IS YOUR RESEARCH ORGANIZATION LOOKING FOR THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE? Carl
E. Barnes
According to a recent survey ( 7 ) , 60% of U.S, companies heavily engaged in research are unhappy with their results. When asked how they felt this situation might be improved, most top executives of these companies responded with suggestions such as “better market research” and %lore sharply defined research objectives.” Indeed, their comments point up the fact that “needoriented” research has become a philosophy in many of our research organizations. This is a natural consequence of industry’s increased awareness of the value of marketing, the interplay between data from the marketplace and the nature of a company’s technical activities. But does this philosophy help or hinder the chances for success in developing profitable new products or processes? Is your research team looking for the impossibIe-an existing need to be filled which will result in a high-profit, proprietary new product? I n general terms, research, can be divided into two major categories : need-oriented and discovery-oriented. Deciding what proportion of effort should be devoted to each is one of research management’s most VOL. 5 8
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To increase research productivity and, thereby, the deuelopment of new products and processes, a favorable research philosophy i s required o f industrial research oyganications
demanding tasks, particularly in these competitive days when coming up u i t h profitable products is getting tougher and tougher. In my opinion, the pendulum has swung in the past 10 years too far toward needoriented research-and the results of the survey seem to support my contention. I submit that the trouble with a major portion of need-oriented research is that even if it is successful, the chances are good that the resulting product will not fill the basic requirement of what is needed to bolster or maintain shrinking profit margins. The trouble with most need-oriented research is : (1) you are not alone in recognizing the needs, and therefore are in a highly competitive situation likelb- to result in a multiplicity of products being introduced, all of which can more or less fill that need-with resultant low profits and (2) the need which is recognized is not really revolutionary, and in filling it you will not have developed a “Polaroid” or a “Xerox”-which again means only modest profits and probably modest sales. WIore specifically, the question facing industry is : I n an era of less productive industrial research, are top management attempts to increase productivity aimed in the right direction? In an attempt to achieve thc success of others it is prudent to investigate the methods used. We might well ask, what is the history surrounding the discovery of significant new products? Is there anything in common which may indicate a pattern? If we take but a brief look at the true story behind many of these we shall see that they were not developed as the result of asking the customer what he wanted. Let us select a few examples of such products and study the actual history of how they came into being. Take, for example, the development of polyolefins. It is possible, I suppose, that if someone had asked the electrical wire and cable people in the early 1930’s what they needed most, they might have said they needed a better flexible insulating material. I don’t know whether anyone did ask such a question, but even if he did, it had nothing whatever to do with the development of polyethylene--u hich, incidentally, was to find its first application in the wire and cable industry. The true story starts somewhat differently. T o begin with, the theory of vinyl polymerization was such in the early 19303, that polymerization of ethylene was believed impossible. Due principally to the insight of Dr. Alfred Caress, then chairman of ICI’s Alkali Division, a basic long range research program was instituted by this division aimed at studying the effects of very high pressures on chemical reactions. It should be emphasized that the only objective in sight was new know1ed;ge. During the course of this study, an attempt was made to 66
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bring about a reaction between ethylene and benzaldehyde. This resulted in small amounts of a white solid which turned out to be polyethylene. Subsequently, the “high pressure” process for making polyethylene was developed. Let’s look for a moment at the history of the development of the “low pressure” processes. This was not the result of the “need” to get around the patented high pressure method. Professor Karl Zicgler began his famous studies in the field of organometallic compounds in the early 1930’s. Later, this work led to the conversion of dienes and styrenes to high polymers by means of metal alkyl catalysts. This was followed by the discovery that linear olefins could be made by the growth of cthylene on aluminum alkyls. Others, notably Guilio Xatta, made valuable contributions leading generally to the polymerization of alpha olefins. The outcome of this area of research led not only to processes for making polypropylene but to another (low pressure) route to polyeth) lene which was essentially linear and of higher density. Other routes to polyethylene were developed-notably the Phillips process. Again, this was not “needoriented” in the sense that it was highly desirable to find ways of avoiding the costly Ziegler and Natta licenses which many companies were taking. Actually, Phillips had no thought of avoiding licenses. The initiation of their research preceded the work of Ziegler and Natta relating to polyolefins. The object of the Phillips research project was to attempt the formation of liquids from olefins using nickel compounds as catalysts. IVhen chromium was substituted for nickel in an attempt to get improved yields, solid polymers were obtained instead. Realizing that this was a far more significant discovery than what it originally had in mind, the Phillips research management quickly switched objectives and pushed the development of hihat is now a widely licensed, significant third route for the synthesis of polyethylene. There are many more examples of really new profitable products which came out of “opportunity-oriented” rather than “need-oriented” research. A few examples are : neoprene, Teflon, silicones, penicillin, transistors, molecular sieves, Terylene (Dacron), and, of course, nylon. The point is not that these were “accidental” discoveries, although in a sense some of them were, but rather that these profitable new’ products were not developed because someone had recognized an existing need for them. They came instead because research was being done in new areas where there was a real chance to discover something new. Unfortunately, in many leading companies, well intentioned management, determined to make its re-
