauchly, who b u i l t the ENIAC f o r the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Then they b u i l t the UNIVAC I f o r Census, which we i n the Bureau of Standards helped to buy. The way i t operated was that we w r i t e the specs because Census d i d not know how to w r i t e the e l e c t r o n i c specs. We d i d n ' t know e i t h e r how to w r i t e a spec f o r a computer, but we had "chutzpa" — t r a n s l a t e d , i t means " g a l l . We wrote the specs. Then, as the computer was being developed, we kept changing the specs. So, Eckert or Mauchly would t e l l us what they were doing and we would change the spec. When the computer was f i n a l l y d e l i v e r e d to Census, the specs matched. T h i s , of course, i s the way you do t h i n g s i n research. You don't w r i t e a t i g h t requirement because i f you knew e x a c t l y what you were doing you would not need the R&D. In p r a c t i c e , you have a vague i d e a of what you would l i k e to have because some guy " s o l d " you the i d e a , and then you w r i t e a spec based on what the i n v e n t o r s a i d . Then, i f you are c l e v e r , you keep modifying the specs and the R&D work u n t i l they come out even, and that's the way a l l great weapons are developed. I don't b e l i e v e f o r a moment that the customer knows e x a c t l y what he wants and then w r i t e s a spec. I f he does t h i s , he w i l l get a hack job and i t w i l l not have much e f f e c t on s o c i e t y . Great things are done because the i n v e n t o r s t a r t s when he recognizes a need, or he thinks he can c r e a t e a need. He then convinces someone that t h i s i s a good t h i n g to do. Then t h i s someone w r i t e s a s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r something the inventor suggested. That i s how you get new ideas i n t o the f i e l d . The f i e l d experience modifies i t and e v e n t u a l l y people t h i n k that they r e a l l y need i t . 1 1

What happened then as the years went by and the Government was sponsoring a great d e a l of r e s e a r c h was that i n d u s t r y d i s covered that r e s e a r c h and development was b i g business. I t was not during the war or b e f o r e . There were some r e s e a r c h l a b o r a t o r i e s , but very few. R&D was an adjunct to other businesses, and i t was not supposed to be a money-making p r o p o s i t i o n ; R&D was never intended to make money. B e l l L a b o r a t o r i e s was not supposed to be a p r o f i t center. Nowhere were there many p r o f e s s i o n a l R&D o u t f i t s . There were a few, v e r y few l i k e B a t t e l l e and a couple of s p e c i a l c o n s u l t i n g f i r m s but very, very l i t t l e R&D f o r p r o f i t . Industry discovered, a f t e r the war, that R&D i s a business, that there was a l o t of money to be made. They began to i n s i s t that the Government c u r t a i l i t s own R&D operat i o n and that more and more work should be done outhouse, and I use the word d e l i b e r a t e l y . S e v e r a l t h i n g s happened as a r e s u l t of t h i s . F i r s t of a l l , when the m i s s i l e c r i s i s developed, s c i -


