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in the Chemical laboratory Edited by NORMAN V. STEERE, 1 4 0 Melbourne Ave., S:E. Minneapolis, Minn. 5541 4
Working Alone in Research and Development Activities* Roy Raider, Sofefy Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory o f the University of California Los Alomos, New Mexico 87544 A discussion on the particular problems ot research and development activities
where risks are broad and often unknown yet individual initiative, diligence and imagination ought not to be completeiy discouraged.
INTRODUCTION
there to he only one person present. In magazines containing hulk initiating* explosives the United States Navy limits one person a t a time; they specify that such a person should be selected for his knowledge of the safety ~ l e and s his willingness toobev them.2 The aurk of Volz and his colleagues lirted examples of work functions for use of) that shnuld not be performed alone: 1. High energy materials. 2. Toxic gases, liquids or solids. 3. High pressure systems. 4. Cryogenic materials. 5. Moving equipment or machinery. 6. Electrical systems. 7. Laboratory functions involving high energy, toxic, flammable or high pressure materials. 8. Driving vehicles on prolonged trips. 9. Any "on-routine job function. 10. Handling or transferring flammable liquids. Other authorities have suggested additions to this list: molten materials, or high temperature materials, water tanks or deep water, high places or pits or any confined space difficult of egress.
The safety problems of working alone have long engaged the interest of management and safety people. Increasingly, regulations have appeared prescribing solitary employment. Such regulations have sometimes been broadly applied through industries and sometimes through craft practices. More often it has been appropriate to do so on a risk category basis such as power machinery or electric power exposures, difficulty of egress, and so an. A study of the subject was made in 1962 and published a year 1ater.l Volz defines working alone "as the performance of any work function by an individual who is not within audio or visual range of another individual far more than a few minutes a t a time." Other than the usual custodial jabs, offhour watchmen or office and administrative duties which are deemed permissible for lone individuals Volz carefully defined as s oerrnissible cateeorv. .. ,. "a .iab function which is pan of a written opera tin^ procedure of long s t a n d i n ~,ueh that the operation is routine and which experience indicates is safe." In all cases a check procedure at a regulated interval was suggested. Such check pmcedures could be by individuals or mechanical schemes: telephone checks to sucentral noint. oervisar or desienated " . . .oersonal check, television, or open circuit audible monitor. Conceivably there could he eircumstances where prudence would require
Clearly many of the items in the preceding list are to he found in research and development environments. To disqualify solitary research effort because it fits on a list may not be necessary and may be unjust. One must he willing to make the ef-
*Work performed under the ausoices of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioh. This paper was presented at the Research and Develooment Section meetine on October 31, 1975 at the National ~ a f e t ; Congress in Chicago. Reprinted by permission of the Research & Development Section and the National Safety Council.
*Initiating mixtures contain materials such as mercury fulminate, lead azide, or lead s t v ~ h a n a t ewhich will readilv detonate hi; the application of impact, or friction, and are used to impart a percussive force to more stable highexplosives.
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fort to look in more detail at a proposed res e m h function; this ' will also require someone to take the responsibility for limitations on a specific case basis rather than by just the general categories. Consideration of working alone offers a special challenge to an enlightened management and staff advisors in a research and development establishment. Personal enterprise, diligence and imaginative procedures should not he arbitrarily discouraged. Yet research work implies working in new fields, in new dimensions, with new materials, sometimes with untried pmced u e s ; an energetic researcher must he encouraged within the hounds of propriety and responsibility. This dilemma then appears to evoke a need for more specific direction with respect to working alone than can he provided by general categories.
THAT SECOND PERSON There is such a variety in what may be required of the second person that this matter, too, requires some thought. For example, in requiring a second person on prolonged driving trips that second person might serve as an alternate driver or perhaps merely as company to engage the attention of the driver, thus keeping him awake; the latter presupposes the second person stays awake. In the case of a second person around moving power equipment there may be requirement for knowing how to: 1. shut off the machinery. 2. render first aid. 3. transmit a message for help.
