NEWS FOCUS
Fashioning a Global Chemical Weapons Treaty Diplomats at the Geneva-based, 40-nation Conference on Disarmament are struggling to write an effective and enforceable ban, but progress is expected to be slow-going this year Lois R. Ember, C&EN Washington
Two more years. Two more years. For nearly a decade that phrase had been the mantra of diplomats hammering out a global treaty banning development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. When asked to predict when such a treaty might be ready for signing, these negotiators invariably answered, "Two more years/'
NEWS ANALYSIS Last year, however, optimism reached such a peak that diplomats began to believe a treaty was really possible early this year. But reality in the form of prickly political issues has intruded, dashing that optimism. Negotiators are now more cautious. Though some warn that a treaty must be completed by 1989 at the latest, others are again saying that at least two more years are needed to complete a document. What was the source of last year's optimism? What
issues have surfaced to slow negotiations in the Genevabased Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament? The short answers are simple, if incomplete. Last year, the Soviets agreed to a longstanding U.S. stipulation: The verification regime must include on-site mandatory challenge inspections at any suspicious facility and on short notice. Soviet agreement closed the gap on the residual technical issues between the U.S.andtheU.S.S.R. If negotiations were purely bilateral, a document could be completed on short notice, dependent only on working out nettlesome details. But the discussions are multilateral, and other nations have not agreed with U.S.-U.S.S.R. positions. For example, Brazil, China, and India are opposed to challenge inspections; they are concerned about intrusiveness. Sweden also has misgivings; it fears frivolous challenges. With most military problems, especially verification, resolved in their broad outlines, the East-West issues have been taken care of. What remain are the socalled North-South issues, which are more political and economic in nature. And these are likely to clog the agenda in Geneva for the next couple of years. by Brant parker and Johnny hart
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News Focus But it isn't merely the substance of the issues that will hamper progress. Some believe the operating style of this year's chairman will slow proceedings. Last year's chairman, Rolf C. Ekeus, head of the Swedish delegation, practiced "an organic approach." By this he means "having a handle on the pulse of negotiations, and bringing an issue forward only when it is ripe for discussion and negotiation." According to British chemical warfare expert Julian Robinson of the University of Sussex, "Ekeus set up a complicated structure of subgroups and pushed them hard. If they made no progress, he took the issues away and worked on them himself, with the help of his delegation." The current chairman, Bogumil Sujka, a member of the Polish delegation, takes a less active role, and is "not as flexible as Ekeus," Robinson says. Of course, the chairman's style is minor in comparison with the substantive issues in the way of completing a chemical weapons (CW) treaty this year. And some of those issues would appear, at first glance, to have little bearing on a chemical treaty. For example, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was agreed upon by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. last December. Debates on its ratification are high on the Senate's agenda. Most commentators believe that another treaty this year will overburden the arms control agenda and muddle the ratification process. In this respect, "The INF agreement has been detrimental to CW arms control," comments Robinson. Further, the Reagan Administration, with the concurrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has ordered its treaty-making priorities after INF. First, it wants to concentrate on a treaty reducing strategic nuclear weapons 50%, the so-called START treaty. If any treaty other than INF makes it to the Senate, it probably will be START. After START, the U.S. and its allies plan to focus on an accord banning chemical weapons and one rectifying the East-West asymmetry in conventional forces. However, there isn't total agreement on priorities within NATO. Roiling beneath the surface is the West German call for a convention limiting very-short-range (tactical or field) nuclear weapons. Additionally, 1988 is an election year in the U.S., and U.S. negotiators at the conference are expected to be kept on a tight rein. With little maneuverability U.S. negotiators, who have been very active in the past, will not likely be able to sow fertile ground for key breakthroughs.
Surprises possible In the history of chemical arms talks, the Soviets have generally been reactors, offering few new concepts that moved the talks forward. Major breakthroughs have come about when they acceded to U.S. formulas. Most of the negotiators C&EN spoke to believe that the Soviets have made all the major concessions they can. So few expect any spectacular announcements from this quarter. But surprises have occurred and may occur again. One negotiator, who asks for anonymity, says the Soviets could pinpoint the locations of their stock8
