The Psychology of Safety Enforcement in Teaching Laboratories Miles Pickering Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 While a great deal has been written about safety rules for teaching laboratories, very little has focussed on the psvchologyof enforcement. TOO often, rules exist on paperbut are never uniformly enforced. Getting compliance with rules without alienating or scarine students is not easv in an era when authority figures of all'kinds are questionedautomaticallv. o u r problems a t Princeton are further increased by our philosphy of trying to avoid having TA's take authoritarian roles ( 1 , 2 ) .While this has many educational advantages, it could, a t least in principle, lead to major safety enforcement problems. It is this that led to our explicit consideration of the enforcement problem. Fortunately, the problems of lab safety enforcement are strikingly parallel to those of the airlines. This essay will argue that much of the enforcement psychology already worked out by the airlines can be applied easily to student labs. The Alrline Model The airline industry has almost exactly the same problems we chemistrv teachers do. Thev must enforce rules and at the same time not scare off potential passengers. Thanks to some clever thinking about enforcement ~svcholom, . . . . these two goals are not ns contmdictorv ns they might opprar. It is useful to review some history. In the beginning flight attendants were nurses, dressed in nursing inifor&. The implicit authority of their position was manifest, and so rule enforcement was easy. Unfortunately, potential passengers tended to take the view that if you had to have a nurse on board, flying could not be a very pleasant experience. Maybe it might be better to take the train! T o counter this, glamour came into the air. Stewardesses became "hostesses" dressed in costumes that would make a Dallas Cowboy cheerleader blush. But glamour and authority to enforce rules are mutually exclusive. The "hostess" is in a weak position because she is young, female, and, as a barmaid in the sky, of lower status than the passengers. The rule enforcement is then handled by having all rules stem from some other source of authority. The flight attendant is then a relayer of order: "The captain has turned on the no-smoking sign", or "FAA rules require that seat trays and seat backs be in the upright position for landing."
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The authority ntwnrd the aircraft rests in the "captain", a person of high authority bv lung tradition. He is not called "oilot" htcauie on n shiu.. the cn~)tninoutrnnks the uilm B\. invoking subtle naval connotations, the airline also provides subliminal reassurance to the anxious. Somehow it would be vaguely unsettling if the intercom crackled, "This is your jet jockey speaking." The women's liberation movement has mercifully put an end to the worst excesses of the glamour nhase, and the airlines are returning to a more sober, high-authority approach. This is a generation that is much more comfortable kith women in high-authority roles, and the presence of male flight attendants also enhances the position of the cabin crew in the eyes of those who are still unable to accept women in positions of responsibility.
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Running through this discussion is the idea that while obedience to rules will turn off some passengers, it is reassuring to others who see safety emanating from the high-authority position of the captain (who is, after all, at risk also). All of this probably has far deeper psychoanalytic roots, which, as a chemical educator, I am not qualified to speak about. Rules on airlines are kept few and simple, and, where possible, hazards are designed out of the planes and systems. It is easy to obey, so most people will do so. For remote hazards, hut where prompt passenger action would be essential for survival, the remoteness is mentioned, "In the unlikely event of a loss of cabin pressure.. . ". This informs without friehtenine. Most o e o ~ l edo not want to know all the potenGal hazards. (I rkmember flying with a bush ~ i l oin t the high arctic whose oreflieht safetv warnines went ;omething likk, "There is a manuaily operated ern&gency . . locator beacon, food, and blankets in such-and-such a compartment. There are three exits from the plane, but, if you go out the forward way, be careful if the props are still turning.") In summary, the airline model comprises three features: (1) subtle manipulation of perceived authority figures, (2) making things foolproof and eliminating hazards, and (3) distinction between immediate and remote hazards. All of these can be transferred, nearly in toto, to the teaching laboratory.