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In working around electrical systems the second person may be specified as "one capable of helping in an emergency." This requires special training in artificial respiration and the ability to deal with an energized circuit. Around chemical or solvent operations the second person may have to know about chemical first aid(showers or other modes of dilution), the use of respiratory equipment and its limitations, and the proper selection and operation of fire extinguishers. In functions carried out in places difficult of egress strength may he a requirement to handle the lifeline as well as other abilities. Some incidents which typify the importance of the ability of the second person are the following: (Continued i n pogeA24) Volume 50, Number 1, January 1973 / A23
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While attending a n overhead conveyor system, a n employee became entangled-in a hook and could not free himself. A new trainee on the night shift was also in attendance but did not know the shut down procedure in a n emergency situation. The trainee acted quickly and using a stripping knife cut down the employee saving him fmm possible serious injury. A chemist was working a t a lahoratory hood preparing a reduction reaction using lithium aluminum hydride. A companion chemist had just left the lab when he heard a cry for help. As he turned back to the lab, he found it in flames and the injured man trying to get out through the door which opened inwards. When the door was opened, the injured man was squeezed between it and the hood. In his fright, the injured man might have run but fortunately, someone had already pulled a safety shower under which he was led t o extinguish the flames and wash the solvent and chemicals fmm his body. A first aid fire blanket from the lab was used to wrap the burned man to try t o keep him warm until the ambulance arrived. He received first degree burns an his face, and more severe burns on his hands and legs.= (Case 676)
Late one evening an employee returned to the laboratory to finish a job of dismantling an electrical operation. He accidently shorted a capacitor causing it to explode. Fragments from the explosion caused deep facial injuries and knocked the employee unconscious. A janitor came upon the scene and found the employee in a large pool of blood. Trying to call a n emergency phone number, he was unable to make himself understood due to heavy foreign accent. He then proceeded to search the building for someone that could summon help. Approximately 15 minutes were lost before another employee could he found and help was called. Some examples of typical research expasures are described in the following paragraphs. c.
Temperature Extremes In temperature conditioning tests the
U. S. Army Materiel Command requires a crew member to be stationed outside the lookout window as a safety observer when personnel are within the temperature controlled room; the observer is to he on the lookout for personnel affected by the temperature.' No person is permitted to work alone below -10°F. A24 /Journal of Chemical Education
Electrical Safety A classical regulation for electrical work might he stated as follows: "When working with possihly energized equipment a second person capable of helping in an emergency must be present." In one of our laboratories in the course of ignitron testing a physicist inadvertently made contact with a poorly designed connector. He received a capacitor discharge estimated to have been between 14 and 20 joules and lost consciousness. He was revived by artificial respiration promptly applied by a co-worker; there were no aftereffects. A less fortunate misadventure is the following:= (Case 787) A fatal electric shock was received by a research worker handling high voltage equipment. A high intensity mercury arc light source was being used. The light, four inches long and %-inch in diameter, was held in spring action holders pressing against the ends of the lamp. Power was supplied fmm the secondary of a transformer (850/110 volts) furnishing as much as 1.4 amps. The arrangement consisted of a metal box. A back cover held the lamp holders, and the leads. Investigation of the area disclosed the following conditions: 1. The box cover was dan2ling by the air hose (air was used to cool the lamp) against the wall. (The air was shutoff.) 2. The box cover had been removed as if alterations were about to be made. (The circuit had knowingly been rewired the day of the accident.) 3. One lead was disconnected from the lamp holder post. 4. The mercury lamp was an the floor. 5. The transformer was energized.
Preventive Measures Although the exact cause of the accident cannot he determined, there are certain principles to keep in mind in working with high voltage equipment: 1. De-energize an electrical circuit when making repairs. 2. Do not work an hazardous equipment alone. In the interest of permitting and encauraging free research and personal diligence for selected individuals we have permitted under considered circumstances the general two m a n ~ l teo be amended as follows: "EXCEPTIONS: For those individuals designated by the research group leader, working alone is permitted within the fallowinglimitatians: ~
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120 volts AC, or less, or any AC voltage where the current is limited to 10 milliamps AC. Three hundred volts DC, or less, or any DC voltage where the current is limited t o 60 milliamps DC. A capacitor charged to a potential no greater than 3W volts or containing a stored energy no greater than 5 joules. An inductor capable of being opencircuited while containine no meater than 5 joules stored energy.
