Making Decisions about Hazardous Waste ... - ACS Publications

Environ. Sci. Technol. 2003, 37, 1485-1492

Making Decisions about Hazardous Waste Remediation When Even Considering a Remediation Technology Is Controversial AMY K. WOLFE* AND DAVID J. BJORNSTAD Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P. O. Box 2008, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6205 NICHOLE D. KERCHNER The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee 37996

This paper investigates the circumstances under which proposed hazardous waste remediation technologies are socially acceptable, that is, considered seriously as options in a public arena. First, it summarizes a conceptual framework that guides investigation and interpretation of sitespecific remediation decision-making. Second, it describes an initial application of that framework to the public participation venue of U.S. DOE Site-Specific Advisory Boards. Investigating the attributes of involved parties and of site context highlights technology acceptability as social decision-making that involves technical and technological issues rather than as a process driven by the technology itself.

Introduction Public officials often are faced with technical decisions that are lightning rods for controversy. A rezoning decision for a hazardous waste incinerator is different in kind from a decision to rezone a parcel of land for a ceramic fabrication facility. Hence, advice drawn from experience with noncontroversial technologies may be woefully inadequate for public officials facing controversial circumstances, particularly when such advice is organized around a single theme. This kind of advice ranges from “conduct early and often public participation”, “use risk-based measures”, “rely on the science”, to “do not break the bank”. Often these suggestions fail to address the real concerns of interested parties and, in doing so, build resistance to the proposed technological option. Moreover, in the lengthy and fluid decision-making surrounding controversial technologies, decision-makers may find that their preferred solutions, or “offers”, unexpectedly and inadvertently fan the flames of public controversy. This paper discusses an alternative perspective on decision-making about controversial technologies, one that is multidimensional and encompassing in its focus on sitespecific decision-oriented dialogues. We suggest that technologies, involved constituents, and physical, social, and institutional settings all have attributes that can influence decision-oriented dialogues significantly and simultaneously. Taking this encompassing view holds the dual promise of enhancing researchers’ insights and promoting more effective * Corresponding author phone: (865)574-5944; fax: (865)576-2400; e-mail: [email protected]. 10.1021/es015659z CCC: $25.00 Published on Web 03/20/2003

 2003 American Chemical Society

and productive decision-oriented dialogues in the public arena. For researchers, considering remediation decisionmaking holistically and dynamically may prompt alternative interpretations and questions from those generated from a more piecemeal approach (e.g., investigating risk or public participation or economics). The perspective we propose also may provide a tool to assist participants engaged in dialogue to listen more productively and, perhaps, structure their interactions to avoid unnecessary and polarized conflict. We do not question the value of public debate and controversy in a democratic society. However, sometimes productive debate is transformed either into a polarized gridlock or situations where antagonism is fanned when parties “talk past” one another, repeating their statements or stances without truly listening or responding to other parties’ concerns. In these situations, dialogue tends to be nonproductive. By “enhancing productive dialogue”, therefore, we aim to help engaged parties avoid or minimize these sorts of nonproductive dialogue. Although deliberately broad, our approach grew from a specific, limited investigation of the social acceptability of using genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs) to remediate hazardous or radioactive wastes. We focused on public dialogues about remediation decision-making, specifically on those aspects of the public dialogue that determine whether a controversial technology is “acceptable”. By acceptable, we mean whether there exists a feasible set of conditions under which the technology would be “on the table” for serious public discussion. We do not address technology selection or deployment. Nor do we address “behind-the-scenes” decision-making (e.g., in accordance with best available technology procedures) that leads to publicly made proposals for specific remediation alternatives, although we believe that portion of the remediation decisionmaking process is ripe for study. GEMs are microorganisms such as yeast, fungi, or bacteria into which genetic materialseither from the same species or other speciesshas been isolated, manipulated, and introduced (1, 2). Our interest lies in GEMs that potentially can transform hazardous waste substances into benign forms, chemically reduce them, or slow or halt their below-ground movement. At present, GEMs are a remediation technology of the future. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Natural and Accelerated Bioremediation Research Program does not include GEMs; the environmental assessment on its Field Research Center in Oak Ridge, TN specifically excludes GEMs. Nevertheless, particularly because of their genetic engineering component, they potentially could be among those technologies such as incinerators and nuclear facilities that, while proposed and promoted on their scientific and technical merits, often are socially unacceptable (i.e., not considered seriously as an option). We have introduced elsewhere the framework that serves as a “template” for our discussion, PACT, the Public Acceptability of Controversial Technologies (3). This paper presents an initial exploration of PACT, investigating acceptability relative to two dimensions of the framework, the Constituent and Context Dimensions. To bound our study, we limit our examination to a subset of 12 contaminated U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites, those that had federally chartered Site-Specific Advisory Boards (SSABs) in the 1999-2000 time frame. (Since that time, three SSABs have been disbanded.) SSABs are officially sanctioned advisory groups. As such, they represent only one forum for public participation, one that is amenable to study using extant data sources. VOL. 37, NO. 8, 2003 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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FIGURE 1. PACT interprets dialogues through shifts in constituents’ positions along a decision-rule continuum. At this initial stage, our aim was to explore the set of SSABs primarily to glean whether PACT can enhance understanding of the process through which remediation technologies achieve some level of public, social acceptability in this particular arena. We focused on how Board composition and formal and informal rules for functioning could affect the dialogue process and technology acceptability. This public participation venue also held promise for our plans for future work to track actual dialogues over time in a subset of SSABs through audio and video recordings of full-group meetings. However, we found that only some SSABs taped their meetings and that full-group rather than working-group sessions tended to be taped. For our purposes, the advantages of unobtrusively observing actual interactions in their natural setting outweighed the disadvantages of relying on minutes (of variable quality) or faulty (inaccurate or biased) recollections of interactions. Because of the central role of our framework, we begin this paper with a brief description of PACT. Then we describe how this framework guided analysis of the potential determinants of technology acceptability deriving from the structure and functioning of DOE SSABs. Finally, we highlight aspects of the SSABs that could influence the nature of the dialogue process differentially across sites.

