EDITOR'S PAGE
The fantasy and reality of SDI The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a scientific research project—if an unusually big one. It was conceived as a five-year, $25 billion or so program to examine the feasibility of developing a system to protect the territory of the U.S. and its allies from nuclear-armed missiles. It involves much basic research in physics. Even if successful, it will provide only guideposts to what would possibly be a decade of development work, which, again, if successful, would lead eventually to deployment sometime early in the next century. This has always been the scientific truth about SDI since it was organized following a March 1983 appeal by President Reagan to the scientific community to turn its talents to developing such a total defensive shield. But somehow since then SDI has moved out of the research realm, long before the scientists involved can complete adequate studies, draw conclusions, and make meaningful recommendations. At the policy-making level SDI is no longer a basic research project. Instead, it has become the very cornerstone of defense and arms control policy. With the aid of a lot of hype and a gullible press, SDI is being promoted in certain quarters as being almost an accomplished fact. High Administration officials are pushing for early development of the first elements of what eventually would be a multilayered system. This has all been a plunge into fantasyland. Now there is a chance to return the debate over SDI to reality. This chance has been provided by an 18-month, 424-page study of the science and technology of directed energy weapons, the core element in any missile defense system, by the American Physical Society. Its major finding is that "even in the best of circumstances, a decade or more of intensive research would be required just to provide the technical knowledge needed for an informed decision about the potential effectiveness and survivability of directed energy weapon systems." This is not a study that can be dismissed as the opinion of politically motivated and ill-informed professors, as have earlier studies of SDI. The 15-member APS study panel includes the director of Massachusetts Institute of Technology's defenseoriented Lincoln Laboratories, a director of the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, a representative from the Army, and two from Sandia National Laboratories. All members, including one practicing chemist, Richard N. Zare of Stanford University, are world-class experts in lasers, particle beams, radar, optics, or other relevant technologies. The credentials of the members of the separate APS review committee that examined the study group's report are equally impeccable. This APS study is a classic, if all too rare, example of how an institution of science can play a responsible role in a critical public policy debate. For instance, it sticks strictly to the science and technology of the issue, where consensus could be achieved. It avoids policy and value judgments. The cooperation of the Administration was sought and received. This included classified briefings. And the whole effort had the enthusiastic support of George A. Keyworth II, then head of the Office of Science & Technology Policy. Although a committed believer in SDI, Keyworth was convinced of the need for such an independent study. The new study also illustrates some of the hazards that scientists face when they involve themselves in discussion of defense-related issues. A New York Times editorial of April 26 found the conclusions of the APS study to be very ill-considered because they undermine the ability of President Reagan to use SDI as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations with the Soviets. This comment implies that Soviet physicists are incapable of understanding the basics of their discipline and coming to the same conclusions as the APS group. Michael Heylin Editor
Views expressed on this page are those of the author only and not necessarily those of ACS
May 4, 1987 C&EN
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