Those designated employees shall reduce the permitted exceptions given above to values he considers safe if the normal environmental conditions are compromised by high humidity, confined work space, unsatisfactory ground system, or other unusual hazards." The above is an example5 of special thought being given to the needs of research and development. Presumably, hazards have been considered in detail. Supervisors are required to consider the qualifications and reliability of individuals and then responsibly designate those permitted t o work within broader limits. S h o p Rules A classical regulation for shop work might he stated as follows: "No work may be done with power machinery unless another person is in the vicinity." Two examples fit this requirement:
Non-compatible chemicals came into contact and started a small fire. The man continued to discard chemicals directly inta the fire when a n unknown box of chemicals exploded in the fire showering the employee with glass. Although no injurv resulted due to the man's h e a w clothi& and face shield, the potentral for misadventure in chemical5 disposal is so great that multiple perrunnel is a requirement.
SPECIAL SITUATIONS Defection While it is not appropriate in this study to consider matters potentially of great ~ u b l i cinvolvement sueh as nuclear weapons, nuclear power reactors and large mis-
siles, it is well to understand the considerations that call for redundant personnel. A buddy system has long been in effect around high yield weapons to avoid the danger of a deliberate or inadvertent act that might trigger an event of catastrophic consequences. Under circumstances of this sort personnel are selected for their knowledge of correct procedures as well as their understanding of the Consequences of incorrect procedures. Such personnel assurance might extend even to the personality (equanimity, reliability, stability, are words that have been used) of the individuals; it is Ymportant that the supervisor having day t o day interaction with the individuals play a responsible role in person(Continued onpageA26)
An employee was turning on a new belt to a shaker in a flour mill when his fingers became pinched between the belt and the drive wheel. Calls for help went unnoticed due t o the noise of the surrounding machinery. Late the neat day an electrician came to hook up the drive motor and found the employee and released him. Only loss or injury was to the fingernails of his hands. The injured employee was alone, contrary t o operating instructions, mixing an adhesive with a vertical shaft mixture. As the resin worked its way up the shaft, he used a fifteen inch spatula to serape the adhesive back into the miring bowl. The sleeve on his shirt caught on the adhesive and pulled the shirt off his body resulting in friction b u m s to his ear, neck and arm.3 (Case 1556)
However, again in the interest of encouraging free research and personal diligence we have permitted an amendment to the general power machinery two-man rule with these additional words:' "This applies only to those tools capable of disaMing the user to the point where he cannot get help for himself. Tools which may be used with no second person present include: grinder, sander, ?/,-inch hand drill, drill press with chucks %-inch or smaller, milling machine with end mill and handoperated-feed band saw." Hazardous Materials Disposal Inevitably a research establishment will have a problem of disposal of a variety of chemical wastes. Aside from other problems of safeguarding the environment, it has been demonstrated that the proced u e s far sueh disposal should require two people. At the University of Minnesota in 1969 two men were assigned t o the chemical waste piek-up and disposal program: they had been doing this job for a number of years. This time while on their normal rounds one man got sick and went home. The other man thought he could finish alone and dispose of them himself. He arrived a t the disposal site and proceeded to dump the chemicals in the pit. Volume 50, Number 1, January 7973 / A25
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nel assurance rather than relying on some remote administrative authority or infrequent medical evaluation.
High Values While this paper generally discusses only personnel safety there has arisen in recent years a consideration of concern for the facility either hecause.the.values are so high or the facility is the heart of a total operation. A computing or a data communications center might he an example to evoke particular concern. In this circumstance personnel redundancy ought to be considered even though personnel safety would he a minor cansideration.
