Scientific Methodology and Ethics in University Education Mihdly T. Beck Lajos Kossuth University, P.O.Box 7, Debrecen, 4010 Hungary George B. Kauffman California State University, Fresno, Fresno, CA93740
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Durine the last seven centuries universities have played a crucial role in the development of the sciences. Currently, changes are occurring in the social and institutional structure of science because the activities of different research institutes provide considerable contributions to many fields of science in many countries. However, the universities have remained and will remain the major, if not the only, place where a novice acquires the necessary l to sciknowledge - to be able to make o r -i ~ n acontributions ence. I t is obvious to anvone followine the course of universitv education during th; last three or four decades that some fundamental changes have occurred. Primarily because of the enormous increase in the number of students, the relationshiv between master and aoorentice has become much .. more tenuous. The universities have become a part of the modern "research industry", whose competitive spirit bas influenced-both enhancing and diminishing-the activities of the traditional universities. In this article certain aspects of scientific research will be examined, and a suggestion will be made for improving university education. o n e caveat is necessary: thk teG"science" kill be used here in its original restricted meaning of the hatural sciences" although many of the conclusions, mutatis mutandis, also are valid in other avenues of human knowledge. Personal and Objective Knowledge The Janus face of science is expressed characteristically by the titles of two books: Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge ( I ) and Karl Popper's Objective Knowledge (2). The basis for all scientific investigation is the assumption, corroborated by experience, that there are laws in nature, i.e., under identical conditions identical events occur, and that these laws are indeoendent of the observer. Aauestion exists as to whether or i o t these laws can be recogkzed by us. There are manv answers to this auestion. and the debate concerning this fundamental epistemological problem probably never will end. Progress in science is characterized by two important features. First, in the process of scientific understanding there are periods of slow, gradual developments as well as abrupt jumps-in Kuhn's terminology (31, paradigm changes. Second, our understanding asymptotically aproaches the full. obiective truth but never the world in its totality as for any &all part of the universe. It applies to a single cell. the structure and reactions of simole or complex molecules, problems of evolution or the ohgin of life, etc. Obviously, science has limitations, but these do not exclude a very deep understanding of the laws governing nature. The act of discovery is replete with personal elements, and the development of scientific progress is not smooth. On the contrary, there are many twists and culsde-sac on the road to knowledge because of the personal Presented at the Pimentel Award Symposium, Division of Chemical Education, 205th National Meeting, American Chemical Society, Denver, CO, March 30,1993. 922
Journal of Chemical Education
abilities, biases, and prejudices of researchers. However, discussions among scientists lead sooner or later to a high deeree of consensus. It is, of course, always possible that the next paradigm change will require a fundamental change in the formerly accepted view. However, in most cases new discoveries do not cause an abandonment of a formerly discovered law of nature but only a restriction in its range of validity, e.g., Einstein's mechanics redaces that of Newton onlv when the speed of light is app;oached. Observation (experimentation) and theorizing represent the two sides of knowledge. Which occurs first-the theory or the observation-is as artificial a problem as that of the chicken and the egg. There is no theory without emoirical knowledee. and it is imoossible to make observations without c&ain assumptions. Although there are a number of laws of loeic, formal knowledge of tbem is neither sufficient nor necessary to make a d&overy. However, knowledge of the laws of epistemology is certainly helpful in uncovering the secrets of nature and is indispensable to a critical examination of discovery, whether it be empirical or theoretical. Although Polanyi's basic postulate is that great discoveries are never made by applying a series of logical rules to known facts, it is important to realize that it is always possible after the discovery to construct a logical path to the discovery. Undoubtedlv, what Polanvi calls "tacit" knowledge plays a determining role in any phase of scientific research. There is no significant discovery without intuition. Intuition, in contrasrio the formal laws of logic, cannot be taught. Nevertheless, it is intimately related to suhconsclous taclt knowledee. which is lareelv s h a ~ e dbv the interaction between tlhe individual &f the knviPonment. Therefore. the master-aovrentice relationshiv mav considerably influence the abflity of the student & maGe significant discoveries. (A disclaimer seems avorooriate: a .. . real genius does not need much help in making fundamental discoveries. We do not refer here to geniuses hut to ordinary scientists, who contribute to the progress of science by making important and reliable discoveries. Real geniuses-rarae aves, indeed-are neither greatly helped nor hindered by a university education. Feyerabend's mistake that "anything goes" ( 4 )is due to his limiting his study to methods of discovery by geniuses. For tbem it is indeed true that anything goes.)
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Teaching the Scientific Approach It is difficult-indeed, it is probably impossibie-to be able to make scientific discoveries bv onlv readine about science and scientific research. ~ v e n ~ j c h a e l~ i r a d a ~ , who was a genius, spent some time with Humphry Davy before carrying out his own original resesarches, and he learned a great deal from his master. Formerly, in the "good old days" the master-apprentice relationship was much closer than now, simply because today most leading scientists have a huge number of co-workers as well as numerous other duties and, therefore, cannot spend as much time with students as they did in the age of "little science".