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e n t i f i c s a l a r i e s i n i n d u s t r y went way up. Simon Ramo, f o r example, o f f e r e d s a l a r i e s that were much higher than the Government could pay because the Government couldn't e a s i l y change i t s s a l a r y s t r u c t u r e . We are a very l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t takes a Congressional act to do anything important. So, the Government did a c u r i o u s t h i n g ; i t increased the number of grade l e v e l s . The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e people began to invent t i t l e s ; there was no more simple " s e c t i o n c h i e f or " d i v i s i o n c h i e f . " They set up " c e n t e r s " " o f f i c e s , " or " l a b o r a t o r i e s . " They set up " a s s o c i a t e d i r e c t o r s " f o r everything; they s e t up " d i v i s i o n c h i e f s " and " a s s o c i a t e d i v i s i o n c h i e f s , " and so on. This p r o l i f e r a t i o n meant that you could r a i s e s a l a r i e s by i n v e n t i n g new t i t l e s . As you know, t h i s works p e r f e c t l y w e l l i n i n d u s t r y too. You may c a l l a man " v i c e p r e s i d e n t of nothing" and i n c r e a s e h i s s a l a r y by doing so. So, the Government suddenly became much more compli~cated. The thing that happens when you do t h i s ( i n s t e a d of s i x l e v e l s you may have t h i r t e e n ) i s that paper work grows because now you have to inform people. Before, when I was a s e c t i o n c h i e f I could go to the d i v i s i o n c h i e f , who was on step above me, and say, "Dr. Dryden, I need permission to do t h i s or t h i s , " and he could give i t to me because the only one he would have to ask, i f he couldn't do i t h i m s e l f , was the d i r e c t o r of the Bureau of Standards. But that s o r t of t h i n g stops when you have s i x t e e n l a y e r s . By the way, the more l a y e r s there are the l e s s they know each other and the l e s s f a m i l i a r they are of the work that i s being done. The s o c i a l d i s t a n c e i n c r e a s e s . I t a l s o means that i f you have an even chance of convincing your boss that what you are doing i s c o r r e c t and i f he has an even chance to convince h i s boss, and so on, and i f you have s i x people to convince, you have one chance i n s i x t y - f o u r of winning. For a r e a l l y new i d e a , that i s p r e t t y tough. Then, s e v e r a l other things happened. Industry wanted to have competitive b i d d i n g f o r R&D, which i s nonsense. You don't r e a l l y ever have competitive b i d d i n g f o r R&D. Imagine that you, a k i n g , i n s t e a d of g i v i n g a commission to Beethoven to w r i t e a symphony, you ask f o r competitive b i d s as to who i s going to w r i t e the symphony. You don't do t h i s . So, there was "comp e t i t i v e " b i d d i n g and because of t h i s , proposal w r i t i n g became a r a c k e t . Proposal w r i t i n g i s r e a l l y a f i n e a r t ; i t doesn't accomp l i s h anything because, by a c t u a l measurement, i t was found that 95 percent of a l l government p r o j e c t s go to the o r g a n i z a t i o n that i s expected to get the c o n t r a c t i n the f i r s t p l a c e , before the proposal was requested. But, you ask f o r proposals because of some l e g a l nonsense about competitive b i d d i n g . The proposal w r i t i n g developed the "two-platoon" system. The two-platoon system works as f o l l o w s : The best people i n your company w r i t e the proposals; when you get the c o n t r a c t , you don't give i t to that team because you can't waste t h e i r time to do the work. So, you give i t to a second platoon, who doesn't do as w e l l . I once t o l d t h i s to a l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n mangement, and they s a i d that they have a t h i r d platoon to e x p l a i n to the Government l a t e r why


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i t d i d n ' t work. In a d d i t i o n , i f you can't w r i t e a proposal you have somebody e l s e to w r i t e i t f o r you because there are s p e c i a l p r o p o s a l - w r i t i n g c o n s u l t i n g f i r m s . There are a l s o proposal engineers. One of my f r i e n d s was a proposal engineer; h i s job was to w r i t e proposals. He i s a very b r i l l i a n t i n v e n t o r , so he wrote proposals. I asked him, " L a r r y , who does the work a f t e r the company gets the c o n t r a c t ? " He s a i d , " I haven't the vaguest idea." The t h i n g that i s happening to the Govenment worker i s (and the reason I t e l l you these s t o r i e s i s because i t a f f e c t s the Government worker very s e r i o u s l y ) , that he begins to l o s e h i s e x p e r t i s e . He begins to s i t at a desk, read proposals, w r i t e requests, and read c r i t i c i s m s . I t gets so bad that he f i n a l l y can't read the proposals f a s t or w e l l enough and he can't read the r e p o r t s that come i n , so he h i r e s another c o n s u l t i n g f i r m to do the e v a l u a t i o n of the proposal or the e v a l u a t i o n of the work that i s being done. So, you have a case where the l i a r s w r i t e to the b l i n d and the b l i n d get other l i a r s to review the work of the f i r s t set of l i a r s . I could g i v e you case h i s t o r i e s but then I would have to g i v e names, and t h i s i s embarrassing. The Government worker, who was an expert when he was h i r e d , s i t s at a desk, he spends a l l h i s time w r i t i n g and reading papers, and he l o s e s h i s e x p e r t i s e . At the present time, h i s h a l f - l i f e , i n e l e c t r o n i c s , i s probably no more than three or f o u r y e a r s . I, f o r example, was a good r a d i o engineer once; I knew how to use vacuum tubes. I could b u i l d you a t r a n s m i t t e r or r e c e i v e r i f you j u s t gave me the wire, a s o l d e r i n g i r o n and a couple of tubes. Then during the war I had to l e a r n how to use small vacuum tubes and f i r e them from guns; that was r e l a t i v e l y easy because I'm an e l e c t r i c a l engineer but I was h i r e d as a mechanic a l engineer by the Bureau of Standards and so I learned a l i t t l e of each. I c o u l d s o l v e problems of mechanics by making e l e c t i c analogies. Then, microwaves were born and suddenly I was thrown f o r a loop. I was used to wires; suddenly I had wave guides, plumbing, square tubes that c a r r i e d c u r r e n t i n c u r i o u s ways, magnetrons, c y c l o t r o n s . By the time I got so I c o u l d understand at l e a s t what was being s a i d , t r a n s i s t o r s were born. Suddenly e v e r y t h i n g I knew was out. Instead of v o l t a g e , I had to get used to c u r r e n t s — sloppy c u r r e n t s — but I had to l e a r n how t r a n s i s t o r s work. I remember going to the f i r s t l e c t u r e at B e l l Labo r a t o r i e s , i n 1946 I b e l i e v e , and they had some t r a n s i s t o r radios. I asked one of the research people, one of the three i n v e n t o r s , "How long do these l i t t l e things l a s t ? " He s a i d , "Mr. Rabinow, they l a s t i n d e f i n i t e l y ; b u t i f you don't overheat them, t h e y ' l l l a s t much l o n g e r . " Anyway, as the years went by, more and more engineers s i t at desks. There has been a study made of how much of t h i s i s good f o r a l a b o r a t o r y . The study was made by Dr. A p s t e i n , who s t u d i e d many of the Government l a b o r a t o r i e s . I don't have the