Public Acceptability of Controversial Technologies (PACT): Overview The PACT framework draws upon a broad literatureson technology acceptability, risk perception, risk communication, public participation, environmental values, environmental decision-making, negotiation, and conflict resolutions to provide a common logic for examining decision-making about GEMs used for bioremediation (e.g., refs 3-45). At a macro level, we designed PACT around those general features (dimensions) that influence decision-oriented dialogues over controversial remediation technologies. These dimensions (Figure 1) are (i) the constituents involved in remediation decision-making; (ii) the technology of concern relative to other technology options; (iii) the social, institutional, physical context within which the wastes are located and remediation decision-making occurs; and (iv) the dialogues themselves. Viewing acceptability from the perspective of a single dimension (e.g., the perspective of public participants, the risk-related characteristics of the technology, or the effectiveness of formal risk communication efforts) can produce a distorted understanding. This distortion is evident in traditional framing of questions dealing with technology acceptability (e.g., “Why are nuclear power plants not seen as safe?”). Even the most controversial technologies are neither universally excluded from consideration nor uniformly rejected. For example, while nuclear power plants were a nonoption in the United States for the past two 1486

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decades, they were built in other countries. Changing circumstances now appear to be bringing them back to the table in the United States. In contrast, antagonism toward genetically engineered foods has been far greater in Europe than in the United States. Focusing solely on such technical attributes as engineering design or risk characteristics can direct inquiry away from the important question: What is it about those technological options thatsin particular settings, among particular constituents, for particular purposes, in comparison with available optionsscauses them to be considered or not, accepted or not? Moreover, trying to influence acceptability through the channels associated with a single dimension (e.g., early and often participation, education, or risk-related information provision) may lead to unexpected results. The most disconcerting result may be the inadvertent propelling of issues or participants toward nonnegotiable stances that polarize rather than promote dialogue. Therefore, we developed PACT to treat all of these dimensions simultaneously and generally, understanding that specific attributes will vary from situation to situation. At a more micro level, we wanted PACT to guide examination and promote understanding of specific decision processes. We therefore identified the attributes of each dimension that may most likely influence acceptability. In other words, if an agency would propose a GEMs field release to remediate a large contaminated area, what aspects of the (a) agency and other parties involved in decision-making, (b) microorganism, (c) current approach to cleanup, (d) community, (e) wastes and the environment in which they are found, and (f) approach taken to decision-making will be important? PACT was not intended to predict, for example, which groups will become engaged in a dialogue over acceptability or the decisions groups make. Rather, the framework provides a structure that guides efforts to understand the dynamics and outcomes of specific dialogues and, ultimately, to generalize across cases. We discuss the framework in three steps. After introducing the concept of acceptability, we define and describe the dialogue dimension, followed by a discussion of PACT’s other dimensions. Discussion highlights attributes we hypothesize to be important in the decision-oriented dialogue process. Acceptability. We begin with the premise that a dialogue process will take place over remediation alternatives and that process will lead to greater or lesser degrees of technology acceptability. For DOE sites, at least some of that dialogue occurs within the public sphere. Dialogue may occur over a lengthy time period, in face-to-face interactions as well as in formal and informal sequences of interactions (e.g., in newspapers, through letters to the editor, op-ed pieces, and the like). Conceptually, acceptability is a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Also, acceptability need not be fixed; the degree of acceptability may change over time and as the result of interactions with other parties. It is a choice made by specific constituents or decision-making groups rather than an attribute of a technology. We have chosen to use “willingness to negotiate” as evidence of and a measurable proxy for acceptability. PACT Dimensions. The logic of the PACT framework (Figure 1) is developed around the dialogue process, labeled the Dialogue Dimension. Three additional sets of attributes, or dimensions, that influence constituents’ initial and subsequent positions along that continuumsthe Constituent, Technology, and Context Dimensionsscomplete the framework. Dialogue Dimension. A decision-rule continuum underlies the dynamics of the Dialogue Dimension. This continuum is bounded by two end points. At the one end, participants apply a binary decision rule (yes or no; consider or refuse to