Novices must have paragons to emulate. Of course, it is not nceessary that the'master be the paragon or even that he or she be one of the paracons, but it is certainly helpful. The most important element in a researcher's education is critical thinking, the acquiring of which is not easy, All of us, including the "masters", have biases and prejudices. In certain phases of the research these can be helpful, but one --even a "master"-has to realize that these prejudices must be recognized and that we should rid ourselves of them. Enthusiasm and critical thinkine do not act in Darallel directions. Finding a balance betGeen the two i i t h e most important element in successful research activity. If the master's attitude neglects this balance, i.e., if he or she considers it more important to prove his or her truth than to find the "objective" truth, the apprentice's view may be distorted. The master-apprentice connection is most helpful for the master, too. This relationship is a two-way street: the apprentice obviously can learn a great deal from the master, but a good master also may learn much from the really able student. For example, the openmindedness of the student may contribute to finding new approaches in solving problems. Verv few universities provide courses on the methodologicafand ethical issuesbf scientific research. Because of the present lack of closeness in the master-apprentice relationship, such courses are now more necessary than ever.
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What to Teach: Factual Knowledge or Way of Thinking?
A popular dictum is that schools should not teach factual knowledge but only effective ways of thinking-how to make correlations and meaningful conclusions. According to this view. it is su~erfluousto learn "facts" because it is easy to find them in books. This argument is naive and dangerous. First, it is theoretically possible to make correlations by knowing only two facts, but in reality a great number of facts are needed to discover whether there is any correlation among them. Scientific thinking does not occur in vacuo. Its essence is to clarifv whether a "fact" is, indeed, a fact and to analyze fads tb discover laws that govern the changes in facts as a consequence of changes in certain conditions. Second, considerable factual knowledge is necessary to cany out any experimental work. Without this knowledge experimentation would be meaningless as well as dangerous. Association. which is ~robablvthe most important element of creative thinking, also assumes factual knowledge. Intuition and association are closely related. Intuition can be regarded as association between very distant situations. The association, of course, may involve not only "focal" but also tacit, subconscious, hidden knowledge. A orereouisite for this association is extensive knowled~e. o n the other hand, much uncritical reading may curb creative thinking. In this respect Feyerabend's dictum, "anything goes", certainly is valid. The good master can help the novice enormously in finding the most productive balance between obtaining knowledge and developing creative thinking skills. A close connection also exists between association and analogy.Recognition of analogies between very differentsubiects and situations mav lead to imwrtant discoveries. The hstory of science many examples of this fact. Analoeies have enormous heuristic value. However. analoeical thinking, application of analogies, which are oRkn oversimplifications, and the regarding of analogies as proofs, is a dangerous method for approaching truth. The discovery of the periodic svstem of the elements and the conjectures based on ibls systek ronrerntng the physical and ch&mtralproperties of the elements orer examples of the value of unalo~+sand the danger of analogical th&ng.
Association, analogy, and intuition are the most important features of creative thinking. However, they do not necessarily lead to the discovery of or even to an approach to the truth. It is always necessary to make a rigorous and critical analytical study of the conjectures. The history of science furnishes many examples in which the most ingenious intuitive discovery later proved to he incorrect. Common sense would not predict that dense, solid matter is composed of atoms that are mostly empty space. Similarly, the observation that the combustion of elements whose oxides are volatile, such as carbon or sulfur, results in an apparent loss of weieht led to the intuitive conclusion that eombustion is dueto loss of phlogiston. Some Pitfalls of Scientific Research The more fundamental a discovery, the greater the necessity for changing the formerly accepted view. However, it is equally obvious that greater discoveries require more thorough and more substantial proof than minor ones. Unfortunately, it seems likely that the possible prospect of making a great discovery generally decreases the researcher's critical faculty. Pons and Fleischmann's alleged "discovery" of 'cold fusion" is a case in point. Perhaps the ereatest ieo~ardvfor a scientific investieator is wishful thinking."