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piles, as the U.S. has already done. Or, they could offer to cut their stockpile 50% if the U.S. halts binary CW production, which it has just begun. Or, this negotiator says, the Soviets could declare a unilateral 50% cut in their stocks with no security loss, because they have a lot of useless weaponry in their stockpile. Certainly the Soviets popped their greatest surprise last August when they accepted in principle the very strict verification measures of the 1984 U.S. draft treaty. Pentagon planners had expected the Soviets to balk at such intrusiveness. And for three years they were correct: Negotiations moved glacially. Then, last year, the Soviet Union accepted the U.S.'s verification formula: mandatory on-site inspections within 24 hours of a challenge by a party to the treaty. The unexpected had become reality. And reality sent U.S. defense and intelligence officials scrambling to rethink their positions. Could the U.S. live with such intrusive inspections of its own facilities? Was a chemical arms agreement verifiable at all? Would an agreement with the Soviet Union—short of total elimination of chemical weapons—better enhance U.S. national security than a global ban? Rumors of this rethinking have reached Geneva. Some delegations at the conference have begun to question the U.S.'s sincerity in negotiating a global CW ban. U.S. resumption of CW production after a hiatus of 18 years has not helped matters either. Rightly or not, this uncertainty is poisoning the atmosphere of the talks, ; not fatally but enough to slow them down. And time is of the essence, declares Ekeus. Easy and cheap to make and easy to conceal, chemical weapons are becoming many Third World countries' means of mass destruction. Unbridled, proliferation may get out of hand, making a global chemical arms treaty impossible, Ekeus argues. "If the basic outline of a satisfactory text is not completed by January 1989, the risks will be high," Ekeus believes. By then, those countries in the Middle East with chemical weapons won't sign a treaty, and if these countries don't sign, then Ekeus believes the U.S. won't either. A U.S. source who asks not to be named discounts Ekeus' assessment. "The idea that it is all over by 1989 is a red herring," he says. Proliferation is a troubling problem, though it may not be accelerating at the rate some nations, especially the U.S., claim. According to Robinson, who follows the issue closely, U.S. officials and documents claim anywhere from 13 to 22 nations have or are reported to have or to be seeking chemical weapons. Yet, when government officials speak for attribution they name no more than six countries (U.S., U.S.S.R., France, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea) as having significant CW holdings, he adds. No matter the number, such proliferation makes it clear that a CW treaty has to be global—not bilateral, not regional, and not bloc to bloc (NATO to Warsaw Pact). The U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed in principle that all CW-capable countries have to be party to a treaty. But a thorny question arises: What do you do about a renegade state? (The prime example is Iraq, which has signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol bar-
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ring the use but not production of CWs, yet has used these weapons against Iran with no repercussions.) The negotiators have yet to face this problem head-on.
A question of security Related to the renegade question is the North-South issue of security assistance. Pakistan has proposed that parties to the treaty be required to come to the aid of Third World countries attacked or threatened by chem ical weapons. Such aid would include, among other things, protective equipment. According to Ekeus, Western countries and the U.S.S.R. will agree with this proposal only in general principle. "Assistance in time of attack is tricky," Ekeus says. "It relates to the United Nations charter, and we have to be careful not to infringe on the charter," he adds. The French have also raised a security issue with which other delegations are now wrestling. France proposes that countries with small chemical stockpiles be allowed to keep their stocks until the end of the 10-year period set by the treaty for destroying such weapons. The proposal would even allow such coun tries to add to their stockpiles while the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are destroying theirs. The French reason that if uniform reduction schedules are imposed on all countries possessing chemical weapons, those with smaller stocks—like France—could lose their stocks more quickly and be placed at a security risk. Ekeus believes the motivation behind the French
proposal is two-pronged. One is a legitimate security concern, a concern linked to the INF treaty and France's role in NATO. (France still believes in the utility of chemical weapons, at least as a deterrent, and along with the U.S. has begun to produce binary chemical weapons.) The second is ideological: France wants to demonstrate that it's an independent entity. Whatever the basis for it, a close observer of confer ence activities says, "There is a partial effort to come to terms with the French proposal." A formula has evolved in the conference that calls for asymmetrical cuts by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and France. Under this Soviet proposal, France would not have to destroy its stock during the first half or two thirds of the 10-year destruction period called for by the treaty. The conference observer, however, doesn't expect the French to be satisfied with this. He expects the U.S. will try to bypass the French proposal "and see if they try to block things." A military expert who has been a consultant to the Egyptian delegation calls the French proposal madness. He argues that the French are talking about proliferation while everyone else is talking about nonproliferation. The West Germans also have a security concern. If central Europe is again the battlefield for the next war, West Germany will bear the brunt. Chemical weapons are most odious because they affect only the unprotected. Under a central European scenario, that would mean mainly German civilians. March 28, 1988 C&EN
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News Focus Sensitivity to chemical arms is also heightened in West Germany because that country stores U.S. unitary chemical weapons. By the end of 1991 or the beginning of 1992, these weapons are to be removed from the Rhineland Palatinate, according to an agreement reached between President Ronald Reagan and Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the 1986 Tokyo economic summit. This agreement has affected and, for the near term, will continue to affect both domestic U.S. and West German politics.