consider), and at the other end they apply a decision rule that treats everything as negotiable. The negative binary position is of primary interest for this analysis because it is the most powerful impediment to productive, nonpolarized dialogue. However, if a technology proponent is viewed as adopting a positive binary position, i.e., there is no information or position so extreme as to dissuade them from wishing to deploy the technology, that stance may lessen other parties’ willingness to bargain. Intermediate points along the continuum constitute conditional decision rules. These rules impose conditions that may not preclude serious consideration but that add burdens in excess of those placed on other technologies that are fully acceptable. The pattern of any party’s decision rules may change during the course of dialogue in response to the communications and interactions among involved parties. Participants may apply different decision rules to the suite of issues about which they are concerned (e.g., meaningful involvement in a decision process may be nonnegotiable, but the level to which contaminated soil is remediated may be negotiable). Decision rules may apply to the decision outcomes considered (e.g., the selection of GEMs or other remediation strategies) as well as to the processes by which decisions are reached (e.g., the role of public involvement). The decision-rule continuum is bounded, at the binary end, by complete acceptability and complete unacceptability. At the tradeoff end of the continuum, it is bounded by a set of potential items that can be traded off. Between lie a graduated set of conditions that alter the attractiveness of the technology of interest relative to alternatives. Constituent Dimension. This dimension includes three attributessvalues, motivations, and strategies. Each participating individual or constituency group may have different profiles, which represent combinations of values, motivations, and strategies. These profiles may change over time. Although there are many ways to categorize environmental values (e.g., refs 9-19), we find a core versus tradeoff value distinction to be most salient. Core values are deeply held and relatively slow to change. Even considering choices that threaten core values causes great discomfort. Parties may be willing to negotiate on other items to protect core values. Choices involving tradeoff values (those values that groups are willing to give up in exchange for something else) cause less or no discomfort. Parties may have different profiles of core and tradeoff values for “items”, such as human life or the environment, or for “processes”, such as participation in decision-making. In practice, parties’ underlying values are not observable partly because the same values may be expressed as conflicting positions. In addition, participants may present strong positions either because those positions reflect core values or as a matter of strategy. It is exceedingly difficult to distinguish whether binary positions actually derive from core values or strategic choices. Constituents may have a variety of motivations for participating in the decision process; those motivations may reflect the individual constituent or the group he or she represents. As examples, parties may be motivated to learn about an issue, to have a role in decision-making, to maintain or achieve power, or to ensure a certain outcome. Similarly, participants may adopt a variety of strategies to achieve their goals, including methods to block the decision process. Technology Dimension. This dimension consists of those attributes of the technology or technologies under consideration that affect their acceptability. Attributes include the technology’s technical parameters, potential harm to human health and the environment, and predictabilitysof the technology’s performance and of any associated harm to human health or well-being, the community, or the environment. We believe that it is unlikely that nonexperimental applications of GEMs will be considered solely as decisions