~Lepr&ure produced by the Gblish or perish complex may contribute to hasty, careless work and the inhibition of critical thinking. Mentors can do much by their own behavior in educating the novice to avoid this danger, but unfortunately, an opposite attitude on his or her part mav result in either a fatal decrease in the master's authority or in spoiling the novice, both as a scientist and as a n ethical human being. The basis for all experimental science is the reproducibility of the experiments. Of c o w , unreproducible results may simply indieate that some trivial mistakes have been made, but thev also mav present a challenee and ~ossiblva ~romise of a si&cant d&overy. At anyr a c , the rlason(i)f& nonre~roducibilitvmust be found. and then re~roducibleresults be reached. Rek u s t be acgeved before valid conclusions producible results are a necessarv but not sufficient condition for any meaningful speculation. " A great danger in scientific research is distortion of a truly scientific approach hv nonrational considerations. ~ i k all e human beings, scientists have their own national pride and prejudice and their own religious or antireligious convictions. It is almost impossible to disregard these beliefs in each and every phase of scientific research, from the selection of the problem to the final conclusions of the work. If these elements become excessive, the scientist will be unable to discover the obiective truth. The rise of Lvsenkoism in the former Soviet Union provides a n illum&ating example. The Soviet regime streised that Lvsenko's teachinas, rooted in the experiments of Ivan ~ladi&rovich ~ i c h u r i ' n the , most suEcessfu1 Russian plant breeder, were based on philosophical materialism, not "idealistic, reactionary Mendelism-Morganism." In fact, Lysenkoism was not a scientific approach at all. It was modem genetics, not Lysenkoism, that found the material carrier of hereditary characters. Actually, the controversy between the two approaches was politically motivated and based on nationalism. The ideological arguments served to disguise the real reasons-excessive Russian nationalism and physical elimination of Lysenko's scientifically more able competitors. The situation in our next example is even more complicated. The problem of the origin df life is most intriguhg. Almost always researchers working on this problem have been motivated by ideological considerations. In 1899 Ernst Haeckel, the militant monist, declared that the problem of the origin of life, one of the seven riddles of the
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world, had already been solved (5).His deep conviction was untouched by the Bathybius fiasco (6).Louis Pasteur had uroven bv wonderfullv simule and convincing - e x.~ e r i ments that no microorganisms can be formed in the decomuosition of organic materials. However, it seems likely that some roleof his ~ a s t e u r ' sdeep religious conviction (mis)conclusion that these experiments were the final evidence against the spontaneous generation of life. Stanley Miller's discovery in 1953 that vitally important organic substances such a s amino acids, the building blocks of proteins, could easily form under prebiotic conditions provided "materialists" with crucial evidence for the spontaneous formation of life, while "creationist" scientists (7) used their ideological bias not only to find but also to amplify its weak points to refute the entire theory. The fact that prejudices may result in excessive inappropriate criticism is spectacularly manifested in the recent, unfortunate revival of creationism. We think that the mutual prejudices among religious and nonrelieious scientists are rationallv unfounded: because-as the fi&e illustrates-religion and skence belong to different but not overlapping sets. They are not directly related. However, there are a number of indirect connections between them. Scientists must realize the limitations of science. Obviously, we never will be able to find the exact answer to the origin of life even if experiments eventually succeed in producing systems with the essential characteristics of living organisms. Religious persons should not fear any scientific discovery. Their beliefs must be independent of scientific views; otherwise their beliefs are not beliefs. Trends bothin theology and science agree with this view. The resolution by the Council of the National Academy of Sciences in 1981 stated that "Religion and science are separate and mutually exclusive realms of human thought whose presentation in the same context leads to misunderstanding of both scientific theory and religious belief' (8).
conflict: certain scientific results may be potentially dangerous for society. One must realize, however, that not the scientific results themselves but their misuse creates the danger. For we, already possess sufficient knowledge to deteriorate the environment but not enough both to produce enough for mankind and to preserve the environment. Scientific research today iscxpcnsive. Therc is no doubt that thc benefits to societv of thc really great discoveries have far excceded the cost of all the useful and useless research. This fact, however, does not automatically and fully relieve individual researchers, particularly team leaders. of the resuonsibilitv for carefullv considering. the potential applicatibns and i s e s of their work to socie6 Althoueh the real value of oure science lies in the resulting knowledge itself, a cost-benefit analysis is necessary when the research involves not onlv books. uencils. and oauer but also very expensive instrukents a i d materials. Leading scientists must be a little bit less hostile to critics like U S . Senator William Proxmire (91,who has awarded several scientists his notorious Golden Fleece Award. However, it certainly would be helpful for politicians to know much more about the history and mechanism of science. Unfortunately, the last two decades have seen a great increase in cases of unethical behavior by scientists (10).The frequency of eases of dishonest behavior from plagiarism to outright fraud has increased sharply. The scientific community must fight these pathological symptoms. A prerequisite is that the researchers must be aware of the situation and the factors leadim to the unethical deuorhnent. In most cases the basis of the &:honest behavior is ;ither excessive ambition or the inability to resist material temptations.
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A Suggestion for University Education Although it would not solve the problem if m u s e s on the methodoloeical and ethical problems of scientific research were insti Ssrx Books t i e r Yak. London 1560 In*c. U J 1 9 B X l a l l , S,.' W,,lmlnrrrr I'hll~dr~lphla.I?. 1076 \ h d l u 3, I' H :id in. 6 . o k r p .