West Germany applies pressure West Germany holds national elections in 1990. Chemical weapons likely will play a pivotal role in those elections. Given this, it is not surprising, then, that West Germany, in the voice of its Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, is pushing hard for a CW treaty. According to Robinson, the West Germans initially were told that there could be no movement on a CW treaty until the issue of challenge inspections was resolved in the INF treaty. Now that that issue has been resolved, the West Germans are being told that "there's too much traffic in the arms control system to make progress on chemical weapons," Robinson explains. But the West Germans saw that an INF treaty was possible once a political deadline was set. So now there is talk of their setting an 18-month deadline after spring 1989 for a chemical arms accord. Such a deadline would put extreme pressure on the U.S. because it would fall close to the 1992 date for removal of U.S. weapons from German soil. Removal of U.S. stocks from West Germany is a politically volatile issue in the U.S. The U.S. Congress is moving in one direction, President Reagan and West Germany are moving in the opposite one. President Reagan cut the deal with Chancellor Kohl to get West Germany's approval in NATO for resumption of CW production in the U.S. That deal has never sat well with the U.S. Congress. And last year Congress stipulated in the Pentagon's fiscal 1988 authorization that chemical weapons stored in West Germany should not be removed unless they were replaced with binary arms that would be stockpiled in at least one NATO country. This condition cannot be met because no NATO country is likely to accept U.S. chemical weapons in peacetime. The so-called Tokyo agreement is somewhat of a mystery. Gordon M. Burck, staff associate for chemical and biological warfare for the Federation of American Scientists and an avid collector of all things related to the chemical treaty, says he has never seen the Tokyo document. Nor have staff members on several relevant Congressional committees. West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, speaking in the Bundestag just after the Tokyo summit, reaffirmed that U.S. chemical weapons would be removed from West Germany and would not be replaced. Speaking very recently, the head of the U.S. delegation at the conference, Max L. Friedersdorf, claimed there is no Tokyo agreement. "My assumption all along has been that the U.S. is going to find a way 10
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to modernize its stockpile and still keep stocks on German soil," a staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee adds matter-of-factly. Agreement or not, Genscher continues to apply pressure. At every opportunity, he suggests that if the political will is there an accord is possible, even this year. That a treaty will not be written this year is the fault of the U.S. and France, Genscher insists. "The U.S. has just begun to produce a new type of chemical weapon. France suddenly insists on being allowed to retain a 'strategic reserve' of poison gas. . . . Time is pressing," he says. For its own reasons, the Soviet Union agrees with Genscher. Yuriy Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation at the conference, has repeatedly predicted a treaty could be ready at the end of May. He has recently adjusted that optimistic forecast, but he still insists that a treaty is possible by the end of the year. Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir F. Petrovskiy blames the U.S. and France for the delay. "The recent beginning of the production of binary chemical weapons in the U.S. and of the French plans of chemical armament . . . are dangerous tendencies." Other NATO countries, however, see the Soviet statements as dangerous tendencies. "There have been comments in Britain that the Russians are attempting to drive a wedge through NATO by co-opting Germany on chemical weapons," Robinson explains. The Soviets frequently claim that U.S. binary production is sabotaging the Geneva talks. This assessment may be overdrawn but it is not entirely incorrect. As Robinson explains, "India and Brazil are reluctant to move on an agreement because of U.S. binary production. Why should they compromise if the compromise is wasted and they still get menaced by chemical weapons?" In addition to binary production, Genscher has also criticized the U.S. for its skepticism over the feasibility of verifying a CW treaty. According to Klaus-Peter Gottwald, first secretary in the political section of West Germany's U.S. embassy, "Genscher's criticisms are lodged against circles close to the Reagan Administration, not against the official U.S. position." Officially the U.S. is negotiating a global ban on chemical weapons. But within certain Administration circles questions are continually being raised about the verifiability of a comprehensive CW ban. These doubts became public with the January 1988 release of the report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, commissioned by the Defense Secretary and the Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs and cochaired by Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter. In it the committee writes: "For the foreseeable future, it will not be realistic to pursue agreements to eliminate . . . all chemical weapons. . . . A ban on chemical weapons could not be verified."
Rumors fly This report fueled the rumor mill at the conference, a mill already working full tilt after the publication of a Rowland Evans-Robert Novak column. Just before Mikhail Gorbachev came to Washington, D.C., for the summit last year, Evans and Novak wrote that the Soviet
Robinson (left): Schedule 4 not needed. Friedersdorf (cen ter): no Tokyo agreement Genscher: time is pressing leader was cooking up a surprise: an East-West agreement instead of a global accord on chemical warfare. The rumor gained credence when the head of the Soviet delegation at the conference, Nazarkin, left suddenly and was found to be headed for Washington. The rumor heated up further when another Soviet delegate asked a British negotiator how Britain might respond to a Soviet proposal for a CW ban between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The so-called Gorbachev surprise, which never materialized, also supported a rumor that "the U.S. does not want a disarmament agreement but a level-ofstocks agreement with the Soviets," explains Robinson. Sweden's Ekeus confirms this, saying that "the binary decision and the security-stock arrangement with the U.S.S.R. are felt to be the real expressions of the U.S. position, at least the expressions of people within the government who don't want a convention [treaty]." Jack J. Ooms, a member of the Netherlands delegation, explains why the U.S. may be considering a level-of-stocks arrangement. "Some in the U.S. want to maintain a small stockpile to retaliate against, for example, use of chemical weapons against U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf." He believes "the Soviet Union would go along with the U.S." He also says this concept is strongly denied by the U.S. delegation in Geneva. A slight variation of this concept has also been raised within Pentagon circles, picked up by Geneva diplomats, and strongly denied by U.S. officials. According to this scenario, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would declare their stocks and then reduce them 50% as a confidence-building measure to entice other countries to join a global ban. Brad H. Roberts, a fellow at the Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic & International Studies, suggests the U.S. and Soviet Union could agree to a "staged build-down" of their vast stocks. They could tie "the final stage of disarmament to steps taken in the developing world," Roberts says. The final step would then be
taken only when both countries were "satisfied that disarmament would be global and stabilizing," he adds. Robinson says if this approach is taken, a total ban is unlikely because "one step is, almost certainly, all that any government is going to take on chemical weapons. The incentive to get more is diminished once you get something."
