From a Commitment in Doha to an Emissions Pledge in Paris - ACS

Chapter 5

From a Commitment in Doha to an Emissions Pledge in Paris Downloaded by UNIV OF FLORIDA on December 11, 2017 | http://pubs.acs.org Publication Date (Web): October 23, 2017 | doi: 10.1021/bk-2017-1254.ch005

Parker D. McCrary* School of Law, The University of Alabama, 101 Paul W. Bryant Dr., Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

Negotiators at the 18th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP18) in Doha failed to produce a universally adopted second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol. In response, negotiators at COP21 in Paris produced the Paris Agreement, which requires only a pledge of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. This chapter explores whether the shift from binding commitments to pledges is legally significant, and if the Paris Agreement will lead to reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions.

Introduction Occasionally, a few steps are more than the sum of their parts. The first human standing upright to walk, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s march from Selma, and Neil Armstrong’s first steps on the moon are each an example of a few steps that were far more important to human history than just someone just walking a few steps. This same phenomena happened to me in Doha. There I was, walking down the palm tree lined Al Corniche Street in the middle of the desert with hundreds of others. However, looking at the landscape you might think you were in South Beach with the amount of manicured Bermuda grass that sat between the palm trees and buildings. Above the sounds of shoes hitting the asphalt, chants could be heard. “More action, less talk!” and “we demand climate action now!” were audible as we strolled down Corniche along the Persian Gulf. These seemingly simple acts in the United States or Europe were magnified in Qatar. Qatar, a country built on oil, is not known for allowing protests, especially an environmental protest © 2017 American Chemical Society

Peterman et al.; Climate Change Literacy and Education Social Justice, Energy, Economics, and the Paris Agreement Volume ... ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2017.

which threatens the entire foundation upon which Qatar is built. However, to truly understand the significance of this moment, we have to travel back in time to how this movement first started.

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Background Humans are extremely likely to have caused an unprecedented level of change in Earth’s climate. Earth’s atmosphere and oceans have warmed and the amount of snow and ice present on the surface of the Earth has fallen. These changes are closely associated with the rapid rise in the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG), especially carbon dioxide (CO2), in Earth’s atmosphere. This phenomenon is known as anthropogenic climate change (1). Unfortunately, without global cooperation, a tragedy of the commons scenario will unfold. In a tragedy of the commons, no single person or nation is incentivized to keep the common area clean. Instead, each nation will maximize its economic output, while emitting as much CO2 as necessary. Since the atmosphere is a part of the common area all nations share, it can be difficult for a single country to observe its individualized impact of CO2 emissions or be incentivized to stop emitting CO2 (2). In response, representatives from around the world signed an international treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (3). The UNFCCC set a goal of stabilizing GHG emissions at levels that would prevent anthropogenic climate change through an ongoing relationship instead of a single treaty. At first, the UNFCCC encouraged nations to voluntarily submit to reductions in GHG emissions, with the reduction taking into “account their common but differentiated responsibilities” (3). Nations were divided into either Annex 1, Annex 2, and non-Annex 1 countries based on each country’s economy and historical emissions. Annex 1 parties included nations with developed economies and a history of high GHG emissions, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan, as well as countries with economies in transition, such as Russia and Turkey. All Annex 1 countries were expected to voluntarily submit to reductions in GHG emissions. Non-Annex 1 countries were those countries with developing economies, including China, India, Brazil, and the rest of the world. Non-Annex 1 counties were not expected to submit to reductions in GHG emissions (3). Unfortunately, the UNFCCC treaty does not include specific emissions reductions for Annex 1 nations. The UNFCCC only provided a “target” to reduce emissions to a low enough level to prevent anthropogenic climate change. The signatories agreed to work towards target emissions reductions, which were the first step in a comprehensive, global strategy to prevent anthropogenic climate change (3). Each year, the annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC nations meet to negotiate specific aspects of the treaty. At first, the UNFCCC aimed to make reductions in GHG emissions legally binding on Annex 1 nations. At the 1997 COP3 (the third annual COP meeting), the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was introduced (4). Consistent with the principle of “common but differentiated 50 Peterman et al.; Climate Change Literacy and Education Social Justice, Energy, Economics, and the Paris Agreement Volume ... ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2017.