to accept or reject that one technology. Instead, we think that the decision more likely would be framed as a choice among multiple technology options. Therefore, PACT’s technology dimension is relative; it places the attributes of GEMs (or any other focal technology) in the context of (relative to) other technology options, just as a decision to consider nuclear power is contrasted with natural gas availability, acceptability of new coal plants in an age of global warming, and ability to import power from other areas. The predictability of the technology of interest and its application may influence acceptability strongly. Involved parties may have a greater willingness to negotiate if technologies are predictable and past experience is judged positively. If, however, the consequences of using a technology are viewed as predictably negative, groups may (a) not be willing to consider that technology seriously and (b) be willing to negotiate about other technology options. Among the factors that influence predictability are the following: (i) comparable scale of use (bench vs field tests, small scale vs large scale); (ii) similarity of conditions (contaminants, soil profile, site hydrology, etc.); (iii) effectiveness in similar or other settings; (iv) problems, direct or secondary, at other locations; and (v) financial costs. Context Dimension. Context refers to the settings in which the technology may be used and in which the technology choice may be made. This dimension consists of three categories of attributessphysical, social, and institutional. The Context Dimension focuses more on how its attributes affect acceptability than on the attributes in and of themselves. Urgency is an example of an institutional context attribute that may significantly influence acceptability. If a rigid and urgent decision schedule is seen as real (with significant penalties for missing the date), involved parties may have greater willingness to negotiate than if there is no urgency. Urgency may be among the few conditions that force participants to confront uncomfortable decisions and make tradeoffs that impinge upon their core values (46). Situations where there is no urgency (e.g., where strict, fast-track schedules seem manufactured or groundless) may not provide groups with incentives to make decisions or confront uneasy choices. We suggest the possibility that continuing difficulty in reaching agreements on cleanup may be an indicator of participants’ perceptions that there is no true urgency or importance attached to the decisions they are being asked to make.

Applying the Framework: DOE Site-Specific Advisory Boards Because GEMs are a remediation technology of the future, we must draw inferences related to their acceptability from situations that are analogous in terms of either the technologies or decision processes involved. DOE SSABs, established in the early 1990s, are one such analogous institutional construct for site-specific, decision-oriented dialogues. We refer to SSABs as “public groups” because they represent a formal mechanism for reaching acceptability decisions that will be deemed “the” public position. They have become an important mechanism through which the DOE seeks public input and recommendations for site-specific decisions. “DOE’s purpose in creating the SSAB Initiative was to obtain broadly based, independent, consensus advice and recommendations on issues that have the potential to affect communities surrounding DOE sites, so that it could formulate policies that could be implemented with community consent” (47). Clearly, SSABs do not make decisions for DOE; they do not decide what remediation technology VOL. 37, NO. 8, 2003 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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TABLE 1. DOE’s SSABs currently operating

disbanded

Fernald, OH Hanford, WA Idaho Nevada Test Site, NV northern New Mexico (Los Alamos) Oak Ridge, TN Paducah, KY Rocky Flats, CO Savanna River, SC

Monticello, UT Pantex, TX Sandia, NM

or technologies to propose or deploy. However, SSABs are deliberative bodies whose roles in the decision-making process are to determine what feedback, advice, and recommendations to make to DOE on behalf of local communities. When we initiated our research, there were 12 SSABs; three have disbanded since then (Table 1). DOE SSABs are federally chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, giving them the legal authority to advise the agency. However, each board established its own operating procedures, with different by-laws and mission statements. Similarly, each SSAB has a different composition of members, site and contamination characteristics, and history. We briefly characterize the range of variation among SSABs with regard to PACT’s Constituent and Context Dimensions. We also suggest how these variations may influence SSAB acceptability dialogues. Constituent Dimension. Despite DOE’s goal of using SSABs to involve communities in decisions affecting them, the Boards differ in many ways. These differences, such as the criteria Boards use to select members and Boards’ rules for whose views members should represent, result in and reflect very different kinds of stakeholder involvement across sites. (SSAB-generated rules for representation are discussed here rather than under Institutional Context because they affect which constituents are involved in the process.) From the perspective of PACT, these differences influence (a) constraints on the kinds of initial and subsequent positions SSAB members take and (b) who participates. Guidelines for whose views Board members should represent can have a tremendous influence on representation and on how individual members proceed through the dialogue process. In most cases, Boards are structured so that members represent their own views, even if they fill a slot for a particular population sector (academic, minority, environmental, etc.). It may be difficult in practice to distinguish whether these members represent their personal views, an identified constituency group’s views, or both. For example, at Hanford, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River members are selected to represent specific population sectors or constituency groups. Savannah River SSAB members are selected to represent population sectors (academia, business, environmental, etc.) and, overall, attention is paid to gender, race, and geographic location. In contrast, many Hanford SSAB members represent specific community interest groups, which suggest replacement representatives when the SSAB members representing them leave the SSAB. For most SSABs, there is no mechanism for ensuring that members report back to and truly represent a group, sector, or community. The degree to which SSABs interact with or represent the community is a matter for empirical investigation. Within the PACT framework, the structure and functioning of Boards with regard to whose interests are represented may influence the dynamics of the dialogue dimension. Individuals representing themselves have fewer constraints than individuals representing constituency groups in their ability to choose to maintain hard-and-fast positions or shift their positions, regardless of whether those positions are 1488