Rumors denied A U.S. negotiator at a January meeting of the Pugwash study group on chemical warfare declared emphatically that "there was no official support at any level for a partial ban," Burck reports. Yet people, formerly in high official positions and still well connected, say otherwise. James Leonard, who was ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament from 1969 to 1971, says he heard about a classified Pentagon paper around January that argued that a CW "treaty was not perfectly verifiable. Therefore, the service chiefs argued that an American commitment to a comprehensive ban was not in America's interest." Jonathan Dean, former ambassador to the Vienna mutual and balanced force reduction talks and present arms control adviser to the Union of Concerned Scientists, says: "There may have been some consideration given to alternatives which drastically diverged from original U.S. concepts. These alternatives appear to have been dropped in favor of a return to the original concept of a global ban and total destruction of chemical weapons." Leonard adds that the alternative formulation was squelched before it reached the Secretary of Defense's office. Someone, he says, must have realized that for the U.S. to renege on its 1984 draft treaty would be too costly politically. Lynn Marvin Hansen, the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency's assistant director for multilateral affairs, says the idea of a partial ban "doesn't reflect DOD's March 28, 1988 C&EN
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News Focus about the number of countries capable of making chemical weapons, and the number the U.S. and the Soviet Union say have to ratify a treaty to make it binding. Leonard flatly says, "We won't get 60. We won't get Iran, Iraq, Syria, or Israel to sign o n . " So the political questions become: How do you entice these nations to become party to a CW ban? Or do you forego a whole ban because a few countries refuse to sign? West Germany thinks not, says Gottwald. Economic as well as security considerations will determine which countries sign on. The economic questions are fairly straightforward. Ekeus (left), Nazarkin: treaty possible Who is going to pay for the by end of this year if the will is there implementation of the treaty? And the flip side of that question is: Will Third World position or it would have been made known outside nations be given economic assistance to develop their DOD, and I am not aware of it." He adds, "The policy own chemical industries? of this Administration is to pursue a comprehensive, verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons. That is Treaty implementation is going to be costly. And as our goal, and it has not changed." Ooms notes, it is important to induce as many of the Denials of the classified document's existence have nonaligned countries as possible to sign a treaty. "We also come from its alleged source, the Defense Departshouldn't make a financial barrier an excuse for these ment. DOD spokesman Randal E. Morger says, "DOD countries not to join the treaty," he says. He ruefully adarms control people absolutely denied any knowledge mits that this issue "is hardly addressed at the moment." of such a paper." Hugh Stringer, who until this month It hasn't been addressed because, as Hansen points was acting deputy assistant of defense for chemical out, negotiators are faced with organizing "functionmatters, denied "knowing anything about it." ally and politically a whole new international agency from the ground up." Delegates have broadly outlined Whether or not it exists is of small consequence the agency that will implement the treaty. But they because the very rumor of its existence was sufficient to tend to get enmeshed in such issues as where power unsettle conference negotiators. Italian Foreign Affairs will be vested. They have yet to decide whether it Minister Guilio Andreotti tried to calm the troops in a will reside in a plenary body or in a smaller council. speech to the conference last month when he called for renewed efforts in the conference for "the global As outlined in the draft treaty, a plenary body called elimination of an entire class of [chemical] armaments." the consultative committee (or the general conference) Ekeus says this "was a crystal clear call to the U.S. not is to be composed of all states who have ratified the to come up with alternatives to a global treaty." treaty. The executive organ of the consultative committee is the smaller executive council whose memberAndreotti believes, "The remaining obstacles are ship has not yet been decided. The executive council mainly connected with the problem of verification." will supervise the activities of the technical secretariat. As these barriers are technical in nature, he has offered Italy as a site for a forum on the issue open to scientists The technical secretariat, or international inspecfrom around the world. torate, will be responsible for assuring that the treaty In addition to verification, Hansen points out other is not breached. It will be the agency that monitors problems—some small, some enormous—remaining to the chemical industry by performing on-site inspecbe resolved before a treaty is ready for signing. He tions. And it is expected to garner the lion's share of correctly notes that there is still no "clear-cut definition the treaty organization's budget, which some have of what a chemical weapon really is." And he says a placed at more than $100 million per year. lot of work remains on challenge inspections. Economic/technical aid There has to be agreement "on arrangements to monitor nonproduction in the chemical industries of Whatever the cost, some countries have said they about 60 countries," Hansen says. In its 1984 draft will sign the treaty but see no reason for contributing treaty, the U.S. stated that 40 countries had to ratify a to its implementation. Venezuela, for example, argues treaty before it could go into effect. The British have that it has no chemical weapons, and that costs should since offered 60 as the appropriate number. This is be borne by those who do.
