GOVERNMENT
Plant Inspections To Pave Way for Chemical Arms Treaty Monitoring International effort aims to develop inspection protocol to detect diversion of commercial chemicals used to make chemical weapons A few weeks ago Bill L. Brady experienced something no other U.S. chemical plant manager ever has. He, two of his chemical engineers, and four government representatives conducted a mock inspection of Akzo Chemicals' Gallipolis Ferry, W.Va., plant. The plant makes organophosphorus-based flame retardants. One of these chemicals, dimethyl methylphosphonate, sold under the tradename Fyrol, would routinely be monitored under a chemical warfare treaty now being negotiated in Geneva. The exercise, for which Akzo
volunteered, is one of many being carried out in 16 countries around the world. A protocol will be developed from these exercises, called national trial inspections, that eventually will be used by an international inspection team to verify that r o u t i n e l y p r o d u c e d commercial chemicals are not being diverted to make chemical warfare agents. According to Brady, the Akzo plant produces "a limited amount of Fyrol, less than 1 million lb per year." Production is done in batches of four campaigns a year. Dimethyl methylphosphonate is not a chemical warfare agent, but it is a distant precursor to one. As Chemical Manufacturers Association spokesman Kyle B. Olson notes, "It is several steps removed from the nerve gas GB," or Sarin. Through chemical manipulations, Olson explains, dimethyl methylphosphonate can be converted to methylphosphonyl dichloride, or
dichlor. Dichlor can be transformed into its fluoride cousin, methylphosphonyl difluoride, or difluoro. Difluoro is one component of the binary GB artillery shell. CMA was instrumental in setting up the mock inspections, working with the company and relevant government agencies. The six-person team included two Akzo chemical engineers, acting as inspectors, a representative from the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and three chemical warfare experts from the Army's Chemical Research, Development & Evaluation Center at Aberdeen, Md. Several people from the Energy Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Onsite Inspection Agency created under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and CMA went along as observers. Brady served that function for Akzo. The actual inspection, which took three days, was basically designed
Sixteen countries plan trial inspections of chemical plants Australia: Conducted an inspection at a multipurpose (batch production) plant late in 1988; may conduct another one. Belgium: Preparing for an inspection.
Italy: May have conducted inspections in December 1988 at two different facilities (report on inspections not available).
Brazil: Conducted an inspection in December 1988.
Japan: Conducted an inspection in November 1988.
East Germany: Conducted an inspection at a pharmaceutical plant in October 1988.
The Netherlands: Preparing for an inspection in early 1989; conducted one in 1986 at a civilian chemical plant, two years before the Conference on Disarmament sponsored trial inspections.
Finland: Preparing for an inspection. France: May have conducted an inspection in early 1989 (report on inspection not available). Hungary: Conducted an inspection at a pharmaceutical-chemical complex in December 1988. 24
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Sweden: Conducted an inspection at a multipurpose (batch production) facility in November 1988; may conduct additional inspection at a military facility.