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based on core values. Group representatives (especially those who are selected by those groups) must ensure that their positions and reactions fall within the bounds of the groups’ identity, beliefs, values, and strategies, perhaps by checking with those groups before taking a stance. Group representatives who stray too far from their mission may find themselves replaced. Moreover, choices made by individuals who represent constituencies may be driven by the groups’ strategies and goals for the dialogue rather than by statements or stances made by other participants. This kind of strategic participation in decision processes highlights the inaccuracy of oft-implied reasoning among those who promote “education” or injecting scientific expertise into decision dialogues as a way of improving decision-making. It is fallacious to reason that if only “they” (constituents external to the agency and its pool of scientific and technical expertise) knew what “we” (constituents within the sponsoring agency and its assessors and experts) know, “they” would agree with “our” conclusion. Note that this discussion is based upon formalized rules of SSAB member selection and SSAB operation. It may be important to distinguish selection from representation. For example, members selected from generic “business” or “minority” communities may operate under fewer constraints and with less community- or group-specific accountability than those selected from specific organizations (e.g., Chamber of Commerce). SSABs vary in size, both according to their by-laws and in terms of the number of positions actually filled at any point in time. Numbers of members can range from 12 to 30. SSAB member attributes also vary across sites, based largely on each Board’s by-laws and selection processes. For instance, the Nevada Test Site group’s by-laws do not include local business representatives, and none are on the Board, in contrast with most other sites where local commerce is represented. To some extent, variations in SSAB composition reflect differences in local communities, such as Native American tribal presence or established civic and environmental groups that have engaged in similar processes. DOE ultimately must approve SSAB members, but members can be selected by Board members, third or independent parties, constituency groups (naming their own representatives), or directly by DOE. Most SSABs include representatives of environmental groups, local governments, labor, economic groups or the business community, academia, and the general public. Some groups include public health, agriculture, civil rights, and racial or ethnic minority representatives. The degree to which SSABs are representative of local communities is not clear and may be related to the purpose the DOE wishes the Boards to serve. Are the Boards “representative” in the sense that they are likely to raise issues of concern to majority or minority groups in the community or are they “process oriented”, with the goal of ensuring that largely noncontroversial issues are “lightly scrubbed”? More to the point, under what circumstances would these Boards have a role to play in a genuinely controversial decision? As long as DOE can control their membership, the Boards’ roles may be minimized. Context DimensionsPhysical. The 12 DOE sites vary considerably in their physical attributes (Table 2). These attributes include the size and complexity of the contamination footprint. They influence the shape and extent of underground contaminant plumes, the efficacy of various cleanup options, and the nature and extent of public interest or concern in any particular cleanup decision. For example, the physical size of the DOE sites at which there are SSABs varies tremendously. Toward the small end is the Rocky Flats site (about 10 square miles), where suburban residential development is encroaching upon the site. The largest of these 12 DOE sites is the 1350-square-mile Nevada