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Some Third World, nonaligned nations have called for economic or "technical assistance as a quid pro quo for their participation in the treaty," says Elisa D. Harris, visiting research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London. She adds that the U.S. is "clearly resistant to linking economic [even in the form of technical] assistance and disarmament." A U.S. source close to the negotiations confirms Harris' assessment. "This is a security treaty, not a foreign-aid agreement. It is not a price for enhancing the security of the nonaligned countries." Former chairman Ekeus contends that "the major industralized countries are misunderstanding what the nonaligned countries want. They fear that the nonaligned countries will come back with more demands than are actually written in the treaty." Basically these Third World nations want the treaty to "facilitate and promote the full exchange of chemi
cal information and equipment related to the devel opment of chemistry for peaceful purposes," Ekeus explains. The Third World countries are calling for cooperation, are asking that no trade barriers, tariffs, or export controls be imposed by one state party on another state party, Ekeus says. "The more serious and major Third World countries are concerned that the convention [treaty] not be used to hamper development of their chemical industries," Ekeus adds. For example, "Brazil and Argentina are rapidly developing their biotechnology industries and they are worried that inspection regimes may harm this development," explains Ooms. Ekeus readily acknowledges that this economic/ technical assistance section of the draft treaty is not being accepted by major industrialized nations. But it shouldn't derail the talks. "Though economic aid is politically highly charged it's a second-order problem,
Geneva negotiators classify chemicals under the treaty's purview Schedule 1: Warfare agents banned by draft treaty O-Alkyl alkylphosphonofluoridates Sarin: O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate Soman: O-pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate OAlkyl A/,A/-dialkylphosphoramidocyanidates Tabun: O-ethyl A/./V-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate O-Alkyl S-2-dialkylaminoethylalkylphosphonothiolates VX: O-ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethylmethylphosphonothiolate Sulfur mustards Mustard gas (H): bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide Sesquimustard (Q): 1,2-bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane O-Mustard (T): bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether Lewisites Lewisite 1: 2-chlorovinyldichloroarsine Lewisite 2: bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine Lewisite 3: tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine Nitrogen mustards HN1 : bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine HN2:bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine HN3: tris(2-chloroethyl)amine BZ: 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate Alkylphosphonyldifluorides DF: methylphosphonyldifluoride Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl alkylphosphonites QL Six other chemicals or chemical groups to be discussed further
Schedule 2: Key precursor chemicals, production to be monitored Chemicals containing one P-methyl, P-ethyl, or P-propyl (normal or iso) bond Λ/,Λ/Oialkylphosphoramidicdihalides DialkyΙ /V,ΛΖ-dialkyIphosphoramidates Arsenic trichloride
2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyaceticacid Quinuclidin-3-ol A/,A/-Diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride /V,AMDiisopropylaminoethan-2-ol A/,N-Diisopropylaminoethane-2-thiol Seven other chemicals or groups to be discussed further
Schedule 3: Large-volume chemicals to be reported Phosgene Cyanogen chloride Hydrogen cyanide Trichloronitromethane(chloropicrin) Phosphorus oxychloride Phosphorus trichloride Di- and trimethyl/ethyl esters of phosphorous [P(lll)] acid Trimethyl phosphite Triethyl phosphite Dimethyl phosphite Diethyl phosphite Sulfur monochloride Sulfur dichloride
Schedule 4: Tracking of supertoxic, lethal chemicals The schedule declares that commercial production of toxic chemicals not listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3 must be reported to the international inspectorate established under the treaty. For Schedule 4 purposes, toxic chemicals are defined as those having an LD 50 equal to or less than 0.5 mg per kg bodyweight or an LCt50 equal to or less than 2000 mgminute per cubic meter. Facilities producing or processing more than 10, 100, or 1000 kg (quantity to be decided) per year would be routinely inspected by the international inspectorate.
Note: Schedules 1 and 2 are provisional lists. Locations of facilities making Schedule 3 chemicals would be reported to international inspectorate, but facilities would not be monitored
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Chemical industry helps Geneva negotiators draft balanced, effective chemical weapons control Writing a chemical weapons (CW) treaty that is global, comprehensive, and verifiable is maddeningly difficult—more difficult, say the experts, than drafting a nuclear treaty. To be meaningful, a CW treaty has to ensure that chemical manufacturing capacity is not diverted to production of outlawed warfare agents. In effect, this means monitoring a negative—monitoring to make certain that illicit agents are not being produced by the chemical industry worldwide. In noncommunist countries, this means close scrutiny of the civilian industry. Compared with the chemical industry, the nuclear industry is minuscule. Nuclear materials that would be tracked under an agreement are fewer in number and clearly identifiable because they are radioactive, and quantities needed for military purposes are easy to define. None of these characteristics is true for actual or potential chemical warfare agents. An effective verification scheme for a chemical arms treaty has to include on-site inspections. Such inspections open the chemical industry to loss of technical and commercial information. The latter, which could include customer lists, is generally deemed more sensitive by industry officials. The trick, then, is to devise an inspection regime that is thorough yet not so intrusive that sensitive information is divulged. Protecting confidential business data is one of six areas in which industry representatives from the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan feel they can offer hands-on technical expertise to Geneva negotiators who are now attempting to draft an effective, verifiable ban on chemical arms. Other areas in which the industry believes it can make meaningful contributions to the treaty-drafting process
established. Last year, industry representatives met in Geneva with the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament. They may meet again with Geneva diplomats at another "chemical experts meeting," perhaps this summer. Then, they could offer their approaches to issues the negotiators have been wrestling with for years. Kyle B. Olson, CMA's associate director for health, safety, and chemical regulations, says industry experts "are still dubious about the absolute verifiability of any treaty, but they think it is possible to develop a system with a high degree of confidence. They'll be doing everything they can to make a treaty as verifiable as possible." Among the things CMA is doing is Olson: dubious about total veriflability drafting a paper on state-of-the-art monitoring devices and how they might be used in a verification scheme. "The include inspection protocols; methods design of a monitoring system is the for reporting data on commercial chemmost difficult task ahead of us," proicals of interest, including the role of claims Will D. Carpenter, vice president distributors, such as shippers and traders; of Monsanto Agricultural and chairman technical requirements for the inspecof CMA's Chemical Weapons Disarmatorate to be set up under the treaty; the ment Work Group. scope of chemicals to be covered under Another part of a verification scheme a treaty; and on-site monitoring devices is inspections. There is growing indusand techniques. Representatives from the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Asso- try consensus for a new concept, that of ad hoc inspections. ciation (CMA), the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers' Federations The draft treaty now calls for routine (CEFIC), the Chemical Industry Associainspections of certain facilities, and tion (U.K.), and the Japan Chemical mandatory challenge inspections of any Industry Association are now drafting suspicious facility. Ad hoc inspections papers outlining approaches to solving fall halfway between these two. Under the sticky issues lurking in these areas. the ad hoc concept, international inspectors could randomly elect to inspect Industry experts met early this year in Zurich, Switzerland, to air these facilities not monitored routinely to verify issues. They plan to meet again in late that no illicit activity was occurring. spring to discuss their draft papers and As Carpenter explains, "Ad hoc to try to form a global chemical industry inspections give the international inspecconsensus. torate a lot more flexibility." They also inject an added element of uncertainty A forum for making industry's views known to negotiators has already been to the inspection regime.