responsibilities,” only Annex 1 countries were required to reduce GHG emissions. The Kyoto Protocol required GHG emission cuts based on the 1990 emissions year. For example, the United States would be required to emit no more than 93% of its 1990 emissions levels by 2012. European countries agreed to cuts equivalent to 92% of their 1990 emissions levels. However, Russia, due to the recent fall of the Soviet Union, was permitted to emit 100% of its 1990 levels, while Australia could emit 108% by 2012 (3). The emissions reductions were to be “legally binding” upon ratification by at least 55 parties and enough Annex 1 parties to represent 55% of the 1990 CO2 emission levels (5). There were several challenges with the “legally binding” intent of the Kyoto Protocol. First, many of the “binding” cuts did not require any reductions in CO2 emissions. For example, Germany had already met its emissions reductions prior to signing the Kyoto Protocol. Second, there was no enforcement mechanism. As a result, several nations that signed the Kyoto Protocol did not remain complaint throughout the Kyoto Protocol period. Third, several Annex 1 nations either did not ratify (United States), ratified after the Kyoto Protocol went into force (Australia), or ratified, but later withdrew (Canada) (5, 6) Even with all of the shortcomings in the Kyoto Protocol, between 1990-2012, collectively, Annex 1 countries decreased GHG emissions by 10.6% based on 1990 level of emissions (7). Despite these reductions, CO2 emissions still hit a record high in 2012. China, now the largest emitter of CO2 in the world, is exempt from making any GHG emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (8). In fact, none of the non-Annex 1 countries, including India and Brazil, were required to reduce GHG emissions (9). While the Annex 1 nations, in total, decreased their GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol excluded developing nations, such as China, which now emits as much CO2 as the United States and all of Europe combined (10). After the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, the UNFCCC’s focus shifted towards planning for what came after the Kyoto Protocol as the ratifiers of the Kyoto Protocol only committed to reduce GHG emissions during a specific period, the First Commitment Period, which only ran through 2012.

Doha Amendment – Second Commitment Period The Kyoto Protocol could only become legally binding once Annex 1 countries representing at least 55% of the 1990 CO2 emissions ratified the protocol (5). With the United States not ratifying the treaty and Australia not doing so until 2007, Russia (with 17.4% of the world’s 1990 emissions) was the treaty’s last chance to reach 55%. As of 2004 at COP 10 in Buenos Aires, only 44.2% of the 1990 emissions were represented among the ratified nations. As a result, much of the negotiations that took place from COP8 through COP10 were focused on manipulating provisions so that Russia would ratify. Finally, Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, which allowed the Kyoto Protocol to come into force in 2005 (11). However, the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period was set to end in 2012, just seven years after it came into legal force. COP13 in Bali, Indonesia coincided with the release of IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. The Fourth Assessment Report stated that “[w]arming of the 51



climate system is unequivocal” and that the warming was “very likely” due to the release of greenhouse gases by humans (1). The negotiators in Bali, while failing to secure any binding commitments, concluded, “deep cuts in global emissions will be required,” post-Kyoto and set up the Bali Action Plan to negotiate a new agreement (12). The U.S. was supportive of the Bali Action Plan despite the understanding that 2/3 of the Senate would need to approve any binding treaty (13). Optimism grew when newly elected President Obama announced that he would attend COP15 in Copenhagen. Obama outlined the U.S.’s position at the plenary session (14). First, all major economies must be involved in mitigation efforts. Second, there must be a review mechanism. Finally, the developed economies must provide financing to the “least developed and most vulnerable” countries. Unfortunately, a deal was not reached at COP15 (15). Instead, the “Copenhagen 5,” consisting of the U.S., Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, negotiated a last-minute accord in which each nation was allowed to set national emission reduction guidelines unilaterally. Europe later grudgingly approved it, but many developing nations vehemently opposed the Copenhagen Accord (16). While some developed countries praised the Copenhagen Accord, it marked a step in a different direction in the international negotiation process as the Copenhagen Accord focused on unilateral rather than multilateral action (17). In the end, Parties could only agree to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord. In some respects, the Copenhagen Accord can be seen as a positive, as both Annex 1 parties (including the United States) and non-Annex 1 parties (such as China), pledged to substantially reduce CO2 emissions (18). At Durban in 2011, the negotiators at COP17 started to realize that a greater sense of urgency was needed. The first commitment period of Kyoto Protocol was set to end in 2012, and there was no agreement in place to govern GHGs emissions after the first commitment period despite the increasing scientific likelihood that climate change is anthropogenic (1, 19). The result of COP17 was the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (20). The Durban Platform sets out a roadmap for the implementation of new binding agreements. First, the Durban Platform detailed the need for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to be developed by 2012 and extend from 2012 until 2020. Second, it called for a new protocol for GHG emission reductions to be negotiated by 2015 for the period extending beyond 2020. The Durban Platform also considered whether a maximum two-degree rise was enough, or if a lower rise in global average temperature was necessary (21). The world set its sights on Doha for COP18 to negotiate a second commitment period (22). The 2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol provided a new set of CO2 emissions reductions that are set to expire in 2020, a “second commitment period” to the Kyoto Protocol (23). Additionally, the negotiators at Doha “streamlined” the Durban Platform to concentrate negotiations on a new protocol to replace Kyoto by 2015 at COP21 (24). Unfortunately, four nations that previously signed the Kyoto Protocol - Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Russia -joined the United States in opting out of the second commitment period. Only 37 nations were legally required to reduce GHG emissions (including 27 52



