“Kyoto is dead.” - ACS Publications

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Comment M “Kyoto is dead.” n March 29, 2001, The Washington Post carried a front-page story entitled “U.S. Aims to Pull Out of Warming Treaty” in which the White House signaled its clear intent to pull out of the landmark 1997 global warming (Kyoto) agreement. The treaty, although signed by the Clinton administration, was preemptively rejected in July 1997 by the U.S. Senate, and few thought it would ever have a chance to succeed if negotiations continued as they have over the past year, given the current political climate in the United States. EPA Administrator Christine Whitman was quoted as saying that the “Kyoto Protocol was dead as far as the administration was concerned and that if the Europeans and Japanese wanted to reach an agreement, they would have to abandon the outlines of the accord and take a different approach (my emphasis). Whitman said that the President continues to believe “that global warming is a serious issue and that the administration will remain engaged in international negotiations on ways to address climate change.” She said that (we need to determine) “how we do it in a way that allows us to make some progress, instead of spending our time committed to something that isn’t going to go.” The reaction from both developed and developing countries to the unilateral action of the United States was severe, as expected. Environmentalists were understandably the most enraged, but across the world, there must have been millions of people who wondered, what does it mean? Is this a signal that the world’s most powerful country is going to begin determining its international policies as a lone wolf? Was the action a reflection of the power of residual isolationist influences in a country known for its isolationism in the early part of the 20th century? Was it a negotiating ploy, or a nonnegotiable position to protect the economy of the world’s largest source of carbon dioxide emissions? What “different approach” might the U.S. administration have in mind? Simply to hold developing countries to the treaty, gain more credits for forests, or something more involved? Presumably, we will hear the answers to some of these questions in the days to come, and perhaps, there will be a good-faith proposal forthcoming from the Bush administration. But coming on the heels of a decision of the EPA Administrator not to pursue the possible regulation of CO2 emissions in the United States, many felt that the decision to pull out of the Kyoto treaty was another sign that the United States was unwilling to change its energy policy.

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© 2001 American Chemical Society

The decision to reject the Kyoto agreement was not unexpected. The Hague conference of 170 nations in November 2000, which sought agreement on the provisions of the treaty, failed: the result of a deadlock between the United States and the European Union on the question of credits for existing and planned forest credits versus direct reductions of emissions. Moreover, there has been a steady but determined effort on the part of opponents to the treaty and to the precautionary principle that is deeply embedded in the argument for the treaty. Most of these arguments are based on the projected economic impacts of the treaty in the United States, but there are also underlying differences of opinion about the magnitude and severity of the impacts of global warming, and the proportion of it that is due to human effects. But this is not the end of the story. As the Post story indicates, there is still the chance that the Bush administration has an alternative plan in mind, perhaps even one that is superior to the proposals on the table. Or, it may be that at this transition point, others may come forward with a new plan to achieve the goals of Kyoto. Perhaps, it is time for us to consider a combination of CO2 emission controls, scientifically credible CO2 credit schemes, and a formula that will not penalize developing countries for the historical emissions of the developed world. Perhaps, this is the time for a more serious consideration of new mechanisms, especially those that take into account nonregulatory innovations, to achieve a global energy regime that is more environmentally benign, economically sound, and equitable for all people. Rio, Berlin, and Kyoto were never exclusively about climate change; rather, they are a part of a serious attempt by thoughtful people to deal with a new idea about how our society can operate within the constraints of our planetary system and benefit the human condition. It is time to stop the ideological and political debate and get to work on solutions.

William H. Glaze, Editor ([email protected])

MAY 1, 2001 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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