quite a different order of magnitude than on-site verification," Robinson avers. Inspectors from the technical secretariat have to be on-site almost immediately after a treaty becomes binding. For example, within 30 days after the treaty becomes effective, nations party to the agreement have to declare the location (or absence) of production and stockpiling facilities, and the quantities (or absence) of chemical weapons. All this has to be verified. 14
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Then, inspectors have to be on-site to monitor the destruction of weapons and the elimination of CW production facilities. Geneva negotiators are now wrestling with the order of destruction of chemicals and facilities. Such activities would begin within one year after the treaty becomes effective and would continue for 10 years. Concurrently, inspectors have to begin to monitor civilian chemical plants to assure that no illicit pro-
and disarmament treaty If there is growing consensus for ad hoc inspections, there is absolute agreement among industry representatives about the so-called Schedule 4. This schedule requires industry to report facilities capable of making supertoxic, lethal chemicals not listed on other schedules to the international inspectorate. The chemical industry is unanimously opposed to Schedule 4. Under this schedule, chemicals would be proscribed because of their toxicity, regardless of their effectiveness as weapons. According to Leo Zeftel, manager of materials resources for Du Pont's chemicals and pigments department and a member of CMA's work group, all pesticide-making facilities and even plants that produce common chemicals would fall under the definition of a Schedule 4 facility. The design of modern chemical plants often makes them capable of producing or containing supertoxic, lethal chemicals. "There could be well over 100 such plants in the U.S. alone," Zeftel estimates. "Any chemical that qualifies for Schedule 4 could be put onto Schedules 1 or 2," Zeftel says. Such an action would eliminate about two dozen chemicals and one whole schedule from the treaty's purview. Opposition to Schedule 4 was expressed most vehemently by CEFIC director general H. H. Lever. Last December he wrote to then-chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Rolf C. Ekeus: "This Schedule 4 is open-ended in that no specific chemicals or groups of chemicals are listed. . . . This is clearly not only unacceptable but also unworkable." To put it mildly, the CEFIC letter "was not well received in Geneva," says Monsanto's Carpenter. As CMA's Olson explains, "The points are justifiable but
disconnect between the German political line, with Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher saying a treaty can be finished by the end of the year, and thé German negotiators in Geneva saying we have to work on it." According to A. K. J. Martin Burgdorf of the Frankfort-based Verband der Chemischen Industrie, the West German chemical industry fully supports the ongoing efforts in Geneva. He adds that his country's industry is "basically open to control measures" so long as they don't impair technical progress or competitiveness. Those sentiments mesh with the U.S. chemical industry's concerns. And Monsanto's Carpenter adds, "Inspection protocols, protection of intellectual property, and the composition and duties of the inspectorate have to be resolved Carpenter: ad hoc inspections fill gap before there's a treaty." Says Carpenter, "There's an opporthe language is too blunt." It was an unfortunate letter, adds a Geneva nego- tunity for industry to make a significant tiator, because "it managed to offend input to all three areas." Another industry representative who asks not to be named everybody without having any influence." CEFIC is a supranational CMA. But it says the best way to do this is to "have is unclear whether the letter represents some industry people actually sitting in all member countries of CEFIC or just on the negotiations." As he explains, one, West Germany. Chemical warfare people who have worked in a chemical expert Julian Robinson of the University plant have knowledge that negotiators of Sussex says it is his understanding may lack. that "The British Chemical Industry AsIndustry's reasons for being involved sociation, which is a member of CEFIC, in the treaty-drafting process are not disagrees with the CEFIC letter." Nego- purely altruistic. It wants a balanced tiators in Geneva say that three out of treaty, one that can be effectively five of the letter's drafters were Ger- implemented and yet does the least harm mans, and that the letter was not to the industry. But the industry also approved by CEFIC's board. believes that drafting a chemical arms The German chemical industry's po- treaty is the correct thing to do. sition vis à vis a treaty is a bit murky. In the end, a signed and ratified Some Geneva negotiators say that the treaty would likely enhance the indusWest German delegation is not moving try's image. As CMA's Olson explains, as quickly as it could, and that this "At least it would put to bed the notion reflects industry's skepticism. (The Jap- that lurks out there that the chemical anese delegation is similarly assessed.) industry harbors a merchant-of-death As one negotiator explains, "There's a mentality."