from the European Union). As a result, Australia was the lone nation outside of Europe that was required to reduce its GHG emissions (25). Immediately after COP18 in Doha, critics blasted the second commitment period as a failure (26). Once again, non-Annex 1 countries were not required to agree to any emissions reductions. Many countries in the European Union committed to up to a 20% reduction of the 1990 base level of greenhouse gas emissions. Australia would be required to commit to a 0.5% reduction of the 2000 base level. In addition, Annex 1 parties could pledge GHG reductions beyond the commitment amount. For example, the European Union pledged a 30% reduction (27). In order to become legally binding on signatories, 144 parties to the Kyoto Protocol must ratify the Doha Amendment. As of October, 2016, 70 countries have ratified the Doha Amendment. Importantly, only eight of the 37 nations required to reduce GHG emissions (Hungary, Italy, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Romania, and Switzerland) have ratified (28).

Paris Agreement – First Pledge Period As COP21 in Paris approached, the ratification of the Doha Amendment by enough states to make the second commitment period legally binding seemed bleak. 2015, at COP21, was the year targeted for the development of a new protocol to go into effect in 2020, the year the Doha Amendment would expire (21). Fortunately, the negotiators started the process a year early, at COP20 in Lima, Peru, by creating a draft negotiation text to be used at COP21 (29). Throughout the year between Lima and Paris, nations submitted proposals included each nation’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). These proposals detailed the steps each country was willing to undergo to mitigate climate change. The idea was that these submissions would streamline negotiations in Paris by serving as a baseline for negotiations (30). For example, the United States aimed to reduce emissions by 26-28% based on the 2005 emissions year (31). However, even with these advancements, at least two issues needed to be resolved before the United States would sign the Paris Agreement: (1) would the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs) be legally binding? and (2) would China and India also be providing an NDC?

Legally Binding Character of the NDCs The first negotiation hurdle leading up to COP21 was whether the new protocol would be legally binding. Even after the signing of the Paris Agreement, it is not completely clear which portions of the Agreement are meant to be legally binding (32). In fact, Article 20 of the Paris Agreement states that States may express their consent to be bound by ratification, accession, acceptance, or approval (33). However, the biggest issue was whether the parties’ NDCs would be legally binding. Essentially, the biggest question was whether the NDCs would be binding on each state under international law, such that each party was required to meet a specific emissions target (32). 53 Peterman et al.; Climate Change Literacy and Education Social Justice, Energy, Economics, and the Paris Agreement Volume ... ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2017.


