Can Laboratory Safety Be Taught? Martin J. Pill Chemical Engineering, University
of Leeds, UK
T h e Human Element When things go wrong, from a small spillage up t o Chernobyl, i t is usual t o blame "human error". The response hy those in authority is predictable: it is to increase the complexity and severity of regulations and to demand more "safety training". (Note that those in authority do not themselves carry out bench experiments or operate a nuclear reactor, but they are pleased to direct those who do.) The aim is presumably to reduce the amount of error emanating from these fallible if not wilfully reckless humans. Several questions do not seem to be asked. (1) Is reduction of human error possible? (2) Is safety training the best way to achieve it? (3) Alternatively, can one increase safety in spite of human error? Errors a n d C o n s e q u e n c e s Human errors are uf several kinds: knocking over flask is a different matter frmn taking the wnmg fladk. It is easy to see that meas&es to control one sort may have no effect on the incidence of another kind of error. Furthermore, control measures can themselves lead to further errors. For example, labelled flasks are less likely t o he confused, but the labels can themselves be wrong1 or misunde~stood.~ It may also be asserted that the magnitude of the error is not strongly related to the consequence. That is, in some cases a gross error may have trivial results, whereas sometimes a minor slip can cause a disaster. It all depends on the circumstance. In fact, what is normally a correct action can become the cause of an accident. This particularly applies t o routine learned procedures, such as switching off electricity when leaving the work area. If there has been a release of flammable vapor, then the action of switching off can generate a spark that starts a fire. The point here is that a routine safetv orocedure can be daneerous. and hindsigdt is not enough to stop the ha: bitusl action.
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Teachlng S a f e l y The cummonest safety tearhing may be described as'safcty awareness". Much timr is spent (somewhat unprofitably, arguing
A312
Journal
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that safety is a good thing, and urging ptople to "think saie". Rather more useful id the time spent informmg people of harardu. I t may be assumed that most people do not want t o suffer injury, and therefore showing them how accidents can occur may help them to avoid this. However, the message that is transmitted is not alwavs that which is ~ e c e i v e d This .~ happens in all fields: safety is no exceptron. I t is therefvre vital to hat,e Rome kmd of checking procedure to ensure that (at least) peupie do nor come away from a safety l e ~ turc n ~ t hthe tdea that carbon tetrachlurrde iu flammable or that a c ~ din the eyes rhould be neutralized with caustic3 In many cases (to my certain knowledge) no information a t all is transmitted. An example is giving a list of flash points t o people who do not know how t o interpret them. Instructions t o "take care" are largely meaningless unless followed by very specific information as t o the nature of care. I have come across people who can recite the need t o "take care with peroxidizable compounds" without understanding the phrase and with no idea how their actions should be modified. .~ ~~
The key henefit of "safety awareness" teaehrng must he to increase prople's motivatim. Sadly, this motivation tends to be short-lived and in any case is not enough. People a t work must be given the tools t o carry out their good intentions.
Instruction, Tralnlng, a n d Education Effective safety practice requires something in the way of facilities: the provision of pipet fillers, good lighting, an uncluttered workspace, etc. Assuming that these are present, a positive program is required in order to ensure that thesefacilitiesare used. Regrettably, it is a common failing to provide safety-related items but no instructions as to their use. Workers may mouth pipet because they cannot use a pipet filler, or they may misuse one and cause contamination. Lack of proper instruction in lahoratories is not only dangerous, it greatly reduces the quality of the work. Safety instruction has three elements: policy, training, and education. They are
t much commonly mired together, t ~ are more effective when prerented repararely. Pdtn rs an official statement of u.hat will be done. I t requires no explanation nor details of method: these should be dealt with separately. "Eyeshields must be worn." "The shower will he tested each Tuesday." "Chemicals will be date-stamped upon receipt." Documents that mix method and explanation are much less clear and less authoritative. Training is the inculcation of a skill (physical or mental) by demonstration and practice. Understanding is by no means necessary (although i t can aid motivation). For example, adults teach children to read without anv historv of callieraohv. .. . .. and armv drills are successful in making soldiers per. form complrx technical tasks regardless of their mechanical knuwledge. In the laboratory, training covers such matters as the correct wav to use a buret or to inieet a samole into a eas chromatoeraoh. .. . There