duction is occurring. This activity will continue for the life of the treaty. As this sketchy outline indicates, the draft treaty calls for a "front loaded inspection regime/' says Burck. The inspectorate has to be organized and inspectors trained quickly. (This would be accomplished by a preparatory commission set up by the treaty. The commission would function between the time the treaty is signed and the time it becomes effective.) Geneva
diplomats have yet to organize the inspectorate or develop detailed inspection protocols. According to Friedersdorf, head of the U.S. delegation, one of the most complicated problems remaining is the development of an effective monitoring regime for the chemical industry. As Dutch delegate Ooms points out, "We must be certain to recognize the legitimate concerns of industry on confidentiality of technical and commercial intellectual property." March 28, 1988 C&EN 15
News Focus Protecting confidential business information is of paramount importance to the chemical industry. Will D. Carpenter, vice president of Monsanto Agricultural and chairman of the Chemical Manufacturers Association's Chemical Weapons Disarmament Work Group, says industry can contribute to the design of a monitoring system that is both effective and relatively benign to industry. "Most of the delegates now accept that industry is a vital, if not absolutely essential, resource in going through this next step/' he says. The inspection regime has to be thorough to verify that no illicit agents are being produced. Geneva negotiators are talking about a materials accountancy or mass balance scheme to track chemicals that have the potential to be made into CW agents. But the draft treaty only requires manufacturers to report data on pertinent chemicals. Industry representatives from all the major Western industrialized countries and from Japan believe that such a limited reporting requirement makes a mass balance scheme impossible. They would like to see the reporting requirement expanded to include traders, distributors, and brokers. Industry insists that broader reporting would create a sounder paper trail. It also would aid in monitoring exports, says Leo Zeftel, manager of material resources for Du Pont's chemicals and pigments department. If the final treaty calls for wider reporting, "It is possible that the most important personnel in the international inspectorate could be accountants and auditors, not chemical engineers/' says CMA's Kyle B. Olson, associate director for health, safety and chemical regulations.
Lists of chemicals Those chemicals or facilities that are to be monitored under a treaty are spelled out in four lists, or schedules. Schedule 1 chemicals are actual warfare agents, and their production is banned. Schedule 2 chemicals are those that have some legitimate peaceful uses but are also key precursor chemicals to warfare agents. Facilities producing these chemicals would, under the draft treaty, be inspected routinely. Schedule 3 chemicals are large-volume commercial chemicals, several steps removed from warfare agents. Facilities making these chemicals are subject only to reporting requirements. Unlike the first three lists, Schedule 4 goes after facilities capable of producing supertoxic, lethal chemicals that are not warfare agents. Such facilities would be subject to the same requirements as Schedule 2 chemicals, including routine inspections. Schedule 4 is designed, say Ekeus, "to guarantee that no clandestine production of chemical warfare agents occurs." According to Robinson, the U.S. supports Schedule 4 as a way of getting a handle on production capability. The Soviets, he says, want it to assure that no new agents are being produced. Ekeus believes the conference is in a "good situation with regard to Schedule 1 chemicals." The only remaining question is if one or two additional chemicals should be added to the list. He says there is "a slight dispute over what should be on Schedule 2." 16
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Schedule 2 lists classes of chemicals as well as specific chemicals, and industry is not so happy with this. In its letter to the conference last year, the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers' Federations (CEFIC) called for the elimination of broad classes of chemicals and only the listing of specific chemicals. Du Pont's Zeftel says CMA believes that the schedule "should list specific chemicals. If a new chemical is discovered that belongs to a class now on this schedule, it should be added as a specific item." A negotiator who asks not to be named says, "Some things on Schedule 2 can be narrowed. But there will still be groups." Any problems associated with Schedule 3 appear to be easily resolved, says Ooms. Industry has few problems with this schedule because there is agreement that production is to be reported "in ranges, not actual amounts," Zeftel says. Schedule 4, however, is another matter. "It is a major problem which we have to solve," Ekeus admits. The chemical industry worldwide is opposed to Schedule 4. Chemicals made in these facilities would be proscribed because of their toxicity, not because they are effective chemical warfare agents. CMA is telling U.S. negotiators that any chemical that qualifies for Schedule 4 could be placed on Schedules 1 or 2. Industry associations from other countries are similarly informing their delegations, Zeftel believes. "If you have a good, swift system for updating Schedules 1, 2, and 3, Schedule 4 is unnecessary," declares Robinson. The chief problem with this schedule is that "with all the containment provisions for environmental and safety reasons, your average chemical plant gets to look more and more like a nerve gas plant," he says. A Geneva negotiator who asks not to be identified adds: "The chance of detecting and verifying clandestine stocks and production facilities is low at best." Ever the optimist, Ekeus doesn't see Schedule 4 as unresolvable. "Industry worldwide will have little concern when it sees how infrequent controls and inspections will be," he says. Another negotiator is less sanguine: "I don't know what we'll do about this." In fact, Ekeus feels the "present rolling text [draft] will liberate industry" from suspicions brought on by environmental and CW concerns. Monitoring will be the cost industry pays for this liberation.