Switzerland: Preparing for an inspection at a multipurpose facility in spring 1989. U.K.: Preparing an inspection at an organophosphorus chemical manufacturing plant in early 1989. U.S.: Conducted an inspection at a West Virginia plant making organophosphorus flame-retardant chemicals in February 1989. U.S.S.R.: Conducted an inspection in December 1988 at a chemical production facility. West Germany: Conducted an inspection in December 1988. Source: Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, head of Swedish Delegation to Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
by CMA. In addition to inspecting the production line carefully and taking samples at strategic points along the line, the CMA protocol "establishes a paper trail to produce a rough materials balance sheet," Olson says. Production records, raw materials received, and final products shipped are audited. According to Olson, four sets of samples were taken at each sampling point, which numbered less than a dozen. Initial analyses, using gas chromatography-mass spectrometry, were made on site. Final analyses will be carried out at the Army's facility at Aberdeen. As "this is the first such inspection ever done in the U.S.," and it was so recently conducted, Brady says it is a little too early to comment. Olson agrees it is too early to comment with precision, but he did say, "People were satisfied that it was a pretty useful exercise." Olson is quick to add, "It may turn out that we may have been overzealous in taking samples." And there appeared to be a "need to nail down more information prior to coming in," he continues. Olson expects that another inspection at a chemical plant producing a different class of chemicals is likely. The results of the Akzo inspection will be reported to the Genevabased, 40-nation Conference on Disarmament this spring. They will be analyzed by the Swedish delegation to the conference, along with the results of inspections from 15 other countries. The Swedes will cull the best features and develop guidelines for an inspection protocol to be incorporated in a final treaty. "Such guidelines will include recommendations on how to conduct an inspection, in practical terms; what inspectors will be entitled to see and not see; a checklist for an inspection; and how to report on the inspections," says Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, head of the Swedish delegation. He expects the guidelines to be delivered to the Geneva negotiators by late summer. No matter the final form of the inspection protocol, it is possible that the chemical being monitored in this exercise, dimethyl methylphosphonate, may not be listed on Schedule 2 of a final treaty. Sched-
ule 2 chemicals are those that are made commercially but can eventually be converted to a chemical warfare agent, and whose production would be routinely monitored. On the provisional Schedule 2 list, dimethyl methylphosphonate falls under the broad category of chemicals containing one P-methyl bond. The chemical industry has urged the Geneva negotiators to narrow the definition under this category. Otherwise too many chemicals are captured in this broad net to deal with effectively, industry contends. Lois Ember
Agencies debate export controls on technology One of the key technological issues the Bush Administration will be facing in coming months is the reform of the export control system—what sensitive technologies and areas of science to restrict for national security reasons. The issue is a controversial one. On the one hand, America's hightech industries, plus those in Western Europe and Japan, are upset with what they believe is the Defense Department's penchant for wanting to classify almost everything. Defense, on the other hand, wrings its hands over industry's liberal view of what is and isn't strategic. The Commerce Department, which administers the Export Administration Act and says it needs more analysts, generally takes industry's side and raises interagency tensions in the process. In the middle is the State Department's evaluative Office of Munitions Control, which is understaffed and crying for help. Off to the side observing and criticizing are units in the National Academy of Sciences and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which promote openness in the communication of scientific research. The premise is that science should be open and that technology is so inherently leaky that nothing but the most strategic knowhow is really controllable. The Defense Department is currently having the Institute for Defense Analysis take a fresh look at
the "Militarily Critical Technology List" with an eye toward reducing its encyclopedic bulk. The list contains thousands of items for which export licenses must be obtained. Recently, the Central Intelligence Agency tried to make a pitch for a stronger policy role with the release of a report on a new, and to its mind sensible, method of classifying strategically sensitive microelectronic technologies. It calls its method a new approach "for processing and presenting intelligence in a usable and understandable form." The method is simple in concept but probably expensive in the analytical brainpower needed across many fields. It amounts to upgrading the agency's ability to assess more keenly Soviet needs and capabilities in specific technologies. The idea is that if one knows specifically what weapons systems the Soviets need, then one need not be so subjective over what to control. "Unlike the current system, which is heavily biased toward developing a universal set of 'militarily critical technologies,' " the report says the new system "returns to the original reason for U.S. and multinational export controls—Soviet military needs." The report, "National Security and Export Controls: A Decision Aid," has no author or address. It was distributed at a meeting of the Commerce Department's Technical Advisory Committee on the Militarily Critical Technology List. The report describes six case studies under which the method is put to use. All involve microelectronics production equipment and processes: low-pressure chemical vapor deposition; ion implantation; automatic wire bonding; ion milling; computer-aided design equipment and software; and mask making, inspection, and repair equipment. All six are on the critical technologies list. But the CIA analysts found that one—ion milling—didn't need to be. This is a form of etching that defines the circuit pattern on an integrated circuit. The analysts found, however, that it was of no use for the advanced control systems the Soviets were trying to develop. "Since the fabrication of less sophisticated integrated circuits can March 6, 1989 C&EN
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