search productive and to avoid “Unproductive” excursions into “blue sky” areas, sets such firm objectives that even if opportunity knocks, no one in the research department dares open the door. Let us imagine that the work which led to the development of the Phillips polyethylene process had been conducted in another company where “business needs” had dictated that the research department try to make liquids from ethylene. Under the rigid objectives which exist in some companies, those experiments which resulted in solids would have been abandoned immediately as not in accord with the objectives of the project. And the opportunity which knocked would not have been followed up, even if it had been recognized. It is a fact that many company managements do make just this mistake. The research organization is looked upon as a service facility. To this end, the operating divisions submit their problems to the research department for a solution. O r corporate planners, to make sure future business needs are met, think up “reasonable” objectives which are incorporated into a rather inflexible research budget. I n short, everything is done which logically can be done to set carefully considered research goals in order to ensure success. There is one cardinal error in this approach. All too often these “realistic” research objectives are set by people who are unskilled in research. It’s as if you asked your accountants to plan the sales campaign for the coming year, or your production men to develop an advertising program. Everyone knows that advertising is a highly competitive business, and that nothing short of Madison Avenue’s most creative agency can be allowed to handle your account. But even though research is just as highly competitive, and probably requires more creativity (although of a different nature), it seems that every businessman “knows” that you can’t leave creative research to researchers. But what does happen when creative research is left to researchers? When this is done, it is even productive to engage in need-oriented research-if research sets the needs. For example, Edwin Land envisioned the “need” for the Polaroid camera and initiated the kind of research to achieve it. Carl Miller envisioned the “need” for Thermofax and set about finding a way of filling this need. Likewise, Chester Carleson envisioned the “need” for Xerox, and, after a long, rocky road, finally realized his objectives. Other examples of envisioned needs are “Scotch” tape, LcScotchgard,” the safety razor, jet engine, and the ball point pen. I t is significant that none of these envisioned needs emanated from the business management, production department, or sales department. Nor did they come from customers. They came from people who had special skills-from the very kind of people that personnel staffs recruit for research departments. This is not to say, however, that an industrial research organization should not do any work on need-oriented projects. I n fact, these should constitute a major portion of the research effort, if only for the purpose of re-
maining competitive. History also tells us that new discoveries can be made by alert people while working on these projects as well-if opportunity research is not ruled out. For example, in the project initiated for the purpose of developing a new line of refrigerants (Freons), an alert researcher discovered a new polymer (Teflon) which, since the climate permitted, was developed to establish a new and unforeseen business. The really important reason for not limiting industrial research to existing needs is that this limitation can greatly reduce the chance of discovering some basically new proprietary product or process. For one thing, in attempting to fill only existing needs, you eliminate the visionary or creative aspect of potential “needs” which don’t yet exist, and this tends to limit research activity to old areas. I t is more difficult to make important new discoveries when reworking old areas. Also, many people can see existing needs. Therefore a risk factor, namely that a competitor will “get there first,” is greatly increased. This risk factor may in fact be as great or greater than the risk of not finding anything of value when investigating wholly new areas. I t also may be as great or greater than the often-cited risk of developing a potential new product for which the market is as yet unknown. There is another historical fact worth mentioningthe matter of “proved inventors.” While every effort must be made to discover and encourage young creative research people-don’t forget the older ones. There is abundant evidence that the inventive type keeps on inventing if the climate permits ( 2 ) . Making available continued incentive for the older creative research people, and not allowing (or forcing) them to become cynical and unproductive from repeated disappointments, can result in increased productivity of the research department. To sum up, history clearly tells us that a way to discover profitable, proprietary new products or processes is to work in new, uncharted fields. I t also tells us that when imaginative people, regardless of their age, work in these fields, ideas for possible new products often evolve from the discoveries made. The ideas may develop into real products if the researchers and the middle management people involved all have the incentive, courage, and freedom to pursue the idea. As for need-oriented research, it is certainly necessary -but limiting research to this field will automatically eliminate two kinds of “discovery” research which history shows are more productive : “opportunity” research and “creative” research-where the researcher thinks up his own “envisioned” need. If your goal is to increase the productivity of the research department, seeking a practical philosophy rather than the philosopher’s stone is the answer.
REFERENCES (1) Barnes, C. E., “Incentivesfor Invention and Commercialization,” Survey No. 2, April 1966, Barnes Research Associates, 375 Park Ave., New York, N. Y. (2) Sparks, William J., “Good Chemists Never Quit,” The Ckemirt (October 1961).
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