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r e p o r t s w i t h me but he concluded that i f you do a l l the work i n house, you become incompetent because you don't have enough outs i d e i n f l u e n c e . There was such a Government l a b o r a t o r y that developed torpedos and i t made some s e r i o u s e r r o r s because of this. I f you do a l l the work outhouse, you become incompetent a l s o . You have to do enough inhouse to keep your e x p e r t i s e so you can t a l k as an equal to the c o n t a c t o r . One of the things that was and i s s t i l l l i k e d by our c o n t a c t o r s , when we work at the Bureau of Standards, i s that the c o n t r a c t o r s respect us because i f they didn't do what we wanted them to do, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the war, we would do i t ourselves and very o f t e n made the f i r s t models. So, we t a l k e d as equals and everything worked beautifully. Then you compare that v i t h some Post O f f i c e operat i o n s , f o r example, f o r whom I worked as a c o n t r a c t o r . I was i n i n d u s t r y then. We developed the equipment that i s used f o r s o r t ing m a i l . When you had 150 people doing an R&D operation i n a company that runs now at eighteen b i l l i o n d o l l a r s a year and when they should have a l a b o r a t o r y of some 10,000 people of q u a l i t y l i k e those of the B e l l L a b o r a t o r i e s , you can expect s e r i o u s problems. T h e i r l a b o r a t o r y has only a handful of people; t h e i r own research i s p i t i f u l l y s m a l l . The r e s u l t i s that the Department gets "snowed" by outside c o n t r a c t o r s , not because the o u t s i d e c o n t r a c t o r i s n e c e s s a r i l y corrupt but because the outside c o n t r a c t o r r e a l l y doesn't know the business. By outside c o n t r a c t o r s , I mean some of the l a r g e s t c o r p o r a t i o n i n America. The Post O f f i c e got s o l d t h i n g s that could not p o s s i b l y work; they design z i p codes which are wrong to s t a r t with and which have to be r e p l a c e d ; you warn them; and they don't b e l i e v e you. Here you have a s i t u a t i o n where n e a r l y a l l the work i s done on c o n t r a c t and t h i s i s h o r r i b l e . You must do about h a l f inhouse and the other h a l f o u t s i d e . On that outside e f f o r t , you probably w i l l spend perhaps h a l f on managing technology and h a l f on managing money. What has happened as a r e s u l t of a l l t h i s is. that the accountants have taken over our operations i n the Government and business, and the R&D workers are now checked very c l o s e l y . T h i s " a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " was mentioned elsewhere. I t i s more important to have your accounting c o r r e c t than to b u i l d a new hand grenade. The k i n d of s t u f f I got away with, you cannot get away w i t h today. For example, when I was working a t the Bureau of Standards, I invented a c l u t c h using magnetic p a r t i c l e s and i r o n p l a t e s — a simple device, but i t was the k i n d of device that everybody could have done but d i d n ' t . I r e c e i v e d a l o t of publicity. Dr. Vannevar Bush c a l l e d me one day and s a i d , "How f a s t does i t operate?" I s a i d , " I don't e x a c t l y know, perhaps three m i l l i s e c o n d s . " He s a i d , "Thank you." He c a l l e d a couple more times. So I s a i d , "Dr. Bush, i f you w i l l t e l l me what the problem i s , maybe I can work on the problem." W e l l , the r e s u l t of that was that I worked on a M i c r o f i l m reader that he had i n vented, but i t had some problems i n s t a r t i n g and stopping f i l m