TABLE 2. Physical Context Attributes site Fernald Hanford Idaho Los Alamos Monticello Nevada Oak Ridge Paducah Pantex Rocky Flats Sandia Savannah River a

relative complexity of contaminationa

size

physical environment

1 050 acre 2 mi2 358 400 acre 560 mi2 569,600 acre 890 mi2 27 520 acre 43 mi2 108 acre 0.17 mi2 864 000 acre 1 350 mi2 35 252 acre 55 mi2 3 422 acre 5 mi2 16 000 acre 25 mi2 6 216 acre 10 mi2 2 820 acre 4 mi2 198 400 acre 310 mi2

rolling upland, steep hillsides

moderate, 11 operating units

shrub-steppe

complex, 78 operating units

shrub-steppe


mountains, canyons, valleys

simple, 6 operating units simple, 3 operating units

basin and range


ridge and valley


hardwoods and grassland


shortgrass prairie


low hills and ridges


basin and range


Atlantic coastal plain


Based on costs and technology needs as well as existing site characterization.

Test Site, which for practical purposes is isolated. The level of interest in specific cleanup decisions may be influenced by the size and remoteness of DOE sites. As another example, the complexity and potential risks to human health and the environment from the multiple hazardous, radioactive, or mixed wastes at the 12 sites vary. The Monticello site, for instance, contains three operable units that are conglomerations of individual waste sites with similar characteristics or contamination sources. Oak Ridge is far more complex, with over 120 operable units (48). When considering the range of DOE and non-DOE contaminated sites, we hypothesize that site complexity creates a “dilution effect”, such that any single cleanup effort at complex sites (i.e., sites with many contamination problems or areas) typically will receive less public attention or scrutiny than cleanup decision-making at sites with one or a few contaminated areas. If this hypothesis is correct, then the amount of public controversy surrounding remediation decisionmaking need not be directly proportional to the amount of risk or the toxicity of the contaminants of concern. Note that this hypothesis assumes that all other attributes are held constant. A high and urgent risk to human health from one contaminated area within a complex site may draw considerable public attention to cleanup-related decisionmaking and implementation. Context DimensionsSocial. Sites’ demographics vary (47). For instance, sites such as Los Alamos, Hanford, and Paducah have sizable Hispanic populations; others, such as Savannah River, have sizable African-American populations. Different Native American tribes live in areas surrounding such sites as Idaho, Los Alamos, Hanford, Nevada Test Site, and Sandia. Tribal representatives are members of each of these SSABs except in Nevada, where the tribe declined an invitation to participate. Injecting foreign substances, such as GEMs, below ground may be particularly controversial for Native Americans. The issue is not one of science but of cultural belief. Lessons from sites without Native American presence may hold limited relevance for those with strong tribal influences. With regard to PACT, it is clear that social context variations influence the validity of cross-site generalizations about technology acceptability.

TABLE 3. Social Context Attributesa site Fernald Hanford Idaho Los Alamos Nevada Oak Ridge Paducah Pantex Rocky Flats Sandia Savannah River

active involvement regarding DOE site very active very active active less active very active less active less active very active active

importance of DOE to local economy highly important highly important highly important less important highly important important highly important less important highly important important

a

Blanks indicate missing data. Information not available for Monticello.

Social structure and dynamics vary across the 12 DOE sites in ways that could influence decision-oriented dialogues (Table 3). For example, community activism varies across sites and does not appear to be linked to the prominence of DOE in an area. There is a relatively long history of active community involvement in such locations as Hanford, Oak Ridge, and Rocky Flats, although the nature of that involvement varies. For example, while Bradbury and Branch (47) characterize some Hanford public involvement activities as “collaborative problem-solving” among local, regional, and national stakeholder organizations, such collaboration largely has been absent at Oak Ridge. Collaboration in Oak Ridge has taken different forms. For example, concerned workers suspected of suffering from beryllium poisoning and other illnesses related to previous DOE employment actively participated in a debate over a mixed hazardous and radioactive waste incinerator. The absence of a corresponding forum for beryllium workers meant that the incinerator decision became even more controversial, leading to the establishment of a special task force to study its effects. Despite the task force finding that the incinerator was “safe”, the Governor delayed incinerator licensing until the sick workers issue was resolved. VOL. 37, NO. 8, 2003 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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TABLE 4. Institutional Context Attributes site Fernald Hanford Idaho Los Alamos Monticello Nevada Oak Ridge Paducah Pantex Rocky Flats Sandia Savannah River

site mission

cleanup deadlines

remediate remediate, research/production remediate research/production remediate, research/production remediate remediate research/production remediate, research/production remediate research/production remediate, research/production remediate remediate, research/production remediate, research/production