The Handicapped The success of a research and development establishment depends so strongly on the talents, imagination and diligence of the individual that R and D work may fairly expect to he a gaod place far the handicapped to perform on an equal basis. More clearly in R and D do abilities count rather than presumed disabilities. But the research environment may require on occasion that some slight provision he made for the handicapped. People without sight perhaps ought not to be alone in facilities where visual warnings are important or floor arrangements
A26 /Journal of Chemical Education
change often. Those devoid of hearing should not be alone where safety may depend on audible alarms. Handicaps are not as disqualifying as many people make them out to be but they oceaaionally have some minor requirement. During the World War U manpower shortage epileptic employees were assigned t o work in pairs with little other restriction and this appeared to be a sufficient measure. Of course, with modern-day anti-convulsive drugs even this requirement of a second like individual may not he indicated. One more incident I wish to describe t o stress the imagination in helping to make decisions about working alone situations. A technician was required to enter a shielded plutonium containment box in a hot eell. Entry is through an 18-inch diameter opening which is provided with a n adapter ring and a plastic sleeve-suit which projects into the radioactively contaminated interior of the cell. The technician was wearing the plastic suit with supplied air. As the technician entered the eell he pushed the manipulator slave arm out of his way. The movement of the manipulatar arm resulted in movement of the manipulator master control arm outside the eell, where the master wrist pushed the door control lever on a console from the "0PEN"ro t h e ' CI.OSEU po,irlon The technrcmn had his feet eatendmp. outside the cell opening. Both ankles were therefore exposed to the shearing action of the pneumatically-operated stainless steel transfer door. The d w r was 18 inches in diameter and ]h inch thick; calculations
indicated that a force of 1000 pounds could beexerted by this door. The health physics monitor assigned to this operation was a t the hank of the boa in the hot cell corridor by the door opening, and noticed the transfer door closing. The monitor called out that the door was closing and instinctively tried manually to prevent the door from closing. Realizing that his efforts were useless, the monitor quickly pushed the technician's feet into the cell. In the meantime the supervisor, who had heard the warning, rushed around to the cell face and moved the door control lever fmm "CLOSE" t o "OPEN." The slowly moving transfer door was a few inches from the closed position when it returned t o theopen position. Alertness and fast action an the part of the monitor and the supervisor undoubtedly saved the technician from serious injury.
References 1. H. A. Vdz. A. L. Hpraeman, E. Levens and A. L. Cohb. "Working Alone:' Chemieal Section Safety Neralctter, Nationd Safety Council. September 1963. 2. "Ammunition Asharc," Department of the Navy, OP-5, Paragraph 1m.4.August 9,1957. 3. Manvfacfwing Chemists' kpsaiation. hc.. Washington. D. C. "Case Histories of Accidents in the Chemical Induafry," Vol. 1. 1962: Vol n. 1966: Vol.
~eientifieLaboratory. July 19. 1962. Ssfefy Rules. Laa Alemaa SciontificLaboratory, Novembor 15. 1962.
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FOURTH BI-ANNUAL SHORT COURSE ON LASER SAFETY MARCH 5-9, 1973 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI' The staff of the Laser Laboratory of the University of Cincinnati Medical Center is pleased to announce the fourth comprehensive "Short Course" on all aspects of safe laser practices. This course, now conducted on a biannual basis, is the result of numerous requests at the laboratory for laser safety data to define the potential hazards of laser devices and describe the control measures necessary to assure safe use. The overall content of this course has been designed to emphasize the practical aspects of laser safety. Lectures will include numerous demonstrations, slides and films, in addition to three special workshop sessions. Emphasis this year will he placed upon the safety codes and legislation currently under consideration. The faculty will include the staff of the University of Cincinnati Laser Laboratory, recognized authorities in laser safety and biological effects of laser radiation. In addition, noted experts in the field of laser safety will also participate, with special guest lecturers. Tuition for the course will
be $325.00 which includes all lunches, daily transportation and course materials. R. James Rockwell, Jr. Associate Professor of Laser Sciences at the University of Cincinnati, will again serve a s course director. The course is jointly sponsored by the Laser Institute of America, the Continuing Medical Education Office (CONMED) and the Laser Lahoratory of the University of Cincinnati. Detailed programs for the "Short Course on Laser Safety" are available. Requests for additional information should be directed to: IASER SAFETY COURSE OFFICE OF CONMED 111 MEDICAI. COLLEGE CINCINNATI, OHIO 45219 (513) 872-5681
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