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very q u i c k l y . Why was I working on a M i c r o f i l m reader? Because my boss d i d n ' t care. I was b u i l d i n g weapons, but i f I f e l t l i k e working on a M i c r o f i l m reader p a r t time f o r Dr. Bush, i t was a l l right. He p a i d me whatever we asked and we l i e d . We s a i d i t would only c o s t $5,000 because $5,000 d i d n ' t r e q u i r e paper work. I don't know what i t cost, but $5,000 i s the o f f i c i a l number. Out of t h a t work came the f a c t t h a t I suddenly r e a l i z e d t h a t i f I could read dots on M i c r o f i l m I could read p r i n t e d c h a r a c t e r s . So, i n 1953 or 1954 I s a i d to Dr. A s t i n , " A l l e n , I would l i k e t o b u i l d a reading machine." He s a i d , "Why?" I s a i d , "I t h i n k I know how to do i t . " He s a i d , "Keep i t low, q u i e t , go ahead." So, I b u i l t a reading machine t h a t read the output of a p o r t a b l e typewriter. I t i s now a t the Smithsonian on permanent e x h i b i t i o n . I t ' s r a t h e r slow; i t read one c h a r a c t e r every minute but i t was r a t h e r e x c i t i n g . You would put a p l a t e n o f paper i n f r o n t of i t ; i t would look a t the f i r s t character, scan i t f o r a while, make up i t s mind what the best guess was, l i g h t up a l i g h t , and everybody would cheer. I f i t couldn't decide, i t would l i g h t up "Tilt." The t h i n g t h a t i s i n t e r e s t i n g i s t h a t many years l a t e r when I was making machines f o r the Bank of America t h a t read 14,000 characters a second i n s i x d i f f e r e n t s t y l e s of p r i n t (to give you and i d e a of what t h a t means, i t reads a f u l l typewritten sheet i n h a l f a second), no one cheered. By then everything was " e l e c t r o n i c " and what d i d you expect? The t h i n g t h a t was i n t e r e s t i n g about t h a t f i r s t machine i s t h a t i t was done on Government money; i t had n o t h i n g to do with my p r o j e c t ; i t was permitted because i t was something the boss permitted as long as i t was not to occupy too much time and d i d n ' t c o s t too much. ( I t c o s t about $30,000). Years l a t e r when I was back a t the Bureau i n my second coming, I asked one of the c h i e f s (who i s not there now) i f I could b u i l d a reading machine f o r the b l i n d . I now had a l o t of e x p e r t i s e ; I had spent m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s developing reading machines, and t h e r e were three other expert people who had come back with me to the Bureau. We are probably as good as anybody i n the world on t h i s . We would have l i k e d to b u i l d a reading machine f o r the b l i n d which could read most p r i n t e d t e x t s ; i t would c o s t perhaps $100,000 to prove the p o i n t . My c h i e f s a i d , " E x p e r t i s e i s no excuse to do work a t the Bureau of Standards now." I f e x p e r t i s e i s no excuse, what the h e l l i s ? The management has changed s i n c e , and I d i d get $40,000 i f I wanted to do i t but now the other reading machine people are too busy with too many other p r o j e c t s . Some have r e t i r e d , and I only work p a r t time so I r e a l l y can't do i t now. In the good o l d days, the question of j u s t i f i c a t i o n would not have a r i s e n . I f you wanted to do something i n t e r e s t i n g , you j u s t d i d i t because the boss was a t e c h n i c a l man, the accountants were not yet i n charge, and you could do whatever you l i k e d w i t h i n reason. The r e s u l t i s t h a t now i n the Government (and I do not only speak of the Bureau which i s probably s t i l l the b e s t l a b o r a t o r y i n the Government) the overhead i s counted very c a r e f u l l y ,



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INNOVATION AND U.S. RESEARCH: PROBLEMS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

