Oiemieai Engineering teigiiteereeig News
WALTER J. MURPHY, Editor
W h a t Price Secrecy? HAT effect are the Government's security and loyalty programs having on American science? A 90,000-word report, published b y Cornell University Press, concludes that t h e measures are unintentionally retarding scientific progress and endangering American leadership in that field. Such a conclusion is no surprise. Titled "Security, Loyalty, and Science," t h e report is the first of eight to be issued in a Cornell study of the impact on civil liberties of current governmental practices intended to ensure internal security and the control of subversive conduct. T h e two-year project is being conducted as part of Cornell's "Research in Civil Liberties" under t h e direction of Robert E. Cushman and has the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation. T h e initial volume, b y Walter Cellhorn of t h e Columbia l/niversity L a w School, declares that t h e present measures, while aimed at desirable objectives, have: 1. Hindered scientific teamwork and led to wasteful duplication of research b y preventing t h e free exchange of ideas between one scientist and another. 2. Obstructed the training of young scientists by refusing them access to new discoveries. 3. Discouraged—by "fear of smear" in clearance procedures—experienced scientists from entering secret research. " W r v o u s hoarding" of new knowledge is no guarantee tli.it it will remain secret, Prof. Gellhorn declares, noting that French physicists have already developed a n atomic pile comparable to the first American model and that the "atomic c \plosion" in t h e Soviet Union in 1949 " a d e q u a t e l y evidences that Russian scientists have achieved a grasp of the subject." "Science throughout its history," he says, "lias been strongly marked by coincidence which emphasizes how unlikely it is that ideas can be made to flow in narrowly national channels. "Americans must constantly remind themselves that the brains of the universe are not providentially concentrated in this country . . . no particular laboratory is likely at any given moment to possess a monopoly of t h e scientific competence that makes possible t h e breaking of new g r o u n d / ' W e agree wholeheartedly with Prof. Gellhorn when he says: " T h e h o p e for science in this country a n d for t h e nation's security is that the public at large will shed its fears, grow in understanding, and cease credulously accepting assertions that safety lies in secrecy. Secrecy is antithetical to the spirit of science. It is socially hurtful. Only for brief periods can it b e practiced without destroying the scientific superiority it is intended to preserve." I n discussing t h e question of secrecy a n d military considerations Prof. Gellhorn takes a position that few will quarrel with—"Secrecy ought not to b e readily attached to scientific or technological matters merely "because in some respects they have military significance. I t should be attached unhesitatingly if their sole significance is a military one." T h e n Prof. Gellhorn goes on to say, " . . . that b y procedures far from polished, unquestionably competent scientists have been summoned to answer neighborhood gossip, to explain isolated acts of kindliness, to divorce themselves from the political attitudes of any of their relatives o r other associates who happen to b e 'left wingers,' and in short establish their Americanism by proving that they a r e just like everybody else. Because some are unwilling to subject themselves or their families to inquisitions into their supposed opinions rather than their observable conduct, American scientific programs are often denied the services of h i g h spirited and
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badly needed men. Unless the tear of smear can be pushed farther into the background than it is at present, the skills of many of the nation's ablest scientists will not be fully utilized." Included in this quotation are some very broad assertions and conclusions. W e have not yet h a d t h e opportunity of reading the actual report, just the press release. Perhaps these statements are amply supported by documentary evidence. Unquestionably some mistakes, perhaps very serious mistakes, were made in the conducting of loyalty clearances, especially when they were first initiated. T h e question that naturally arises is how many cases were there, a n d are the same mistakes being made now? Scientists have been quite vocal on the subject, and to the extent where investigations were mishandled, we have been critical on this editorial page. T h e lay public is beginning to get t h e impression, however, that only scientists are subject to loyalty investigations. Thousands of others who are either in government employ or in one way or another are associated with many government projects, agencies, or committees also have been required to submit to the same kind of investigation complained of by scientists. W e fail to see the justification of the statement "in short, establish their Americanism by proving that they are just like everybody else." It is most unfortunate that there is a necessity for loyalty investigations at all. It would b e nice to believe that every American was a loyal citizen, that there were n o dupes or actual traitors with allegiances foreign to the best interests and welfare of the United States. Through bitter experience we know that there are such individuals; w e must also bear in mind that the public is aware of a number of cases disclosed by the F B I involving scientists, including chemists and chemical engineers. Scientists have said and we have said that there are no real secrets about nuclear fission. W e have not always been careful to differentiate between basic knowledge and technology. T h e public now is keenly aware that there have been certain areas of scientific and technical data which apparently the Soviets thought were sufficiently secret so that they enlisted spies to gain such information. It might b e well for all of us to dwell occasionally on t h e basic reason why w e have loyalty clearances a n d p r o b a b h will have them for a long time to come. T h e Trojan Horse technique of the twentieth century certainly is not an American concept—but at this very moment it is directed at us a n d must be met successfully if w e are to survive as a nation and freedom is to prevail. W e condemn any hysteria about this business of loyalty and loyalty clearances. W e trust it will b e kept to a minimum and employed, as Prof. Gellhorn suggests, only in those areas where real prudence dictates that it is necessary. W e deplore any instance where an individual is accused u n justly, and w e will exert every influence w e can against t h e possible creation of a "police state," but w e d o admit t h e necessity of carefully screening those to whom really confidential information is given a n d those who are engaged in or have access to work that is of military value to an enemy. All this leads to t h e inevitable conclusion that scientists in publicizing their position on such matters as loyalty clearances must b e sure that they do so in a w a y that t h e public does not get erroneous impressions and that w e a r e not setting ourselves on a pedestal w e deny to others. Perhaps the Gellhorn report will accomplish the purpose of giving the public a true impression of t h e scientists* basic concern with preserving free exchange of ideas and knowledge. W e sincerely hope so, for some such medium is sorely needed at t h e present time.
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