VIEWPOINT pubs.acs.org/est
Nuclear Accident Like Fukushima Unlikely in the Rest of the World? Qiang Wang†,‡,* and Xi Chen†,‡ †
State Key Laboratory of Desert and Oasis Ecology, Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Urumchi, 830011, P.R. China ‡ Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Urumchi, 830011, P.R. China
I
t is too soon to fully understand what happened in Japan’s Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power station. However, available information let us wonder whether the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl could have been averted. In addition to natural disaster and technical risk, the failure of Japan’s nuclear regulatory system was also to blame for the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Above all, the performance record of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the operator of the Fukushima plant, has been subpar for a very long time.1,2 For example, following a relatively small earthquake in 2007, a fire ensued at another nuclear plant, and TEPCO masked the fact that hundreds of gallons of radioactive water leaked out.2TEPCO has also been involved in a series of disclosure violation, most notably in 2002 when its leadership was fired after being accused of falsifying inspection videotape and other safety records.1 In addition, the Fukushima plant was one of the most problem-prone nuclear facilities in Japan for over a decade.1,3 In the most recent case, in August 2010, employees at the Fukushima power plant, armed with plans for work on the No. 6 reactor, instead began conducting work on the No. 5 reactor. They then altered work plans on their own, leading to a mistake that rendered the unit’s cooling system inoperable.3 However, on February 7, 2011, NISA approved a 10-year extension for No. 1 rector at Fukushima plant, after the reactor ended its designed lifecycle. r 2011 American Chemical Society
Finally, crucial efforts to depressurize of the crippled No.1 reactor were delayed. TEPCO considered using seawater from the nearby coast to cool No.1 reactor at least as early as morning 12 March, the day after the quake struck. But it did not do so until that evening, nor begin using seawater at other reactors until 13 March. TEPCO was reluctant to use seawater because seawater can render a nuclear reactor permanently inoperable, hurting its assets.4 This delay partly led to the No. 1 reactor meltdown and the hydrogen explosion which doomed No. 2 and No. 3 reactors. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) show that Japan has rated well on governance relative to the majority of countries of the world, but rated in the bottom half of countries of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.2 Investigations before and after the Fukushima nuclear accident revealed that Japan’s nuclear safety regulation system was deeply flawed in three aspects: nuclear safety rulemaking, agency setting, and having a revolving door. During the nuclear safety rulemaking process, the experts involved lacked independence. Transcripts of the rulemaking meetings showed the members rarely challenged each other, despite the fact that these experts represent contrasting backgrounds, such as utility companies, bureaucracies, institutes, and universities.1,2 Moreover, power company advisers dominated a panel responsible for Japan’s nuclear safety rulemaking.1 For example, in a safety guideline submitted in December 2001, TEPCO told NISA that sea waves at the spot would not exceed 5.7 m. It is believed that 22 of the 35 experts on the committee that submitted these guidelines had strong ties to the nuclear industry.1 On March 11, 2011, the water reached 14 m above sea level at the plant, shutting down the electricity for the cooling system of the reactor, causing the Fukushima disaster. In addition, lack of independence leads Japan’s nuclear regulatory agency to become a caretaker of the nuclear industry. Among the three nuclear regulatory organizations of Japan (Japan Atomic Energy Commission, Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan, and NISA), NISA is the main administrator. NISA is also a division of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). METI has multiple and seemingly contradictory roles. METI is a promoter of nuclear power, but at the same time regulates nuclear safety. Moreover, NISA and the nuclear industry share common interests in reducing Japan’s heavy reliance on imported fuel.2 In some sense, NISA has become a caretaker of nuclear industry, rather than a watchdog for nuclear security and public interests.2,5 Received: October 13, 2011 Accepted: October 24, 2011 Published: November 08, 2011 9831
dx.doi.org/10.1021/es203629u | Environ. Sci. Technol. 2011, 45, 9831–9832
Environmental Science & Technology
VIEWPOINT
Finally, revolving door between regulator and nuclear utilities leads the regulator fail to take responsibility. A survey shows that among the 95 people currently at nuclear regulatory bodies, 26 are found to be affiliated with the nuclear industry.1 Meanwhile, amakudari (descent from heaven) allows bureaucrats of nuclear regulatory agency, usually in their 50s, to land cushy jobs at the companies they once oversaw. At TEPCO alone, from 1959 to 2010, four former ministry-level officials from nuclear regulatory agency successively served as vice presidents at the company.1,5 We contend here the Fukushima was Japan’s accident, which was partly caused by the failure of the nuclear regulatory system. Nuclear accidents like Fukushima are unlikely to happen in a country with an effective nuclear regulatory system. Meanwhile, we believe that strengthening the nuclear safety regulatory system is not optional but imperative to ensure that the 433 operational reactors and the 65 currently under construction worldwide run safely. The rest of the world should learn these lessons of Fukushima to strengthen their nuclear safety system. This includes but not is limited to the following: (i) Responsibility for keep reactor safe must be rest on an independent agency, which is a legitimate, credible, and authoritative regulator. (ii) Laws should be improved to strictly restrict the revolving door. Personnel of nuclear regulatory agencies must be subject to certain conflict of interest restrictions on private employment activities even after they leave nuclear agency. (iii) International peer-review should be welcome to ensure any country not reduce the nuclear safety standards on the ground of its specific condition.
’ AUTHOR INFORMATION Corresponding Author
*E-mail:
[email protected].
’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work is supported by National Nature Science Foundation of China (No. 41001384) and the Foundation of Director of XJB, CAS (Y17305101). ’ REFERENCES (1) Pritchard, J.; Thibodeaux, T.; Sambriski, B.; Reed, J. Revolving door connects Japanese nuke industry, sympathetic government regulators. Washington Post May 1, 2011. (2) Kaufmann, D. Japan’s Triple Disaster: Governance and the Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Crises. http://www.brookings.edu/ opinions/2011/0316_japan_disaster_kaufmann.aspx (accessed October 10, 2011). (3) Morse, A.; Obe, M., Reactors had high rate of problems. The Wall Street Journal March 25, 2011. (4) Shirouzu, N.; Dvorak, P.; Hayashi, Y.; Morse, A., Bid to ‘protect assets’ slowed reactor fight. The Wall Street Journal March 21, 2011. (5) Onishi, N.; Belson, K., Culture of complicity tied to stricken nuclear plant. The New York Times April 27, 2011.
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dx.doi.org/10.1021/es203629u |Environ. Sci. Technol. 2011, 45, 9831–9832