there's a great d e a l o f e f f o r t on accounting before and a f t e r each p r o j e c t . You have t o w r i t e papers before you s t a r t . You make c o n t a c t with your boss as t o what you w i l l accomplish next year, next year he looks t o see what was accomplished and a committee looks a t both o f you. So, the whole s e n i o r s t a f f of the Government today i s concerned with paper and much l e s s time i s spent i n the l a b o r a t o r y . Unless you do l a b o r a t o r y work, unless you d i r t y your hands, you cannot be a p h y s i c i s t o r an engineer. I don't care how b r i g h t you are r e g a r d i n g the paper work, you must know why f r i c t i o n e x i s t s between s h a f t s and bearings; you must know why gyroscopes d r i f t ; you must know why m i s s i l e s sometimes tumble o r why hand grenades explode i n the wrong p l a c e s ; there's no way o f doing t h i s by l o o k i n g a t paper. I was once asked why do I make experiments, why don't I compute e v e r y t h i n g ahead o f time, l i k e i n the case o f a reading machine which c o s t a q u a r t e r o f m i l l i o n bucks t o make. I d i d some t h i n k i n g and decided t h a t I know w h y — I don't know enough. I don't know enough o f the t h i n g s t h a t happen i n r e a l machinery to p r e d i c t e v e r y t h i n g ahead o f time. I know the general t h i n g s t h a t are going t o happen but u n l e s s I b u i l d a model, I simply don't know enough. You must b u i l d models and t h a t ' s how you l e a r n t o be an engineer. Now, the work i s done by t h i r d or f o u r t h echelons down, which i s most unfortunate; t h a t i s , the b e s t p h y s i c i s t s and engineers are now managers. When you go through a l a r g e l a b o r a t o r y today, you look t o see who i s doing the work i n the l a b , and you f i n d t h a t i t ' s a t e c h n i c i a n who doesn't know enough. I n my o p i n i o n , t h i s i s t r a g i c . Now, I would l i k e t o speak b r i e f l y about what the Government does with i t s patents. I t now owns some 28,000 patents which i t developed o r owns. What happens t o them i s a tragedy because the Government i s under v a r i o u s p r e s s u r e s . Admiral Rickover t h i n k s t h a t we should make them f r e e t o everybody because i f they're f r e e t o everybody, everybody w i l l p i c k them up. T h i s i s pure nonsense. A f r e e patent i s nothing; i t ' s a p i e c e o f paper. No one i s going t o spend the k i n d o f money i t takes t o develop a magnetic p a r t i c l e c l u t c h u n l e s s he has an e x c l u s i v e l i c e n s e . I f you don't give e x c l u s i v e l i c e n s e s , people simply don't develop. In Europe I owned the patents of the c l u t c h . I s o l d the patents t o Eaton. I made $26,000 a f t e r taxes, which was n i c e . The American patent belonged t o the American Government. In Europe, the c l u t c h was used i n f i v e automoblies, and i t was used a g r e a t d e a l i n other machinery. I t i s used i n the United States only when there's nothing e l s e t h a t w i l l do the job. In the reading machine case, the Government gave me the commercial r i g h t s because the development was done i n a m i l i t a r y l a b o r a t o r y and m i l i t a r y l a b s have d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s . I d i d b u i l d my own b u s i ness as a r e s u l t and we d i d make a g r e a t many r e a d i n g machines. So, i t does make a d i f f e r e n c e as t o whether you have o r don't have e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s o r i n c e n t i v e s t o develop. There are b i l l s i n Congress now t o change the Government p o l i c y ; the Government


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should be able to g i v e e x c l u s i v e l i c e n s e s on i n v e n t i o n s where i t makes sense. You hear t h i s s t u f f from a prominent Senator who says that t h i s i s a "give-away, that the patents belong to the people. That's not the q u e s t i o n . The question i s , do they get used? Do they c r e a t e jobs? Do they c r e a t e employment? In t h i s connection, I can t e l l you a v e r y simple s t o r y . During the war, we c o n f i s c a t e d a l l the patents belonging to the Germans, the Aust r i a n s , the I t a l i a n s . These were i n d u s t r i a l , high-grade patents obtained here by t h e i r companies. We c o n f i s c a t e d 15,000 of them and the Government made them a v a i l a b l e f r e e to everybody and they d i e d . No one wanted to make a L e i c a Camera when anybody e l s e could make a L e i c a Camera. Some people d i d , and i n a year o r so nobody made L e i c a s any more, because there was no p o i n t i n making something that somebody e l s e could always make cheaper. The German patents simply died and the Government now has great t r o u b l e w i t h i t s 28,000. You hear these s t o r i e s about i t "belonging to the people," t h e r e f o r e make i t " f r e e to everybody." People ask what would happen i f the Government would develop a cure f o r cancer. Should i t be made e x c l u s i v e ? I have my own reward f o r it. I would say t h i s : " I f you want to reward someone f o r the cure of cancer, you can g i v e them o n l y one reward. Money i s not enough. You g i v e him a g o l d l i c e n s e p l a t e that enables him to park h i s c a r any p l a c e i n the world."


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Note 1. By i l l e g a l , I do not mean, o f course, that there was an act u a l law a g a i n s t doing i t . I o n l y mean that doing the work was not approved i n advance by some h i g h e r l e v e l of management. RECEIVED November 13, 1979.


The Individual in Government Research and Innovation - ACS

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