2005 2046 2056

consensus consensus consensus

yes yes yes

2017 2001 2014

Robert’s Rules of Order

yes

majority

yes

2013 2010

Robert’s Rules of Order consensus majority

yes yes

2002 2006 2001 2038

consensus consensus consensus Robert’s Rules of Order

yes no yes yes

The history of public involvement is considerably different at other sites. An FBI raid on Rocky Flats in 1989 sparked the continuing involvement of regional chapters of national and international environmental organizations such as Sierra Club and Greenpeace. In contrast, the Los Alamos SSAB is one of the first community groups in that area. At some sites the SSABs were initiated by citizens (e.g., Oak Ridge), but at others the push came from DOE (e.g., Paducah). The history of active community involvement at sites influences the nature of relationships among parties (citizen, environmental, business, and religious groups; DOE and its site managers; regulators; etc.), including the trust and confidence they have in one another. New decisions and decision processes build upon past dynamics rather than begin with the proverbial clean slate. The economic dominance of the DOE site in each community and its likely future dominance (e.g., whether the site mission is limited to cleanup or cleanup plus continuing research or production) also varies (Tables 3 and 4). At some locations, such as Hanford, Oak Ridge, and Pantex, the DOE is highly important to the local economy, in contrast with sites such as Rocky Flats. We hypothesize that the greater a group’s economic dependence on the organization(s) responsible for remediating a site, the greater the willingness to negotiate to protect those economic resources. If a site is scheduled for “closure” and has few economic alternatives, local participants may take harder stances in calling for extensive cleanup. At Rocky Flats, in contrast, cleanup decision-making has gone relatively smoothly. Bradbury and Branch report that agreement tends to be easier to achieve in those SSABs where the primary or only mission is remediation, in comparison with those sites with continuing research and production activities. Context DimensionsInstitutional. The institutional context of DOE sites and of the SSABs themselves may influence remediation dialogues at those sites (Table 4). Two salient attributes are site mission(s) and the cleanup deadlines imposed on the sites. We hypothesize two scenarios for sites with a single mission, both of which may influence the acceptability of particular technologies. First, where the DOE site historically has been of great local economic importance, a longer and more extensive cleanup effort may be locally desirable to prolong and maximize jobs and the flow of funds to the area. In the second scenario, where the DOE site has relatively little economic impact on the area, parties may have very different motivations and may be more willing to promote a quick (and effective) cleanup. Cleanup deadlines across the sites can span up to 50 years, but for some sites closure is scheduled for 2006. We hypothesize that, when seen as urgent, these deadlines may act as forcing conditions that promote decision-making and 1490

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SSAB decision procedure

SSAB use of working groups

resolution. Without urgency, deadlines may allow delay. Urgency may vary considerably among involved constituents across or within sites. In Rocky Flats, for example, the contractor has significant performance bonuses at stake and there are pressures from the local private sector to redevelop nearly lands. Not all involved parties at Rocky Flatssor at other DOE sitesshave incentives to feel this same sense of urgency. The institutional context of SSABs also can influence the dialogue process. For example, internal SSAB procedures for securing “agreements” vary. The three major approaches are (a) majority voting (e.g., at the Nevada Test Site); (b) following Robert’s Rules of Order (e.g., at Los Alamos); and (c) consensus (e.g., at Hanford). These approaches, together with procedures for reporting (or not reporting) minority opinions to the DOE, influence the relative power of SSAB members and the nature of the recommendations or comments that the DOE receives. Rules and procedures that allow minority opinions to “count” in decisions confer some power to those minority voices. In contrast, parties that typically express minority views are rendered powerless by rules and procedures that consistently silence those voices. The institutional procedures for determining agreement can affect both the blocking power of individual SSAB members and the “costs” to individual members of maintaining (versus shifting) their stances. Institutional procedures can change over time, too. For example, in 1998 Oak Ridge changed from a consensus approach to Robert’s Rules of Order, partly to reduce the ability of a minority of the Board to block consensus (47). SSABs increasingly are linked to one another through meetings, visits, inter-group meetings, and other forms of communication. While SSABs focus on their local DOE reservations, those considerations are nested within a larger institutional and regulatory context. For instance, at a March 1998 Oak Ridge SSAB meeting, participants discussed the need for on-site treatment of wastes within the context of regulatory and legal restrictions as well as state equity issues. At that time, courts prohibited Oak Ridge Reservation wastes from being shipped to any private waste disposal facility. SSAB members discussed how that restriction underscored the need to treat wastes effectively on-site. However, members also noted the inequity of the Oak Ridge Reservation having to import and treat other sites’ wastes without being able to export its own wastes. This kind of discussion shows that SSAB members not only may position themselves with regard to other members of their SSAB but also with regard to players who are not technically “at the table”.