The Parallel in Chemistry Our TA's do not take the authoritarian role. We shoot for a helpful, resource-person, elder-sibling approach. Authority is vested in other people. For each afternoon the lab is in session, there is a head TA or faculty member in charge. These oeoole are dressed in hieh-authoritv uniforms-a white lab coat (with Princeton insignia to distinguish them from the other people in the building with plain white lah coats). This provides reassurance, as well as authoritythese oeoole are clearlv scientists. Bv contrast. the TA's are encouraged to dress informally. The lab hook cites the Federal rule (10 CFR 1910.133) requiring safety glasses. Technically this applies to employees only, hut Princeton rules (and common sense) require that students not be exnosed to hazards to which emoloiees could not be legally exiosed. Our TA's then can state "government regulations require. . .".This is far more successful and treats the students as mature people. Contrast this with the approach in many labs, where the statement is "If you do not wear safety glasses, you will lose x points." This is poor strategy for several reasons. The ohviousimplication is that if I am willing to losex points, I do not need to wear eye protection. Second, i t expects the TA to take on an authoritorian role, something that most TA's are not good at. Third, it invites confrontation. In fact, probably the penalty is invoked rarely or idiosyncraticallyby some TA's and not others because it is seen as too severe. Our back-UDoosition is not that we will oenalize erades but that we are r&ett'ully required to removk studenis from the hazard bv excusine them for the afternoon. This haoucns only rarely, and is notbone by TA's but by supervisors:~uch cases occur only every other year or even more rarely. This very rarity argues that they arise from psychopathology of some sort. We also use something called the "forest ranger system." This refers to the story of a forest ranger who found that if he went up to somebody with an illegal fire and told them to put it out, i t would be restarted the moment his back was turned. If, however, he went up to them in plain clothes and told them, "You'd better put out the fire, Isaw the ranger coming this wav". then the fire staved out. Our lab manual encourages st"dents to remind earh other about safety glasses with a statement in the "lah etiguette" section savina. -. "If -vou see a person without safety glasses, remind h:lm or her. The person would much rather hear about it from you than from the teaching staff?" This has definitely reduced our compliance problems (3). Needless to sav. we also follow the airline examnle hv chosing comfortable eye protection (the Jones ~ i s o r g dan2 ~) hv heloine adiust them as needed. We insist (as is . - oeoole . ciearly required by law) that TA's also wear eye Make it easv to comnlv. . . and half the battle is won. I t should heremembered that thegreat majority of law?iuitsarise from eve and so, if this single . inlurics, . - hazard can be eliminated. you are at much less risk. The second feature of the airline model is the elimination of hazards. The microscale labs are the most obvious application of this approach, but, even a t small scale, one has to plan carefully for dispensing of reagents. I t does no good whatever to run a reaction with 200 mg of KCN if the student has to get it out of a 100-g bottle! There are often easy ways around this. For example, we prepare CuzHg14 and AgzHgI4 starting from mercuric nitrate. But the mercuric
nitrate is dispensed as 1mL of solution containing 30 mg of Hg', and thereactim is carried out in the trsr tuhe in a G c h the mercury wus originally dispenstd thus eliminating transfers and potential spills (3). One can eliminate thousands of speared hands by lending out thermometers with corks alreadv on them. bv reolacine glass wash bottles with plastic ones, by getting peopleto looi for and replace chipped glassware on check-in day. One can eliminate innumerable burns by giving people a time limit before which thev are not to disassemble aooaratus, touch a .. hot . -..nhiect. .. " ~ etc. ~ ..... , One can pick materials to he safe, and eliminate trickv steps. Can ;,ou give students H S 0 4 that has already been diluted?Can it be repldced with a lessdangerousacid" 1s the exoeriment as a whole renlaceahle with somethine safer that wiil still teach the same Ling? Do we really need aperchloric acid digestion? (I am a chemist, and I have never had to do one!) One of the tests of teacher liability is whether the experiment teaches enoueh to he worth the risk. The teacher shbuld be able to defendhis or riskbenefit decision. I am sure that some educators will argue that students need to learn how to cope with hazards. ~ h iseems i to me to he based on the false assumption that all or even most of our students will become chemists. Even then, most physical chemists would seek advice before handling some of the more difficult organic chemicals, and all of us consciously avoid hazards where we can. We professionals are knowledeeahle enoueh to know our limits. T o the deeree that the lag is illustrat&e of the mode of scientific discovery rather than illustrative of oure chemical fact. it becomes easier to design around hazards and far more i n tune with today's chemistry course (4). The last part of the airline example is reassuring the anxious. Our teaching ahout safety tends to ignore the communplace and over emphasizes the unlikely. -We treat problems like burning clothes or major fire or explosion as though they were things that happened every day. Certainly these are unlikely events in the average student's career, and good design can make them even less likely. While we have a clear legal duty to inform ( 5 , 6 ) ,we do not have an obligation to scare. Wealso should help students learn tocope. If we aregoing to suggest that concentrated HCI should not come into contact with their skin, should we not also issue disposable gloves, or, a t the very least, add that it can easily be washed off, and dispense it in some relatively spillproof and breakproof container. In almost all cases, there is something one can do that is damage limiting, and this should be suggested. Practical action is far more reassuring than vague implicit threats, it may be required to limit liability, and it is teaching good lab practice. I am sure that folkways differ greatly from school to school, hut, if this essay stimulates faculty to think about how the airline parallel might be applied to their lab teaching, it will result in afar safer and more comfortable flight for all the voyagers through chemistry labs.
I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Piekering, M. J . Chem.Edue. 1978.55.511. Piekering, M. Chron. Higher Edue. 1983.26 (June 29),56. picker in^, M. ThaRadiseoliery Book: A Cenrml Chemistry Lob Monuol: Ginn. 1986. Pickering, M. J Chem. Educ 1985.62.874. Sweenev.T.L.J.Chem.Edur. 1977.54.131 Gerlovich, J . A. J . Chrm. Edue. 1983.60.358
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Number 5
May 1988
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