The United States would clearly not support any binding commitments. Despite signing the Kyoto Protocol, the United States never ratified it. Then President George W. Bush argued that the Kyoto Protocol’s “common but differentiated responsibilities” pushed the bulk of the cuts to the Annex 2 parties (34). Moreover, the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 that the Kyoto Protocol should never have even been signed (35). The European Union lobbied for legally binding NDCs to match the formulation of the legally binding commitments of the Kyoto Protocol and the second commitment period from the Doha Amendment (32). For example, the Kyoto Protocol states, “[t]he Parties shall … ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions … do not exceed their assigned amounts … inscribed in Annex B” (4). The Doha Amendment, as its name suggests, only amends the Kyoto Protocol in a few places. Here, the Doha Amendment replaces the assigned amounts from Annex B with a new table that includes the second commitment period (27). The United States, China, and India rejected requiring conduct. Instead, the United States argued for procedural requirements relating to the NDCs, which might not require ratification by the Senate. Ultimately, the final text of the Paris Agreement differs starkly from the language in the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement uses softer language. In Article 4.1, the Paris Agreement sets out the “long-term” goal of stabilizing the global temperature rise and recognizing that “peaking” will take longer for developing nations. Article 4.2 states, “Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve.” Thus, Article 4.2 requires parties to undergo the procedural hurdles to create a NDC, but the wording does not require a party to actually achieve the NDC, but only one that it “intends to achieve” (33). Article 4 goes on to provide additional requirements of parties. While states are not required to commit to a particular NDC, Article 4 provides additional guidance on how the NDC should be selected by each party. Article 4.3 states, “Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.” Article 4.4 continues this theme and states that developed countries “should continue taking the lead” in mitigating anthropogenic climate change (33). The closest that the Paris Agreement gets to requiring domestic mitigation is found in Article 4.2, where it states that Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation but does not tie the mitigation to a particular NDC (33). Thus, the language of the Paris Agreement requires procedural steps but not a binding emission target. A Global Response The second concern was whether the entire world would be open to reducing GHG emissions. For the United States to sign the Paris Agreement, China and India needed to be involved. China and India did not have any binding reductions in GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol (4). However, GHG emissions 54



have risen steadily in China and India. In 1990, the base year calculation used by the Kyoto Protocol, the United States emitted, 5,000 million tons of CO2, representing 22% of the emissions of the world. The United States was also the highest emitter of CO2 per capita of the Annex 1 nations, emitting 19.6 tons per person. China, meanwhile, emitted 2,500 million tons of CO2 that year, which was more than every other Annex 1 party other than the United States. However, China’s per capita rate of emissions was only 2.1 tons per person, which was less than every other Annex 1 country (36). China’s per capita rate of CO2 emissions, its historical emission of GHG emissions, and the classification of its economy in 1990 as “developing,” ensured that China would not be required to commit to reductions under the common, but differentiated responsibility approach the UNFCCC adopted in the original framework treaty (3). However, in the past nearly 25 years, this situation has rapidly changed. By some measures, China is now the world’s largest economy due to rapid urbanization and modernization (37). As of 2013, China, which emitted 10.3 million tons, now leads the United States, which emitted 5.3 million tons, in total CO2 emissions. In fact, the United States emissions have been reduced from a high of 5.94 million tons in 2005. Additionally, while the United States retained the title of highest CO2 emitter per capita amongst the Annex 1 countries with 16.6 tons per person, China 7.4 tons per person is not far behind emitting 7.4 tons per person. China also surpasses the European Union, which only emits 7.3 tons per person. Over the past 23 years, the United States saw a 6% increase in total CO2 emissions and a 16% decrease in per capita CO2 emissions, while China saw a 312% increase in total CO2 emissions and a 246% increase in per capital CO2 emissions (36). Thus, the Bush Administration, with unanimous support from the 105th U.S. Senate, thought that the Kyoto Protocol would be an ineffective means of lowering GHG emissions since many developing nations would dwarf the emissions of the United States (34, 35). Even the Obama Administration was unwilling to commit or pledge GHG emissions reductions without similar actions by developing nations (14). This has proven partly true, as GHG emissions have continued to rise to an unprecedented level despite binding GHG emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (8). However, even before COP21, the United States and China held bilateral talks to create an agreement upon which both parties could agree. In September 2014, the two sides announced a political agreement, in which the United States “intends” to lower its emissions by at least 26% of the 2005 levels by 2030, while China will seek to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030 and get at least 20% of its energy production from non-fossil fuel sources (38). Ultimately, China, India, the United States, and 172 other countries signed the Paris Agreement, indicating their intent to ratify it (39). Parties deposited their NDCs with the UNFCCC when each Party ratified the Paris Agreement. Each country released an INDC prior to COP21, where the final negotiations for the Paris Agreement took place. China’s INDC, stating it intends to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030, closely matches its targets set during the bilateral talks with the United States (40). Similarly, the United States reiterated its goals from the bilateral political agreement with China (38). Thus, the Paris Agreement represents a global effort to mitigate anthropogenic climate change, unlike the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha Amendment. As both China and 55


India have signaled that they will contribute to the mitigation efforts, the United States decided to sign the Paris Agreement.


