book reviews A realistic account-which necessarily contains the blemishes as well as the laudatory a s p e c u f scientists, their societies and asaoeiations. their means of formal and in~~~. formal n~mmuniratiun,and their eduration, ir clsnrly ~resented.These three chapters should he required reading for any student contemplating a scientific career. Four chapters are devoted to interactions between science and society and the dissent and disquiet from within the scientific community as well as from nonscientist critics such as Theodore Roszak, Jacques EUul, and F. R. Leavis. The countervailing perspectives of Michael Polanyi and Arthur Koestler are discussed. Without minimizing the value of science, the implication is that we need to he objective about objectivity. Here, Jacques Monod's "Chance and Necessity" provides precisely the circumstantial evidence that a critic like Roszak readily seizes upon to illustrate the excesses of the scientific perspective. In this regard, Dixon mentions W. H. Thorpe's perceptive comment that, in an ironically paradoxical sense, a leap of faith for which there is no scientific evidence is actuall" reouired to interoret the world in terms of wientifir reductionism. The predominant focus is the social rontext of rcienre. A better understanding of chis is necessary for all, scientists and nonscientists alike. The comparatively narrow training of many scientists thus requires a remedy. The puhlic nature of science needs to be expanded beyond Polanyi's "Republic of Science" or even Bronowski's "democracy of the intellect" for those are composed of scientists and other intellectuals. Increasing democratization is a compelling reason for scientists explaining to the puhlic the nature of their work and their goals. One way or the other, the general public is going to have greater influence. If scientists take the proposed initiatives, they will still retain their prerogatives, that is, substantial control of the directions of scientific research. Dixon directs some critical comments towards the prevailing anonymous referee system for scientific papers, the uses and abuses of citation analvsis.. the ootentialitv for cormpr:on ofnll sorra in the Ph.1). credentinling process. etc. The effurts, including those of "in~crmedinttuehnolom" and uf technology assessment, to counteract some of these dangerous tendencies are documented. Individual activist scientists, as Commoner, Ehrlich, e t al., and activist organizations,such as the Scientists Institute for Public Information, are both vital to maintaining the humane imperative of science. Provocatively suggested is an oath for scientists, similar to the Hippaeratie. A formulation due to M. Thring is presented. It could well be designated a Baconian Oath. Of related interest is that Charles Susskind (in "Understanding Technology," Johns Hopkins University Press,Baltimore, 1973) proposed an "engineer's Hippoeratic Oath." Neither Dixon nor Susskind believe this to alone be sufficient to ensure that science and technology are used beneficently. However, it can he expected to increase the consciousness of scientists and eneineers reeardine" the roc~alconsequences of their nctiviti~s. In conclusiun, I)ixun presentr n clearly written, well balanced account of science and ~
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A392 / Journal of Chemical Education
technology. Citing a great many artidea from Seienee andNew Scientist, the social context of science in partidarly the past dozen y e m is vividly portrayed. Dixon's biases, as they may he so termed by some, are explicitly dec l a d . Though some resders may not entirely agree with all his particular remedies, none will fault his general partiality for the Baconian imperative.
emokiyn, New York 71201
The Sclentlllc Approach. Second EdHlon
J T Douies, University of Birmingham, England. Academic Press, New York, 1973. xi 185 pp. Figs. and tables. 15.5 X 23 cm. $9.75.
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On a scale from 0 to 5, the simplicity of atomic theory is rated as 4, the laws of thermodynamics as 3, and relativity theory as 2. Using the same range of values, the unifieotion of concepts is 3 for atomic theoryand for the laws of thermodynamics, and 4 for relativity theory. For each of these three theories, the testedness is 5 and the refutedness is 0. For Newtonian mechanics, the simplicity is 4, the unification of concepts is 3, the testedness is 5, and the refutedness is 1. Strange measures indeed! T o a great extent, these terms and scales derive from an attempt by a professor of chemical engineering to discuss the various aspects of the scientific process, largely in the parameters that have been introduced and elaborated upon by Sir Karl Popper in "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" and "Conjectures and Refutations," certainly two major works of the 20th century in the philosophy of scienee. In an earlier review of the first edition in this Journal (43, A1096 (1966)), a reviewer expressed two dissatisfactions,one pertaining to Davies' endeavor to lessen the gap between the "two cultures," and the other, the disnaritv, between the descriotion of scientific rerenrrh by notable philosphem uf sciencr. as Sir Karl, and the nctual activities uf research scientists. By a substantial enlargement of the first edition (the second is about twice the number of pages of the first), the topics naturally are presented more extensively and added are sections on creativity (featuring accounts of Kekulb's dream), "inner perfection'' of scientific theories (on a scale of 0 to 1, Newtonian mechanics is 0.72, relativity theory is 0.64, atomic theory is 0.54, and laws of thermodynamics are rated 0.401, degrees of credihility and of elegance of scientific theories, and market forecasting and world trends.~.i.e... the work of Meadows. et ol. In making mvre widrly understandable the ,ricntific process,at leaat nr e m i w n e d I,? a major contemporary schoul of phhsophical thwght. 1)aviaa does deserve nmrldcrable credit. Regardless of how succersfirlls thrs is ever accomplished, I am not altogether convinced that it inerorahlv r e a d t s n o r for that matter can even be legitimately expected co do s-in ropprochemmr ui the two cultures.
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Despite the context of presentation heing largely Popperian, Davies does stress the centrality of scientific imagination and ereativity, along with the attitude that it is the prepared mind which is favored by the creative impulse. Thus, intense, obsessive, and prolonged effort is a prerequisite for the flourishing of scientific creativity. In this spirit, Davies is altogether in accord with Sir Karl, although this perspective is often slighted when Popper's works are discussed. In scientific discovery, or,perhaps hetter for many circumstances, scientific invention of ideas, there is a crucially important component that Popper calls Erdenrest, "a remainder or residue which is not rational." If one is not familiar with Popper's worldview, Davies' hook can be expected to whet one's interest in delving further into the works of a major contemporary philosopher of science. As to the ouestion of the correrpvndenre of Sir Knrl'sdesrription w that of the process na it actually occurs, ultimately that is a personal judgment, and the problematical aspect of this is equally present in the theories of Michael Palanyi, Thomas Kuhn. and most recentlv. ,. Gerald Holton. If Popper might he, hy some, accused id reification, it is worth muamg un the fact that many of his important ideas were conceived as he was engaged in cabinet making, hardly an ahstract enterprise. ~~
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James A. Goldman Division of Continuing Education and Exfension Services New York City Community Coiiege of CUNY Brooklyn. New York ii2Oi