Monitoring industry At present the draft treaty calls for routine monitoring of chemical plants producing Schedule 2 chemicals. Additionally, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed in principle to on-site, mandatory challenge inspections. Under this concept, a state party to the treaty can demand an inspection at any suspicious facility of another state party, at any time, on short notice. Some nonaligned countries are opposed to this type of inspection. At the suggestion of its chemical industry, the West German delegation has proposed a third type of inspections—ad hoc inspections. Industry considers
Nuclear safeguards system used as model for chemical inspectorate For a treaty outlawing development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons, an inspection system is a must. How to design it is tricky. No one knows how large an inspectorate is needed. As British chemical warfare expert Julian Robinson explains, "We don't know the number of chemical weapons o r . . . the number of possessor states, so we don't know how many facilities have to be inspected." The number of facilities to be inspected affects the number of inspectors needed. "One of the interesting things about the whole process is that all the pieces are interrelated. The number of inspections depends on the number of inspectors, but the number of inspectors depends on the number of plants targeted in the first place," says Kyle B. Olson, the Chemical Manufacturers Association's associate director for health, safety and chemical regulations. In the absence of data, the diplomats at the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament are relying on a nuclear model—the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards division—for designing their chemical inspectorate. (IAEA was set up under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to
detect the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons use.) According to Robinson, the IAEA safeguards division routinely inspects about 400 facilities a year and another 500 sporadically. It employs 200 to 300 civil servants and has an annual budget of about $30 million to $40 million. A chemical inspectorate about the size of the IAEA safeguards system appears to be the Geneva diplomats' goal. In fact, they are setting the IAEA model as the upper limit for the chemical inspectorate. Anything larger "is politically unacceptable," Robinson says. But, by accepting the IAEA system as the upper limit of a chemical weapons verification system, the diplomats are defining that system "in terms unrelated to the function . . . [it] is meant to perform," Robinson adds. Indeed, the IAEA model, when applied to chemical weapons verification, may prove too costly. Nuclear facilities are fewer in number than chemical plants. And unlike most chemicals, their products—radioactive materials—are readily identifiable. Also, militarily significant quantities are readily definable. This is not true for chemical warfare agents. If the IAEA safeguards system remains the model for the chemical inspectorate,
ad hoc inspections to be mini challenge inspections. Instead of a nation bringing a challenge against another nation party to the treaty, the inspectorate could elect to m o n i t o r a facility not r o u t i n e l y monitored. Ad hoc inspections would not be so thorough or so invasive as routine or challenge inspections, but they would confirm that no illicit activity was occurring at a facility. Ad hoc inspection was proposed as a way "to get out from under certain aspects of routine inspections/ 7 explains Robinson. He says the U.S. and Japanese chemical industries are generally nervous about routine inspections because a lot of data and trade secrets can be revealed. Because no nation has officially declared its production plants, it is unclear how many facilities will have to be monitored. U.S. industry sources estimate no more than 150 facilities worldwide and only about a dozen in the U.S. will have to be monitored. A Geneva negotiator puts the global figure at 60, with about 10 in the U.S. This same negotiator divides the work of the inspectorate three ways. He says 30 to 40% of its efforts will be devoted to verifying the destruction of existing stocks. He believes 50% of the inspectorate's
then that inspectorate might be kept artificially small. The number of facilities to be inspected will have to be kept to a manageable number. And, of course, the number of facilities inspected is dependent on the number of chemicals monitored. Therefore, the list of chemicals might be kept artificially short. Keeping the chemical inspectorate small may be wise. But it could also open up gaps and loopholes a desperate nation might seek to exploit. The IAEA system is not simple. It tries to cover all evasion possibilities. If it mimics the IAEA regime, the chemical inspectorate will be quite elaborate. "Elaborate systems, by their very complexity, may generate a sense of security that is actually false," Robinson argues. He suggests that a better model might be a simpler system of technical exchange visits. Such visits have occurred or will occur in several countries. A U.S. Defense Department official, who asks for anonymity, makes no comment on these exchange visits. He does say, however, that he is "not sure there is an existing model that will be helpful in setting up an international organization, including the technical inspectorate," needed to verify a chemical weapons treaty.
time will be tied up with routine inspections of CW production facilities, storage sites, and commercial chemical plants. And he says 10% of its effort will be devoted to challenge inspections. Challenge inspections will be politically costly and are not likely to be demanded too often.
Two more years The demands on the conference will be great this year, what with all the thorny issues remaining to be resolved. Robinson says, "Full elaboration of the CW treaty as currently conceived seems certain to take the [conference] at least another two or three years, even supposing the [conference] to be capable (in organizational and procedural terms) of the task at all." Ekeus believes the effort, no matter how strenuous or time-consuming, to be worthwhile. First, he says, "A treaty will prevent CW proliferation. Second, it will liberate industry from the concerns related to weapons and it will expand international cooperation through free-trade arrangements." In short, Ekeus sees a CW treaty promoting security and international economic development. Laudable goals, even if it does take "two more years." D March 28, 1988 C&EN
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