TABLE 5. Summary of SSAB and Site Attributes That May Influence Participants’ Technology Acceptability Positions over Time constituent attributes

context attributes

constituents represented or excluded

DOE’s local economic importance

participants represent constituents or themselves

cleanup only or continuing research/production mission complexity of contamination nearness of cleanup deadline

Summary and Discussion Remediation decision-making may occur in situations that are steeped in controversy, where participants hold and express impassioned views. Often, there may be no “ideal” technological solutions from the perspectives of technical effectiveness, associated environmental and human health risks, or financial costs. A considerable amount of research and development ultimately aims to improve or provide better alternatives to existing technological solutions. Still unresolved, however, is whethersor under what conditionss these technological solutions might be considered seriously as remediation options for particular sites in the public arena. This question is central to the concept of acceptability and the conceptual framework, PACT, presented in this paper. PACT provides an encompassing view of dimensions and dynamics of site-specific, decision-oriented dialogues about remediation. It prompts research questions and hypotheses as well as a systematic way of analyzing the complex world of remediation decision-making. This article does not formally test of the PACT’s framework. Instead, it presents an initial, qualitative exercise to see if the framework imparts a logical basis for dissecting and analyzing real-world situations and whether its use spurs potentially valuable insights, particularly insights that may be generalizable to other sites or situations. Clearly, technological attributes may play a significant or dominant role in peoples’ willingness to consider a particular technology seriously. However, a technology-oriented perspective fails to explain why the same technology is rejected emphatically in some locations and deployed in others. With PACT, we broaden this technology-oriented perspective by presenting technology acceptability as social decision-making about technical and technological issues. The initial application of PACT reported here did not consider technology attributes. Instead, it investigated a formalized public forum within which remediation technology acceptability could be determined. DOE SSABs provide one venue through which to observe and analyze a visible portion of the world of remediation decision-making. Confining inquiry to SSABs narrows the realm of investigation to something more manageable than the entire domain of site-specific remediation decisionmaking. The formal record keeping (minutes, recordings, etc.) associated with full-group SSAB meetings also is a tremendous resource for the next phase of research, in which we will analyze the dialogues over time. The comparison of SSABs reported here focused on identifying which Constituent and Context attributes could affect the positions that SSAB participants take over time. It also began to highlight attributes of the dialogue processs its structure (e.g., procedural rules)sthat could influence dialogues. The attributes we identified serve as much as hypotheses as interim findings (Table 5), as the following three examples show. Hypothesis: participants who represent groups are more constrained in the positions they take and

dialogue attributes decision procedures (consensus, Robert’s Rules, etc.) use of working groups

in any change in those positions over time than participants who represent themselves. We hypothesize that procedural rules created by SSABs may consistently, though perhaps inadvertently, silence participant or constituent perspectives (e.g., if only majority votes or reports are put forward to DOE). We also hypothesize that the greater the extent and complexity of contamination at a site, the greater the willingness to consider innovative technologies. The next phase of research will begin to explore a subset of these hypotheses by analyzing full-group SSAB meeting dialogues. However, each hypothesis addresses only one component of a large and complex technology acceptability system. To understand fully any particular case and, perhaps more importantly, to discern what is generalizable across cases, it ultimately will be necessary to comprehend the functioning and dynamics of the entire system.

Acknowledgments This research was funded by the Natural and Accelerated Bioremediation Research (NABIR) Program, Bioremediation and Its Social Implications and Concerns (BASIC) Program Element, Biological and Environmental Research (BER), U.S. Department of Energy (Grant KP1301010). Milton Russell is a principal investigator on this project and contributed enormously to the ideas presented in this paper.

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Received for review August 22, 2001. Revised manuscript received January 30, 2003. Accepted February 7, 2003. ES015659Z

Making Decisions about Hazardous Waste ... - ACS Publications

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