ra no sharp divide between safety and glad laburatury working: proper handlrng i,f apparatujand matrrialsgiws hetter reauits and fewer mishaps. However, there are activities where safety is the prime motivation. For example,nooneshould use breathing protection without having received orooer instruction and ~ r a c t i c eunder the guiaancr of a genuinely knuwledgeablr prrson. The same gms fur dealing with gas rglinders, e.g.. for an atomic absorption apectrophotometer. Regrettably, this does not take place in all laboratories, for reasons of ignorance, lack of care, and personal pride. Some managers and even safety officers simply do not realize that training is required: they assume that providing the facility is enough. In other establishments, instruction is informal and unchecked: one student or junior technician passes on a mixture of half-truths, guesses, and hearsay to a new colleague, who will in turn pass on an even less reliable version to the next neophyte! Perhaps the biggest danger comes from oride: neoole of senior oosition and ereat cducat;on ;end to suppoIe that they do not requirr training. Howewr, an understsnding of the mat he ma tic^ of spectra u,ill not
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tell you which buttons t o press on the new spectrophotometer, and the best theoretical chemist may not be able to set up experimental apparatus. The answer is for management to use tact hacked up with firmness in making senior staff take instruction, and for all of us t o admit it frankly when we are faced with something new. Education is often confused with training. Those who appreciate the difference tend to assume that education is always hetter. Not so! In safety and many other fields, simple training may be more effective for certain tasks. However, there is no doubt that laboratory workers need to be educated: that is, they need agood depth of knowledge, and they need to be able to think. The safety officer's training methods can ensure safety in situations that are predictable and well known. The scientist's education is needed to reduce danger in new situations (such as a new chemical experiment) and t o find ways out of unexpected difficulties (such as a complex accident or an unanticipated reaction product). I t must be pointed out that knowledge is not enough-it is thinking that is vital. In planning experimental work, scientists should use the standard literature t o check for hazards. They should also use their specialist knowledge and intelligence to anticipate dangers, even if unlikely. When dealing with an unusual compound, it is no excuse t o sav that no hazards are listed: a ~rofessional ~~, chem~stshould he anle to use the structure and whatever is known of the rewfivity to antrcipate pruhlcrns and thus tnkp prrcnu.
cabinet: what is needed is a few simple rules. People mLst be informed uhat the rules src-it is surprising hou often a fadwe to communicate occurs a t this primary level! Furthermore, training of one form or another is required as the work or the staff changes. Finally, education for safety should begin with early science teaching, and should continue through student days and into employment. Senior staff should see education as part of their management function. Ultimately, the dedicated scientist will take pride in self-education in safety as in other areas of his or her profession.
'Pin, M. J. J. Chem. Educ. 1984, 61, A231. Peters. G. A. Hazard Prevention 1985, (May/ June), 21. These are both wrong1 %letz, T. A. Chem. Eng. (UK.)1988, 35. 446.
Is Teaching the Answer? In the aftermath of an incident there is a great tendency to rush t o training and education as a panacea. Experienced training officers have estimated that 80% of the training they are asked to provide is for problems that are better solved by other ,"em,%. .....
For example, reducing the fire hazard is more worthwhile than training people to use extinguishers. Taking on hoard a recent approach for chemical plants,' we can try to make the laboratory more "user friendly", that is. tolerant and forgiving of humanfailings. ~ i r n ~expedients, le such as the use of trays to catch spillages and keeping only a small amount of chemicals in the work area, will limit the damage that an accident can do. Items of major hazard potential, such as gas cylinders and large solvent stills, should not be in a general work area. I t is also possible sometimes to substitute different materials or methods to reduce the need for exceptional care and skill. We all make mistakes. and i t is orobablv more practical t~ seek to change the situationsothat weran survireourerrorsthan to try to turn people into perfect robots. ~~
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Conclusion In answer t o the title of this article, laboratory safety is the minimizing of dangers due to equipment failure or human action/ inaction. I t cannot be taught, but teaching is a vital element in achieving it. Exhortation is largely valueless. ~ a k i n g p e o p l aware e of dangers a t least gives them the chance of avoiding injury. The laboratory safety policy should not be a complex legal document kept in a filing ..
Volume 65
Number 12
December 1988
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