Ratification As discussed above, the Paris Agreement requires procedural conduct, but it does not require Parties to commit to a particular emissions target. However, for these procedural steps to be binding on the parties, they must do more than simply sign the agreement, as 175 countries did in April 2016 (39). According to Article 20, the Agreement is subject to “ratification, acceptance, or approval by States.” Article 21 further states that the Paris Agreement will enter into force once “55 Parties to the Convention accounting for … 55 percent … of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, approval or accession” (33). “Ratification” is broadly used to cover all possible ways a party may indicate its intent to be bound by international law for the obligations in the Paris Agreement. As of October 2016, 81 of the 197 parties to the UNFCCC had ratified the Paris Agreement representing greater than 55% of the global GHG emissions. As such, the Paris Agreement is set to go into force on November 4, 2016 (41). In comparison, 4 years later, the Doha Amendment has still not been entered into force. It requires 144 parties to ratify the agreement, and as of October 2016, only 70 had done so (28). At this rate, it does not appear that the Doha Amendment will ever be entered into force because very few developed countries, which contribute the largest portion of GHG emissions, have ratified or accepted the Doha Amendment. China has agreed to the Doha Amendment, but it was not required to commit to any reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (27). When signing the Paris Agreement, both China and the United States – together representing almost 40% of the global GHG emissions - pledged to “ratify” the Paris Agreement by the end of the year (42, 43). Thus, ratification by these two countries would virtually ensure that the Paris Agreement will be entered into force. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is the leading international agreement on the law of treaties. While the United States is not a ratifier of the VCLT, it acknowledges that it contains customary law, which is binding on the United States (44). In Article 2, the VCLT defines a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.” Article 2 further states “‘ratification’, ‘acceptance’, ‘approval’ and ‘accession’ mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty” (45). As such, the United States must establish that it intends to be bound by the Paris Agreement under international law through consent. The fact that the Paris Agreement is not entitled a “protocol” or a “treaty” does not indicate that it is not a treaty. In fact, virtually all of the participants indicated that the Paris Agreement would be a treaty (32). The United States has several options for ratifying an international treaty: (1) approval of an Article II treaty by the Senate, (2) Submission to Congress as an 56 Peterman et al.; Climate Change Literacy and Education Social Justice, Energy, Economics, and the Paris Agreement Volume ... ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2017.


executive agreement, or (3) by the President alone using existing treaty authority (46). According to the treaty clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, “[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur” (47). Thus, the President could submit the Paris Agreement directly to the Senate to ratify it. However, 70% of the Republican Senators, or 38 members, have denied anthropogenic climate change even exists (48). Thus, if the Paris Agreement was introduced in the Senate this year, it would be mathematically impossible to obtain the 2/3 majority needed to ratify it. A second option would be to submit the treaty for ex post approval by a statute from the entire Congress. This option requires a statute that specifically gives President Obama the authorization to accept the international obligations required by the Paris Agreement. While this option would not require a 2/3 majority, it would still require a majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate (46). Unfortunately, the Republican party holds a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate (49). Thus, it would be unlikely for the Paris Agreement to be accepted under this option. A third option for the acceptance of the Paris Agreement would be for the President to accept the treaty using existing treaty authority. The United States ratified the UNFCCC, or treaty document 102-38, in 1992 with a 2/3 supermajority of the Senate (50). The UNFCCC already binds the United States to undertake mitigation efforts and subsequently report on these actions (46). Specifically Article 4, binds parties to “adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change.” Article 4.2(b) further requires parties to communicate these efforts (4). In fact, a senior State Department official specifically mentioned the UNFCCC as the source of the President’s legal authority to enter into the Paris Agreement without submitting it to the Senate for approval (51). Republican members of Congress disagree that the President has the authority to accept the Paris Agreement without the consent of 2/3 of the Senate. In fact, Rep. Mike Kelly of Pennsylvania introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives with the support of 28 other Representatives that the President should submit the Paris Agreement to the Senate for approval (52). Sen. Mike Lee of Utah introduced a similar resolution in the Senate with the support of 30 other Senators (53). Others have agreed with these members of Congress and argued that the Paris Agreement is a treaty that should be submitted to the Senate for approval prior to ratification (54). Regardless, it seems clear that President Obama will accept the Paris Agreement using existing treaty authority under the previously ratified UNFCCC treaty (55). As such, on September 3, 2016, the United States formally entered the Paris Agreement with China (56). However, the legality of the President’s move is far from certain. Many members of Congress could try to challenge this move, but it might not be possible to challenge the President’s authority if acting under existing treaty authority (46). A more likely scenario is that a future president could attempt to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. According to Article 28.1 of the Paris Agreement, a Party may not withdraw from the treaty until three 57


years after the Agreement comes into force, with a one-year waiting period. The Agreement will not enter into force until the day after it is closed for signatures (April 21, 2017) (41). Thus, the incoming president could not withdraw from the treaty until at least 2021, well after the U.S. Presidential election of 2020. In fact, President-elect Trump has vowed to “cancel” the Paris Agreement some days and offered suggestions that he may be flexibile on the United States’s contribution on other days. While Trump can’t withdraw from the Paris Agreement until 2021, he could simply not fufill the obligations of the Paris Agreement with the only penalty the loss of international credibility (57).


From Doha to Paris I arrived in Doha in December, 2012. This was the year that history would be made. The Kyoto Protocol was set to expire in 2012, and the world was set to come together in Doha at COP18 to save the planet. Naively, I felt the energy and I believed it would happen. Unfortunately, like Copenhagen, the negotiators failed to achieve a binding treaty. As discussed previously, in Doha, the goal was to create an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that reinforced the failed strategy of legally binding the developed world to commit to reduce GHG emissions. Even to this day, the Doha Amendment has not gained enough signatures to be entered into force. It never will. Leaving Doha, I was crushed. I did not believe that the United States would ever be a part of the mitigation effort for anthropogenic climate change. A well-funded anti-climate change movement had very successfully eviscerated any bipartisanship on the issue. Fortunately, President Obama and the United States shifted to a different strategy in Copenhagen. As such, the Paris Agreement is more similar to the Copenhagen Accord than to the Doha Amendment. Although other countries, such as the European Union, initially criticized this approach, this change in strategy can be credited with making the Paris Agreement possible. By tossing out binding commitments, more parties are willing to participate. More importantly, the United States, China, and India are all willing to accept an agreement that forces them to procedurally participate in the process. Each party may not be bound to a particular number as it was in the Kyoto Protocol, but at least these three important countries are materially participating. The participation of China, India, and the United States is critical, as CO2 levels have been quickly rising despite the best efforts from the parties to the Kyoto Protocol that were actually required to decrease GHG emissions. However, for the Paris Agreement to mean anything, the United States must lead. With the current political state of the Senate, President Obama could not simply submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification. It would be quickly rejected. Instead, the Paris Agreement was carefully drafted to fall within the obligations already ratified in the UNFCCC. Thus, President Obama was able to essentially cut the Senate out of the process and accept the agreement using existing treaty obligations. 58 Peterman et al.; Climate Change Literacy and Education Social Justice, Energy, Economics, and the Paris Agreement Volume ... ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2017.

The United States and China officially ratifying the Paris Agreement is an historic event. It marks the beginning of a global response to anthropogenic climate change. While I believe it is too late to prevent the Earth from rising 2°C (much less 1.5°C), this agreement will prevent a global catastrophe as long as the Parties continue to operate under this agreement in good faith for decades to come.

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62 Peterman et al.; Climate Change Literacy and Education Social Justice, Energy, Economics, and the Paris Agreement Volume ... ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2017.

From a Commitment in Doha to an Emissions Pledge in Paris - ACS

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